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This thesis examines how large organizations that routinely engage in high-risk 
activities—particularly the U.S. fire service—discover, interact with, and counteract 
deviant behaviors that latently influence safety-centric attitudes within organizational 
frameworks. To a larger extent, the thesis analyzes how sociological interactions in the 
workplace shape decision-making processes in dangerous situations. The research 
question specifically asks whether the U.S. fire service has normalized deviant behaviors 
that negatively influence firefighter safety. A policy analysis with recommendations was 
the methodology incorporated to validate the absence or presence of normalized 
deviance. This method required analyzing at a granular level the policies and procedures 
of a large metropolitan fire department, with the Dallas Fire Rescue Department (DFRD) 
chosen as a representative organization. While the thesis did not reveal widespread 
institutionalized deviance within DFRD’s emergency operation procedures, analysis of 
internal documents about specific emergency incidents signal a trend toward 
abnormalities in decision-making abilities in low-probability, high-risk incidents. 
Recommendations include capturing routine information for best-practices reinforcement 
in addition to comprehensive analysis of emerging deviance patterns. Additionally, a 
second recommendation suggests incorporating an anonymous near-miss reporting 
system to identify workplace incidents that fall short of an accident, but nonetheless 
contain pertinent educational information. 
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Oftentimes, organizations declare employees to be their greatest asset. Workers 
engaging with others in their insular workplace achieve organizational goals through 
collaboration and establishing and developing a localized work ethos. However, when 
work processes are strained by supervisory production demands, performance of the local 
workgroup can adjust to accept risk that makes safety negotiable.1 Incremental and 
leisurely erosion of safety-centric workplace processes can influence and drive an entire 
institution to analyze and perform actions under aberrant decision-making frameworks. 
This thesis seeks to understand how high-risk occupations, especially the U.S. fire 
service, potentially adopt and eventually contend with the normalization of deviance.  
The concept of normalizing deviance within high-risk vocations was first 
examined in depth after the 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster by sociologist Diane 
Vaughan. Vaughan’s analysis of the tragedy disclosed several sociological failures within 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that contributed to poor 
decision-making.2 
At the organizational level, normalization of deviance elucidates the social 
construct of workplace catastrophes.3 Decisions that would otherwise appear illogical 
outside NASA were seemingly rational inside the agency, as the boundaries of normality 
had been widened to accommodate incremental failures and near misses now fell within 
the boundaries of acceptable performance.4 Delineating between unsafe acts, near misses, 
incidents, and accidents is crucial to understanding the escalation of occurrences, and 
                                                 
1 David L. McLain and Kimberly A. Jarrell, “The Perceived Compatibility of Safety and Production 
Expectations in Hazardous Occupations,” Journal of Safety Research 38, no. 3 (January 2007): 299, doi: 
10.1016/j.jsr.2006.10.011. 
2 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at 
NASA (London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), loc. 483 of 13511, Kindle.  
3 Ibid., loc. 500. 
4 Ibid., loc. 1687–1696. 
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their cumulative effect upon an organization.5 Additionally, understanding how 
organizations are structured and operate, from either a linear or complex construct, 
provides a level of clarity as to potential problems encountered. Furthermore, the belief 
that organizations can conceivably exist in a pre-accident period, called an incubation 
period, is examined for legitimacy.6 
Another major theme explored is the abstraction known as a drift into failure. This 
framework suggests that organizations methodically and slowly make incremental 
changes that direct the organization toward the boundaries of safety, which challenges 
those borders with increasing frequency.7 A reviewed accident causation model is the 
Swiss Cheese Model, which seeks to define the conception of defense in depth, and how 
active and latent failure pathways can defeat such protective layering.8 Finally, 
consideration is given to the idea of the overall effects of either loose or tight coupling on 
organizations; specifically, how these organizational characteristics can either help or 
hinder business continuity and operations.9 
Chapter IV of this thesis delves into whether normalization of deviance exists 
within high-risk organizations. The principle of production over safety as a stark reality 
encountered by high-risk organizations, and its contributive effect on workplace 
justification of shortcuts are examined. Shortcuts sometimes give rise to satisficing, 
implying that people choose an easier way as opposed to the best way to solve a 
problem.10 Structural secrecy as an insulating mechanism against outside influence is 
                                                 
5 Sidney Dekker et al., Resilience Engineering: New Directions for Measuring and Maintaining Safety 
in Complex Systems (Ljungbyhed, Sweden: Lund University School of Aviation, 2008), 12–13, https://pdfs. 
semanticscholar.org/a0d3/9cc66adc64e297048a32b71aeee209a451af.pdf. 
6 Barry A. Turner, Man-Made Disasters, 1st ed. (London: Wykeham Publications, 1978), 86. 
7 Sidney Dekker, Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex 
Systems (Farnham, United Kingdom; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), preface, xii. 
8 James Reason, “A Systems Approach to Organizational Error,” Ergonomics 38, no. 8 (August 1995): 
1711, doi: 10.1080/00140139508925221. 
9 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 8, Kindle. 
10 Barry Schwartz et al., “Maximizing versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 83, no. 5 (2002): 1178, doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.5.1178. 
 xvii
considered as influential to promoting normalized deviance.11 To evaluate the U.S. fire 
service effectively and fairly, and particularly the Dallas Fire Rescue Department 
(DFRD), evaluative criteria are established to determine whether normalization of 
deviance exists in the fire service. 
The fifth chapter opens up with a discussion of annual firefighter Line of Duty 
Death (LODD) statistics that reveal consistent mortality rates despite innovations within 
the fire service industry, such as the Incident Command System.12 Decision-making 
paradigms on the fireground are examined that might explain perpetual LODD, including 
violations of existing rules and regulations that place firefighters at elevated risk of injury 
or death. Loss of situational awareness is reviewed as a possible factor in fireground 
injury or death.13 The concepts of both goal seduction and situation aversion are analyzed 
to verify if either advance unsafe fireground actions.14 Next, the idea of a safety culture 
within the fire service is inspected and how a firefighter’s identity is based on both 
internal and external influences.15 
The sixth chapter specifically examines the DFRD for instances of 
institutionalized deviance in its internal documents and training resources used in both 
initial and operating platforms. After action reports (AARs), in addition to manuals of 
procedures and standard operating procedures are reviewed. Also, a study of almost 
2,000 injury claims over a 17-year period is reviewed. Finally, specific instances of safety 
breaches are analyzed for conformity to firefighting best practices. The chapter concludes 
                                                 
11 William H. Starbuck and Moshe Farjoun, eds., Organization at the Limit: Lessons from the 
Columbia Disaster (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 54. 
12 U.S. Fire Administration, Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2015 (Emmitsburg, MD: 
U.S. Fire Administration, 2016), 5, 
https://usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/ff_fatalities_2015.pdf. See Figure 1. On-Duty Firefighter 
Fatalities (1977–2015). 
13 Dubé Robert, “Situational Awareness Ensures a Safe Operation,” Fire Rescue, January 31, 2008, 
http://www.firerescuemagazine.com/articles/print/volume-3/issue-2/firefighter-safety-and-health/situation 
al-awareness-ensures-a-safe-operation.html. 
14 Christopher Bearman and Peter A. Bremner, “A Day in the Life of a Volunteer Incident 
Commander: Errors, Pressures and Mitigating Strategies,” Applied Ergonomics 44, no. 3 (May 2013): 489, 
doi: 10.1016/j.apergo.2012.10.011.  
15 William Pessemier, “Developing a Safety Culture in the Fire Service,” International Fire Service 
Journal of Leadership and Management 2, no. 1 (2008): 11, http://www.ifsjlm.org/sites/default/files/past-
edition-pdfs/IFSJLM_Vol2_Num1.pdf#page=9. 
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with a review of documents external to the DFRD and their potential relevance to the 
overall discussion of permitting deviant mindsets on the fireground. 
The final chapter seeks to draw conclusions and offer specific recommendations 
to assist the DFRD in restraining normalized deviance. Four conclusions and three 
recommendations are presented that provide pragmatic solutions to outstanding issues. 
Conclusions range from initiating in-depth studies of near miss incidents and increasing 
overall situational awareness, to an acceptance that organizational drift towards failure is 
manifest within the fire service in general and the DRFD in particular. Recommendations 
include accepting a resilience engineering approach to understanding accidents by 
embracing a modified risk matrix model that aligns more with the reality actually 
observed. Next, a proposal to initiate an anonymous near-miss reporting system is 
examined, including a draft form that captures incidents that occur more frequently than 
accidents. Quantifying and documenting such events can scope the size of the issues 
leading to the near miss. Lastly, the recommendation to summarize and document more 
everyday incidents in an abbreviated AAR is suggested, including a shortened AAR form 
that can be collected and analyzed.  
In closing, the thesis seeks to understand how deviant behaviors progress to such 
a degree that they actually influence how unsafe work is performed in high-risk 
occupations. Focusing on the fire service, normalization of deviance is the tragic end 
state of a long-term turning of a blind eye to workplace productivity over safety, coupled 
with an almost unabated allowance of local workgroups to construct dangerous 
subcultures that are permitted to thrive. While the fire service has the public perception of 
being quintessential risk takers in limited situations, normalizing and allowing risk to 
infiltrate the mundane decision-making paradigm of the firefighting profession is a 
dreadful thought. The recommendations of the thesis advance practical solutions that 
ideally expose organizational drift into failure before a more systemic normalization of 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Large organizations that operate in high-risk environments ideally have the safety 
of their employees embedded within their operational guidelines and procedures. The 
U.S. fire service, as one of these organizations, knowingly places its employees in 
imminently life-threatening situations with regularity. Firefighters are trained to conduct 
risk assessments prior to committing actions, and they continuously reassess to maintain 
situational awareness for themselves and those being rescued. Boundaries of acceptable 
courses of action at an emergency incident are sometimes boiled down to the mantra of 
“risk a lot to save a lot, risk a little to save a little, and risk nothing to save nothing.” Has 
the fire service, in some ways at the organizational level, normalized risky behavior, 
which allows employees to operate outside of established norms?  
Sociologist Diane Vaughan examined similar actions within National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) after the Challenger space shuttle tragedy in 1986, 
and explored NASA’s acceptance of non-normative decision-making processes, and an 
ultimate acceptance of unsafe actions that led to a critical failure. Yet Vaughan probes 
deeper into the organizational mentality and seeks to “explicate the sociology of mistake. 
It shows how mistake, mishap, and disaster are socially organized and systematically 
produced by social structures.”1 Vaughan ultimately described the actions, particularly 
the decision-making process leading up to action, as a “normalization of deviance.”2 
Dekker provided better context about the interval of time associated with this decision-
making process when he describes it as a slow descent into catastrophe, a “drift into 
failure.”3 
                                                 
1 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at 
NASA (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), xiv.  
2 Ibid., 75. 
3 Sidney Dekker, Drift into Failure: From Hunting Broken Components to Understanding Complex 
Systems (Farnham, United Kingdom; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), xii.  
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Additionally, the fire service can be considered a highly complex system, non-
linear in thought and actions during emergencies, which gives rise to an increased ability 
to experience critical failures, as Roberts, Bea, and Bartles assert highly complex 
organizations are prone to do.4 Moreover, organizations should not take previous 
successes as assurance of future protection, which can mask hazards that go 
underestimated.5 Starbuck and Milliken echo these sentiments, adding that employees 
can confine their performance in predictable patterns.6 According to Dekker and Woods, 
it is the high reliability organizations (HROs), which includes the fire service, that have 
developed an ability to perceive emerging problems and are able to adjust, prior to that 
critical failure.7  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does the U.S. fire service practice a safety normalization of deviance? 
Specifically, does the Dallas Fire Rescue Department (DFRD) practice a safety 
normalization of deviance?  
C. KEY TERM DEFINITION 
Ascribing meaning to the term normalization of deviance for the duration of this 
thesis originates from Dr. Diane Vaughan, a noted sociologist at Columbia University. In 
a 2008 interview, she defines the term as, “Social normalization of deviance means that 
people within the organization become so much accustomed to a deviant behaviour that 
they dont [sic] consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far exceed their own rules 
for the elementary safety.”8 
                                                 
4 Karlene H. Roberts, Robert Bea, and Dean L. Bartles, “Must Accidents Happen? Lessons from High-
Reliability Organizations [and Executive Commentary],” The Academy of Management Executive (1993–
2005) 15, no. 3 (2001): 71.  
5 Sidney W. A. Dekker and David D. Woods, “The High Reliability Organization Perspective,” 
Human Factors in Aviation 2 (2010): 123–44. 
6 William H. Starbuck and Frances J. Milliken, “Challenger: Fine-Tuning the Odds until Something 
Breaks,” Journal of Management Studies 25, no. 4 (1988): 319.  
7 Dekker and Woods, “The High Reliability Organization Perspective,” 123. 




D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The object of the thesis is the fire ground safety policies of the DFRD.  
1. Selection 
Simply put, too many firefighters are sustaining on the job injuries at emergency 
incidents, with some even succumbing to death as a result of catastrophic injuries. It is 
possible that some of these injuries and line of duty deaths (LODDs) are a result of an 
organizational deviation from established safety procedures at local workgroup levels, 
and thus, potentially preventable. 
2. Limits 
The thesis focuses on the fire service in general, from an organizational point of 
view, and is not directed towards the individual firefighter. 
3. Data Sources 
Sources include applicable federal regulations, recognized fire service standards, 
DFRD manual of procedures (MOPs) and standard operating procedures (SOPs), fire 
service periodicals, fire service textbooks, and journal articles. Aggregated statistical 
employee injury data from the DFRD was requested and obtained through the DFRD 
safety officer. Such a request requires a one-time human interaction, with an Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) determination form submitted with a final determination that no 
IRB process was needed, received on May 15, 2017. No formal interview, surveys, or 
correspondence beyond the sole request for information is performed.  
4. Type and Mode of Analysis 
The steps of analysis are the following. 
 What is the conceptual background of a normalization of deviance? 
The initial step explores how the term “normalization of deviance” came into 
existence, by exploring Diane Vaughan’s investigation of NASA in her book, Challenger 
Launch Decision. Next, an investigation into how various sociological constructs within 
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organizations can influence organizational-wide safety deviance in high-hazard 
occupations. The primary goal of this step is to define the problem space for this concept 
to ascertain that a normalization of deviance exists as a phenomenon. 
 Does a normalization of deviance exist in other high-risk occupations? 
With the concept of a normalization of deviance now realized, an examination of 
various high-risk industries, not including the fire service, is assembled and conducted. 
Verification of deviance comes through scrutinizing evidence located in journal articles, 
books, and open sources that highlight previous critical failures within these high-risk 
occupations. Within this review, the conflict between safety and productivity is studied as 
a primary and latent contributing factor leading to normalizing deviance.  
 Define what a normalization of deviance in the fire service might 
resemble. 
As a high-risk organization, the fire service in the United States may also be 
subject to a normalization of deviance; therefore, this section investigates in what specific 
ways a normalization of deviance may be manifest during fire emergency incidents. 
Again, the notion that safety and productivity are in opposition is researched by utilizing 
open-source statistics of injury statistics of firefighters, as well as “near-miss” injury 
reporting to discover trends within the fire service that indicate potential organizational 
deviance. 
 Does evidence exist of a normalization of deviance in the DFRD? 
A review of department specific MOPs and SOPs, both present and previous 
versions, are studied to determine if organizational normalization of deviance is 
embedded within such documents, as related to incident safety procedures. A base case is 
reviewed as an example of deviance. Furthermore, a review of past employee injury 
statistics is examined for patterns that may indicate deviance as well. Lastly, department-
generated safety notices and other documents are studied for prospective organizational 
deviance. 
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 If evidence exists, what are some recommendations to counteract such 
challenges?  
Three policy recommendations are generated potentially to offset any 
normalization of deviance discovered during the analysis and research phases. Options 
seek to quantify measurable reduction in injuries related to departmental normalization of 
deviance. Options also acknowledge and seek to balance departmental, regulatory, 
political, and monetary constraints. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The framework incorporated to confirm or deny the presence of normalized 
deviance within the DFRD is a policy analysis with recommendations. A review of 
DFRD’s operational documents, namely its MOPs and SOPs, may expose any embedded 
deviance that may benefit from prior research into other HROs. While policy analysis is 
typically thought of as an intra-organizational function for continued relevance and 
revision, the policy analysis conducted for this thesis is comprehensive and strategic in 
scope, designed to disclose specific examples of deviance throughout the DFRD. Once 
the analysis phase is complete, suggestions are recommended. Recommendations are 
intended to influence future decision-making strategies by DFRD leadership in light of 
evidentiary findings. The ability to implement one or more of the recommendations is 
dependent upon a number of factors that fall outside the purview of this thesis.  
F. CHAPTER DISCUSSION  
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I is an introductory chapter that 
discusses the framework of the thesis. Chapter II, the literature review, presents a 
comprehensive exploration of previous research on the normalization of deviance. 
Chapter III delves into various assorted principles bolstering normalized deviance as an 
aberrant organizational construct. Chapter IV contemplates the veracity of the claim that 
high-risk occupations are particularly at risk of normalizing deviance. Chapter V 
concentrates on the fire service as a specific high-risk occupation and whether deviations 
exist. Chapter VI is scoped down even further and centers on a policy analysis for 
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deviance within the DFRD’s MOPs and SOPs and other internal documents. Chapter VII 
concludes with offering four conclusions and three recommendations for the DFRD to 
execute in hopes of identifying occult deviance. Recommendations offer realistic 
instruments designed to engage DFRD firefighters as a source of information-sharing 
platforms in both an anonymous route (through the near miss reporting form (NMRF)) 
and from a candid leadership perspective (through the AAR). Limitations and 
impediments to implementation of applications are briefly characterized.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review constitutes an assessment of various sources that 
are essential to the idea that risk, as well as dangerous actions, can be systematically and 
perhaps knowingly normalized and accepted in hazardous and high-risk occupations, 
particularly within the U.S. fire service—a “normalization of deviance,” in Vaughan’s 
term.9 By deviance, Vaughan “refers to behavior that violates the norms of some 
group.”10 It is the ever changing (and accepting) of a “new normal,” which constitutes a 
departure from the true and accepted tenets of an occupation. Vaughan furthermore 
asserts that accepting and normalizing risk and alternate behaviors can conceivably lead 
to systemic and catastrophic outcomes.11  
This section first explains the origins of the normalization of deviance. Next, an 
investigation of diversified, high-risk occupations prone to experience a normalization of 
deviance is briefly examined. Afterwards, a study of the fire service in general seeks to 
answer how deviance can manifest itself in this type of organization. In addition, all high-
risk institutions cope with the issue of a safety culture, and a concept of “defense in 
depth.” This literature review is drawn solely from open source journal articles, studies, 
fire service periodicals, reports, websites, and books.  
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE 
The idea of a “normalization of deviance” has its origins in the NASA Space 
Shuttle program, stemming from the Challenger space shuttle tragedy that occurred on 
January 28, 1986. Diane Vaughan’s fundamental assessment of the Challenger disaster is 
described in her book, Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and 
Deviance at NASA, which serves as the basis for her normalization of deviance argument. 
Vaughan explains how an organization like NASA socially embraced errors, oversights, 
and flaws, considering such items normal over time; and how such complex social 
                                                 
9 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, 75.  
10 Ibid., 58. 
11 Ibid., 75. 
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systems can influence and alter groups, and summarizes the normalization of deviance 
within NASA during the shuttle program.12 Related to the Challenger catastrophe, 
Vaughan explored how the recognition of industrial deviation was discovered and 
interpreted in a way that was “normalized” at NASA, and “then finally officially labeled 
an acceptable risk.”13 Turner similarly suggests that disasters can be viewed as a “socio-
technical” problem, one in which complex connections exist between various 
processes.14 Vaughan seemingly concurs with Turner when she writes, “The explanation 
in this book explicates the sociology of mistake. It shows how mistake, mishap, and 
disaster are socially organized and systematically produced by social structures.”15  
NASA astronauts were cognizant of safety-related issues, at times speaking out. 
Astronaut Sally Ride would state, “After the Challenger accident, NASA put in a lot of 
time to improve the safety of the space shuttle to fix the things that had gone wrong.”16 
The safety enhancements alluded to by Astronaut Ride primarily came out of a 
Presidential Commission report on the Challenger accident, more commonly referred to 
as the Rogers Commission report, after its Chairman, William P. Rogers. This exhaustive 
and rigorous report would expose the depths of NASA as an organization, from both 
structural and social perspectives. Perhaps one of the report’s most damning conclusions 
was the apparent sacrifice of flight safety through the dismissal of launch restrictions and 
exemptions through the absence of any mandatory executive level consideration.17 The 
Rogers Commission report was central to exposing the path that deviance takes through 
an organization, which exploits a weakness of rigid production schedules that seek to 
diminish high safety standards. 
                                                 
12 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, xiii. 
13 Ibid., 65. 
14 Barry A. Turner, Man-Made Disasters, 1st ed. (London: Wykeham Publications, 1978), 3. 
15 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision. 
16 “Safety Quotes,” BrainyQuote, accessed April 1, 2017, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/ 
keywords/safety.html. 
17 William P. Rogers et al., Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Accident, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: NASA, 1986), 110, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19860015 
255. See Findings, number 2.  
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The notion of attaining high employee output to the detriment of safety is not a 
novel idea among some outcomes-based professions, including some high-risk 
occupations as well. The synergistic effect of poor safety and a striving for productivity 
through performance at emergency scenes can be a catalyst for an organization to accept 
non-normative, deviant behavior patterns that can lead to a normalization of deviance. 
Going a step further, McLain and Jarrell claim that the nexus between safety and 
performance, which they call production, occurs in an arduous and rapidly changing work 
setting, one in which fulfilling either safety or production adequately, will likely sacrifice 
one over the other.18 Pettersen and Schulman argue along similar lines of thought, 
claiming that when employees face a dilemma that traditional procedures fail to address, 
the worker will readily alter work processes to mitigate the problem.19 A divergence from 
approved methods can prove disastrous. Dekker adds that both intra and extra-
organizational stressors can actually cause stalwart safety parameters to be tested during 
critical periods where achieving goals seems to outweigh rigid safety principles.20 
Referring to disasters, Pidgeon and O’Leary state, “disaster is defined in the man-made 
disasters model not by its physical impacts at all, but in sociological terms, as a 
significant disruption or collapse of the existing cultural beliefs and norms about 
hazards.”21 Dekker and Pruchnicki argue that disasters are a result of a long, leisurely, 
and unacknowledged acceptance of risk that an organization accepts.22 Turner alluded to 
this pre-disaster timeframe as an “incubation period.”23 In a 2011 book, Dekker aptly 
defines this same phase, and its features, as a “drift into failure,” adding that 
                                                 
18 David L. McLain and Kimberly A. Jarrell, “The Perceived Compatibility of Safety and Production 
Expectations in Hazardous Occupations,” Journal of Safety Research 38, no. 3 (January 2007): 300, doi: 
10.1016/j.jsr.2006.10.011.  
19 Kenneth A. Pettersen and Paul R. Schulman, “Drift, Adaptation, Resilience and Reliability: Toward 
an Empirical Clarification,” Safety Science, March 2016, 4, doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2016.03.004.  
20 Dekker, Drift into Failure, preface, xii–xiii.  
21 Nick Pidgeon and Margaret O’Leary, “Man-made Disasters: Why Technology and Organizations 
(Sometimes) Fail,” Safety Science 34, no. 1–3 (2000): 16, doi: 10.1016/s0925-7535(00)00004-7.  
22 Sidney Dekker and Shawn Pruchnicki, “Drifting into Failure: Theorising the Dynamics of Disaster 
Incubation,” Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science 15, no. 6 (November 2, 2014): 534, doi: 10.1080/ 
1463922X.2013.856495.  
23 Turner, Man-Made Disasters, 81. 
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technological and social considerations play decisive roles during this time.24 In closing, 
the literature seems to suggest that normalization of deviance has sociological origins. 
B. STUDY OF THE FIRE SERVICE 
The previously mentioned “drift into failure” concept is best understood by 
assigning a suitable nomenclature that suggests a successive escalation in severity of 
action and potential consequences. Dekker et al. explains four progressive steps, 
culminating with the most severe act referred to as an accident.25 One of these four terms 
fundamental to the normalization of deviance is a “near miss,” which Dillon and Tinsley 
describe as an occasion when something dreadful almost happened, but did not.26 Such 
events position the employee at the boundaries of safety, stopping just short of an 
accident for a variety of reasons. Dee, Cox, and Ogle take a different approach to near 
misses and maintain that these examples can prove advantageous for organizations by 
unmasking arcane frailties within a system.27 An accurate percentage of near misses 
reported by those experiencing such circumstances remain relatively unknown, perhaps 
due to the fact that no threshold of true injury was reached, with antecedent events now 
irrecoverable.  
The readings revealed that several high-risk occupations are prone to a 
normalization of deviance, and share several common characteristics. Charles Perrow’s 
book, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, seeks to identify and 
explain such industries, even going so far as to classify such groups as being complex and 
tightly coupled.28 Industries include nuclear plants, aircraft, chemical plants, nuclear 
                                                 
24 Dekker, Drift into Failure, xii. 
25 Sidney Dekker et al., Resilience Engineering: New Directions for Measuring and Maintaining 
Safety in Complex Systems (Ljungbyhed, Sweden: Lund University School of Aviation, 2008), 12–13, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a0d3/9cc66adc64e297048a32b71aeee209a451af.pdf. 
26 Robin L. Dillon and Catherine H. Tinsley, “How Near-Misses Influence Decision Making under 
Risk: A Missed Opportunity for Learning,” Management Science 54, no. 8 (August 2008): 1426, doi: 
10.1287/mnsc.1080.0869.  
27 Sean J. Dee, Brenton L. Cox, and Russell A. Ogle, “Using near Misses to Improve Risk 
Management Decisions,” Process Safety Progress 32, no. 4 (December 2013): 322, doi: 10.1002/prs.11632.  
28 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 98, Kindle. See Figure 3.1, Interaction/Coupling Chart. 
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weapons accidents, space missions, and military early warning.29 Roberts, Bea, and 
Bartles expanded on this idea of tight-coupling by stating that in organized systems, of 
which those industries previously listed would qualify, “accidents can be viewed as 
normal because the interdependencies in a system are so great that one small glitch in one 
place can lead to a large failure somewhere else.”30 Weick therefore concludes that in the 
event of a failure, loose coupling is preferred, as the portion of the system experiencing 
failure can be quickly isolated from the unaffected portions, and thereby, preserve the 
remaining system.31 Starbuck and Milliken contend that organizations often rely on 
previous achievements as a barometer of proficiency in performance and thus become 
complacent in demeanor.32  
Whether such mindsets are pervasive within a fire service organization, ones that 
lead to a true normalization of deviance, requires further examination. Pessemier declares 
that correlations exist between high safety standards and high performance, and vice 
versa for poor safety and poor standards in other high-risk professions, including the fire 
service.33 Pessemier and England argue that the U.S. fire service is plagued with 
diminishing degrees of safety due to its communal structure.34 Yet, firefighters are taught 
to assess situations regarding their own safety, as well as those who need to be rescued. 
Wilson rightly points out the safety mantra that has existed for decades in the fire service 
by stating, “What happened to the axiom taught in incident safety officer training that 
says, ‘Risk a lot to save a lot (human life); risk a little to save a little; risk nothing to save 
                                                 
29 Perrow, Normal Accidents, 98. 
30 Roberts, Bea, and Bartles, “Must Accidents Happen?” 79.  
31 Karl E. Weick, “Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems,” Administrative Science 
Quarterly 21, no. 1 (March 1976): 7.  
32 Starbuck and Milliken, “Challenger,” 319.  
33 William Pessemier, Improving Safety Performance by Understanding Perceptions of Risk and 
Improving Safety Management Systems (Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2008), 4, http://www. 
academia.edu/download/33187447/S908-D2-Pessemier.pdf.  
34 William L. Pessemier and Robert E. England, “Safety Culture in the U.S. Fire Service: An 
Empirical Definition,” International Journal of Emergency Services 1, no. 1 (2012): 11, doi: http://dx.doi. 
org/10.1108/20470891211239290.  
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nothing?’”35 Therefore, a tenuous relationship can exist between personal safety and 
productivity in the fire service. 
Starbuck and Milliken seem to argue from a different perspective by claiming in 
their article that “successes foster complacency, confidence, inattention, routinization, 
and habituation: and so human errors grow increasingly likely as successes 
accumulate.”36 John Dixon, in a 2015 Firehouse article, sums up safety issues when he 
writes, “looked at another way, we as humans take shortcuts while we are under time and 
pressure constraints. These shortcuts are usually referred to as ‘safety shortcuts.’”37 Such 
shortcuts are perhaps reflective of the oftentimes-quoted mantra of “this is the way we’ve 
always done things.” Possibly, such stagnant thoughts still dictate the actions of some 
firefighters throughout the United States. 
Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy reaffirm such sacrifices in either safety or 
production capabilities in their article when they conclude from a root cause analysis that 
“four higher order causes emerge: under resourcing, inadequate preparation 
for/anticipation of adverse events, incomplete adoption of incident command procedures, 
and sub-optimal personnel readiness.”38 It is in such areas within the fire service that a 
normalization of deviance thrives and can expand within an organization. These same 
authors allege that the four higher order causes are indicators of the fire service culture 
itself; that tasks must get done with any resource, as expediently as possible, and one that 
fails to embrace safety adequately, which leads to a normalization of deviance.39 
According to Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy, such attitudes are fortified both inside and 
outside the fire service. Inside influences include tradition and interagency social 
                                                 
35 Jim Wilson, “Change Your Mind, Change Your Culture,” Fire Chief, January 2009, 32.  
36 Starbuck and Milliken, “Challenger,” 322.  
37 John Dixon, “Firefighter Safety: The Normalization of Deviance,” Firehouse, October 1, 2015, 
http://www.firehouse.com/article/12109412/firefighter-safety-the-normalization-of-deviance. 
38 Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, and David M. DeJoy, “Line-of-Duty Deaths among U.S. 
Firefighters: An Analysis of Fatality Investigations,” Accident Analysis & Prevention 43, no. 3 (May 2011): 
1179, doi: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030.  
39 Ibid. 
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networks, possibly at the station or company level, whereas outside influences are from 
stereotypes that firefighters have in the public as positive role models.40  
In terms of inside influences that can lead to a normalization of deviance, the 
literature speaks oftentimes of individuals of an organization who embrace deviant 
attitudes in a variety of ways (not wearing issued personal protective equipment (PPE), or 
performing hazardous tasks). Smith and Dyal discuss the overwhelming amount of work 
assigned to firefighters at an emergency scene and argue that under increased workloads, 
firefighters feel stressed, which can influence the ability to make rational decisions.41  
Even fire-service periodicals have weighed in on deviant practices within the fire 
service as a whole, primarily centered on safety and leadership issues. Daniels writes in 
his article for Fire Chief magazine, “It will take a personal commitment from the person 
who sets the tone in the organization-the fire chief-to begin a cultural shift in an 
organization.”42 Adding to the discussion is Jim Wilson, who quotes one of the sixteen 
firefighter life-safety initiatives, which states “Define and advocate the need for cultural 
change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, 
supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.”43 These articles speak of a 
common theme of compromised safety, a top priority in high-risk occupations. 
Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy maintain that three sections must be considered 
to improve safety: strict execution of SOPs for various firefighting tactics and methods, 
adherence to incident command procedures and personnel management, and improved 
communication and firefighter tracking at incidents.44 Referring to SOPs, Hodous et al. 
emphasize the value of SOPs at fire ground incidents as a foundational contributor to 
                                                 
40 Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy, “Line-of-Duty Deaths among U.S. Firefighters: An Analysis of 
Fatality Investigations,” 1179. 
41 Todd D. Smith and Mari-Amanda Dyal, “A Conceptual Safety-oriented Job Demands and 
Resources Model for the Fire Service,” International Journal of Workplace Health Management 9, no. 4 
(September 5, 2016): 448, doi: 10.1108/IJWHM-12-2015-0073.  
42 David Daniels, “Unacceptable Behavior,” Fire Chief 49, no. 1 (January 2005): 52–53. 
43 Wilson, “Change Your Mind, Change Your Culture,” 30. 
44 Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy, “Line-of-Duty Deaths among U.S. Firefighters,” 1172. 
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achieving incident safety when the SOPs are followed.45 To strengthen safety at 
incidents, Porter, Bliss, and Sleet proclaim that situational awareness can greatly 
contribute to a safety-based behavioral mindset.46 Situational awareness is of paramount 
importance in the dynamic fire ground safety plan. Concerning incident command 
systems (ICSs), Bigley and Roberts state that the ICS found in firefighting sets a proper 
framework for what is found in highly reliable organizations.47 Finally, in response to fire 
ground communications, Hodous et al. argue that constant fire ground communication via 
handheld radio, with constant communication between incident command and firefighters 
working inside, can immediately report either improving or deteriorating conditions.48 
An organization-wide normalization of deviance is possible in these three safety-based 
sections. 
Several authors write about the need for a resilient safety framework in high-risk 
occupations like firefighting, and how such strategies seek to diminish the organizational 
level of normalization of deviance. For example, Reason writes about organizations 
having “defensive layers,” whether they are designed, human-based, or managerial.49 
Additionally, Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy also speak to this multi-layered safeguard, 
what they refer to as “defenses in depth.”50 These same authors argue that a multi-layered 
organizational defense seeks to defend the entire organization, despite singular elements 
that falter, a tautological argument.51 Reason makes a compelling argument for the 
layered defense against normalizing deviance in his “Swiss cheese model (SCM),” where 
each slice of cheese represents a defensive layer, where each slice has a single hole 
                                                 
45 T. K. Hodous et al., “Fire Fighter Fatalities 1998–2001: Overview with an Emphasis on Structure 
Related Traumatic Fatalities,” Injury Prevention 10, no. 4 (August 2004): 224, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.11 
36/ip.2004.005348.  
46 B. E. Porter, J. Bliss, and D. A. Sleet, “Human Factors in Injury Control,” American Journal of 
Lifestyle Medicine 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 95, doi: 10.1177/1559827609348679.  
47 Gregory A. Bigley and Karlene H. Roberts, “The Incident Command System: High-Reliability 
Organizing for Complex and Volatile Task Environments,” The Academy of Management Journal 44, no. 6 
(2001): 1293, doi: 10.2307/3069401.  
48 Hodous et al., “Fire Fighter Fatalities 1998–2001,” 224. 
49 James Reason, “Human Error: Models and Management,” BMJ 320 (March 18, 2000): 769, doi: 
10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768.  
50 Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy, “Line-of-Duty Deaths among U.S. Firefighters,” 1171.  
51 Ibid. 
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capable of getting smaller or larger.52 Reason argues that holes in one slice are not a 
concern until several slices have holes that “momentarily line up to permit a trajectory of 
accident opportunity-bringing hazards into dangerous contact with victims.”53 
What does a “defenses in depth” look like at a fire-related incident? A 2014 
article suggests that several aspects of safety have been improved, from applied science 
in tools, methods of operation, and personnel improvement.54 Such improvements can 
lead to several layers of redundant safety. Another safety implementation is actually the 
enforcement of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1407, Standard for Training 
Fire Service Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC).55 NFPA 1407 is a safety precaution 
comparable to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standard 
found in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), CFR 1910.134(g)(4), which 
discusses the “2 In/2 Out” rule that requires two firefighters staging outside a dangerous 
environment to rescue the two firefighters working in the dangerous environment.56 
Layers of safety should be built as an incident grows in complexity and size. An 
additional redundant safety feature in the fire service is the establishment of the 
independent incident safety officer (ISO) at larger emergency responses with the sole 
focus on all aspects of firefighter safety, according to NFPA 1521, the Standard for Fire 
Department Safety Officer Professional Qualifications.57  
In conclusion, the study of normalizing deviance seeks to roadmap how an 
organization, beginning with high-risk occupations and filtering down specifically to the 
                                                 
52 Reason, “Human Error: Models and Management,” 769. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Thomas N. Warren, “Fireground Safety Tips,” Fire Engineering, April 16, 2014, http://www. 
fireengineering.com/articles/2014/04/fireground-safety-tips.html. 
55 “NFPA 1407: Standard for Training Fire Service Rapid Intervention Crews,” National Fire 
Protection Association, accessed April 20, 2017, http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-
standards/list-of-codes-and standards?mode=code&code=1407&tab=editions. 2015 edition. 
56 “Regulations (Standards-29 CFR 1910.134)(g)(4),” United States Department of Labor, accessed 
April 20, 2017, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.showdocument?ptable=STANDARDS&p_id 
=12716#1910.134(g)(4). 
57 “NFPA 1521: Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer Professional Qualifications,” National 
Fire Protection Association, 16, accessed October 26, 2017, http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-
codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1521. 2015 Edition. See Section 5.2.1 
General Requirements. 
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fire service, adopts a culture and methodology of practice that may normally be rejected. 
Dekker’s “drift into failure” succinctly characterizes how an organization becomes in a 
sense entropic in thought, which invariably leads to dangerous actions and potential 
failures at critical times, at the scene of emergencies. Vaughan’s normalization of 
deviance argument applied first to high-risk professions then down to the fire service 
provides various levels of understanding about how safety and performance (or 
productivity) competes for a preeminence of thought in the first responder’s mindset. 
Turner’s incubation period underscores the timeframe in which normalization of deviance 
settles within an organization. As a result, the “holes” in Reason’s SCM align in an 
organization, with a cascading failure lurking. Non-linear thought processes, such as 
those in high-reliability organizations (HROs) like the fire service, seek a solution to a 
normalization of deviance. The following chapter seeks to explore how normalized 
deviance emerges and is conveyed throughout an organization.  
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III. THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF NORMALIZATION 
OF DEVIANCE 
The term “normalization of deviance” originated from sociologist Diane 
Vaughan’s in-depth analysis of the 1986 NASA Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, and is 
discussed in her book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and 
Deviance at NASA. In the preface of the 2016 edition, Dr. Vaughan encapsulates her 
findings when she states, “The explanation presented in this book explicates the 
sociology of mistake. It shows how mistake, mishap, and disaster are socially organized 
and systematically produced by social structures.”58 Simply stated, Vaughan 
unequivocally attempts to connect systemic failures to social frameworks within 
organizations, as both a means of providing the context in which failures occur, as well as 
providing a roadmap to explain how NASA’s decision-making paradigms had become 
deviant and normalized. Thus, a normalization of deviance can be viewed as a 
progressive lowering of organizational guidelines to achieve departmental goals, where 
“normal” is socially redefined and inadvertently degraded, concealing a latency period 
prior to an accident. This chapter endeavors to describe both a historical examination of 
NASA in the wake of Challenger disaster, as well as acknowledging the various concepts 
that support a framework in which a normalization of deviance develops and succeeds, 
coupled with its pernicious effect on organizational safety. 
In the aftermath of the Challenger disaster, NASA, when regarded as a social 
organization, was shaken from the doldrums of their routineness. Soon after, NASA 
initiated its own internal investigation into the catastrophe. Concurrently, a formal fact-
finding panel known as the Presidential Commission was formed by President Reagan 
under Executive Order 12546, and their authoritative report, known as the Rogers 
Commission Report, revealed information that put NASA’s leaders and their multi-tiered 
launch decision process in the crosshairs.59 Succinctly, investigations would reveal the 
                                                 
58 Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at 
NASA (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), loc. 500–508 of 13511, Kindle. 
59 Rogers et al., Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 
Volume 1, 212–13; Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, loc. 630. 
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origin of the mechanical failure of the two O-rings on Challenger’s right solid rocket 
booster (SRB), with the O-ring failure ascribed to extraordinarily frigid temperatures the 
night before launch.60 Vaughan writes that Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI) engineers feared 
that extremely cold temperatures would have an effect on the elastic capabilities of the O-
rings (primary and secondary) to expand into the joint at SRB ignition; essentially that 
the O-rings would harden and be less flexible, and thus, potentially be less reliable.61 For 
the record, the temperature at Challenger’s launch was 36 degrees Fahrenheit, 
representing the coldest weather launch to date, 15 degrees colder than the absolute 
lowest temperature (53 degrees) that MTI guaranteed the O-rings to operate normally.62  
The potential of O-ring failure had been addressed years earlier, as far back as 
1980, with resolution taking the form of a redundant or secondary O-ring. Starbuck and 
Milliken express that even prior to the redundant measure in 1980, MTI had increased the 
O-ring’s width to 0.028 inches, as well as enlarged exterior shims that aided in pressing 
the O-rings into the joint in an attempt to appease NASA’s calls to revamp the joint 
design completely.63 This dual approach to appease NASA’s concerns obviously worked, 
as evidenced by a final Committee report that stated, “NASA specialists have reviewed 
the field joint design, updated with larger O-rings and thicker shims and found the safety 
factors to be adequate for the current design.”64 In the same vein, in 1980, the secondary 
SRB joint appeared on a critical items list as a Criticality 1R. According to NASA, 
Criticality 1R items are described as any system that includes redundant components that 
if ineffective, may precipitate a destruction of the shuttle and the lives of astronauts.65 It 
is unmistakable that both MTI and NASA had significant concerns and held lingering 
                                                 
60 Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision, loc. 670. 
61 Ibid., loc. 572. 
62 Rogers et al., Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 
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63 Starbuck and Milliken, “Challenger,” 324. 
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reservations about the SRB joints, principally at the O-ring-joint interface, in addition to 
optimal performance issues in inclement weather. It is under never-encountered and 
adverse conditions, frigid temperatures and an ice-coated launch platform, that 
Challenger enters history, not as a historic mission as touted, but a horrific failure for 
NASA as an organization. Nevertheless, beyond any technical failures that fell within the 
purview of NASA’s control, or cold temperatures that were out of NASA’s control, the 
Presidential Commission would determine “that the NASA organization contributed to 
the technical failure.”66 In closing, several organized investigative bodies drew logical 
conclusions that would look beyond the technical failures to more ingrained social 
failures of the entire organization that uncovered the insidious culture of normalized 
deviance. 
In retrospect, Challenger was to be an extraordinary mission, an underscore of 
NASA’s confidence and ability to send an ordinary citizen into space and was part of 
NASA’s space shuttle program, “Officially known as “Space Transportation System 
(STS) 51-L, it became publicly identified as the “Teacher in Space” mission.”67 
Challenger was the 25th launch within the STS, and the first mission of 1986.68 What 
captivated much of America, and specific to the Challenger mission, was one of its 
crewmembers was an ordinary citizen, Payload Specialist Christa McAuliffe, a New 
Hampshire high school teacher. NASA’s goal was to send a teacher into orbit on the 
space shuttle to educate students from space.69 Challenger would launch from the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on January 28, 1986, after a two-hour delay. The shuttle 
underwent catastrophic failure just 73 seconds into launch, when both the launch vehicle 
and its crew were lost. That same evening, President Ronald Reagan would address the 
nation, where he states in part, “We’ve grown used to wonders in this century. It’s hard to 
dazzle us. But for 25 years the United States space program has been doing just that. 
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We’ve grown used to the idea of space, and perhaps we forget that we’ve only just begun. 
We’re still pioneers. They, the members of the Challenger crew, were pioneers.”70 While 
the nation mourned Challenger’s seven-member crew, questions quickly arose from 
every direction as to how such an accident could occur.  
The Presidential Commission made sweeping conclusions about the cause of the 
disaster, both technical, as well as cultural in nature. Page 73 of the Rogers Commission 
Report declares: 
In view of the findings, the Commission concluded that the cause of the 
Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field 
joint of the right Solid Rocket Booster Motor. The failure was due to a 
faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors 
were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of 
materials, the effects of reusability, processing, and the reaction of the 
joint due to dynamic loading.71  
To the official Presidential Commission, the causative mechanical failure of 
Challenger had been isolated and identified, but the same report would also reveal 
NASA’s culture and operational frame of mind, ones that were surprising to Commission 
members. The report would charge NASA with sociological deficiencies as well. Such 
shortcomings were formally addressed when the Commission wrote, “That testimony 
reveals failures in communication that resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on 
incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data 
and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal 
flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.”72 Overall, the Presidential 
Commission’s report seemed to lay bare an overwhelmingly weakened communication 
culture within NASA. However, Vaughan’s analysis of the Presidential Commission’s 
final report, analyzed chiefly through sociological and cultural lenses, would declare the 
contrary; that NASA and contractors within the STS, including MTI, developed and had 
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open dialogue concerning problems and concerns. She (Vaughan) evidenced this issue 
when she disclosed from a personal interview with Larry Wear, a solid rocket motor 
(SRM) manager with Marshall, “I believe there was truth in flight readiness reporting. It 
was open, the whole environment was entirely open. What keeps everybody honest is, 
Lord knows, a room of 150 people. You just couldn’t keep problems secret.”73 In 
conclusion, the Presidential Commission established both a technical and cultural basis 
for the Challenger disaster, even though Vaughan in certain respects drew disparate 
conclusions from her assessment of the report. 
Prior to even discussing accidents, distinctions should be made between the 
following terms: unsafe acts, near misses, incidents, and accidents. Oftentimes, within the 
workplace, the terms incident and accident are used interchangeably, yet the terms are 
indubitably discernible within a safety culture framework. This paper considers incident 
and accident as distinct terms, with qualifying definitions being explained soon. 
However, it should be noted that the terms accident and disaster are essentially 
synonymous for purposes of this paper, although Turner seeks to separate the two terms 
based on several subjective criteria, such as an event’s magnitude, financial toll, publicly 
witnessed event, and unforeseen problems, whether in isolation or a fusion of many 
factors.74 Ideally, the terms are best represented in a pyramidal graphic, collectively 
referred to as an iceberg model, with unsafe acts at the base, thereafter moving up to near 
misses, then incidents, with accidents at the peak.75 The upward movement, from unsafe 
acts through accident within the iceberg model, is conveyed and best understood in a 
progressive fashion, one in which danger and the potential for harm to people increase 
with each successive step.  
Within the workplace, unsafe acts are likely too numerous and underreported to 
be accurately calculated, given the ability of the perpetrators to react and recover quickly, 
thus averting any level of personal injury or equipment damage as a result of their 
aberrant activity. What defines however an act as unsafe? What makes a system or action 
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unsafe is truly subjective. A myriad of issues could account for classifying an act as 
unsafe, from the conditions leading up to the event, as well as the people involved, 
comprising an individual’s mindset, as well as physical and mental capabilities to regain 
a normal state competently prior to committing the unsafe act. Unsafe acts are deceptive, 
however, and can lead to a near miss. Dillon and Tinsley in their article quote Dejoy by 
defining a near miss as “when an event could have happened (for example, because of 
hazardous conditions) but did not.”76 Therefore, some might view such events that did 
not occur as non-events, seemingly from a qualitative stance. Nevertheless, the literature 
seems to argue from a quantitative frame of reference; not did an event occur, but how 
bad is the event? Near misses themselves can be regarded as enlightening, as well as 
beneficial from two dissimilar perspectives. First, near misses can reveal vulnerabilities 
associated with the barely avoided incident, as both Dee, Cox, and Ogle and Dillon and 
Tinsley maintain.77 Antithetical to highlighting vulnerabilities, these same authors 
promote the idea that near misses can also emphasize the concept of a system’s resiliency 
and protect the person from experiencing actual harm.78 The near miss is viewed as a 
successive step towards an incident, but one in which no harm comes to the one 
experiencing the near miss, as the name implies, and therefore, is outcome driven. The 
near miss does not necessarily signify a breach of established policy, but it does suggest a 
greater degree of acceleration towards an incident.  
Incidents indicate a progression beyond near misses, and include more serious 
events that lead up to the edge of failure, stopping just short of producing injury or death. 
In the iceberg model alluded to previously, incidents precede accidents. Dekker et al. 
make several observations regarding incidents and accidents by starting with the 
declaration that in essence, both are the same, except for the final disposition.79 Second, 
the writers declare that more incidents simply occur than accidents, which allows for 
greater opportunities to examine such phenomena, and at a reduced expense, as no real 
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damage was done.80 While incidents may not cause injury, the potential exists to inhibit 
production processes; a quantitative measure exists by which such incidents can affect the 
overall efficiency, perhaps measured by a percentage drop in output. Connecting 
incidents back to the aforementioned iceberg model, Dekker et al. profess that near 
misses can be successfully leveraged to forecast potential incidents.81 Documented 
instances of near misses can serve to uncover trends in the workplace, whether such 
events are either grouped into broad categories, or narrowly identified. Finally, an 
accident denotes a fulfillment of a chain of events that crosses the boundary of an 
incident into a territory filled with the most severe conclusions, grave injury or death of 
one or more persons. Yet, disasters are an opportunity to increase the collective 
knowledge by studying these events, so as to not repeat them, as Starbuck and Milliken 
claim.82 Ideally, the same authors are convinced that dissecting accidents can lead to a 
greater understanding of how to curtail the true and supreme cost that accidents demand, 
lives and resources.83 Therefore, an accident, in the context of an organizational 
normalization of deviance, reflects an explicit and comprehensive failure of an entire 
system, as the established and interconnected socio-technical system’s defenses were 
unable to prevent the accident from occurring.  
Before any further discussion of the normalization of deviance can be considered, 
several longstanding concepts regarding how and why accidents happen are being 
challenged; the very frame by which several modern organizations have endeavored to 
ascribe a level of understanding to accident causation. These challenges seek to go 
beyond the traditionally held beliefs that accidents are merely the results of cause and 
effect sequence of events, best described by a linear trajectory. As author Barry Turner 
concisely states, “The time has come to set aside the assumption which has been tacitly 
made for so long, that all disasters are unique, and that they are caused by singular chains 
of events which are beyond the reach of rational consideration because they are not 
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amenable to generalization.”84 With this statement, Turner concludes that disasters 
contain essential components that are potentially predictable and therefore, not 
extraordinary in origin. Such contemporary views unquestionably challenge conventional 
cause and effect paradigms. 
In similar fashion, a modern day author is seeking to revolutionize the theoretical 
lens through which accident causation is even examined to boldly challenge the 
continued relevance of iconic scientific revolution theories. Dekker, in his book Drift into 
Failure, confronts mainstream causation models based on what he terms the “Newtonian-
Cartesian vision.”85 Applying such nomenclature is an obvious reference to both Sir Isaac 
Newton and René Descarte, who have both enjoyed a perpetual influence into the 21st 
century in regards to cause and effect analysis and assigned a linear understanding of how 
accidents happen. Dekker postulates that with the theory of accidents presenting as a 
complex and nonlinear arrangement, that exercising a linear problem analysis yields 
inaccurate and oftentimes unsuitable results, even going to the extent of declaring that 
such investigative methodologies can actually facilitate failures.86 For the record, 
Descarte was a staunch proponent of reductionism, a methodology in which he proposes 
that any system could be meticulously deconstructed to its most basic functional parts, 
primarily to comprehend how a system of components worked.87  
In the context of organizational accidents, a proclivity exists for drilling down to 
discover a root problem, whether it is revealed in a person or a process that failed. 
Newton would reinforce Descarte’s reductionist philosophy and canonize it formally in 
his Second Law of Motion, which essentially describes cause and effect relationships.88 
In regards to accident causation within organizations, Dekker seems to promote an even 
larger view than both Cartesian and Newtonian theories offer, by advocating for an 
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expanded view beyond the individual level that reaches to organizational levels of 
review.89 Finally, investigative frameworks, like those proposed by Dekker, should 
match the complexity of modern accidents and seek to progress in understanding 
accidents and abandon the perpetual use of Newtonian-Cartesian doctrines to address 
issues. In essence, accidents in today’s modern world should be perceived as containing 
attributes that are both complex and non-linear, what Turner referred to “as a ‘socio-
technical’ problem, with social, organizational, and technical processes interacting to 
produce the phenomena to be studied.”90 As a result, the socio-technical basis for today’s 
accidents is truly complicated, with multiple nodes of potential failure interwoven into 
the fabric of an organization.  
For this reason, establishing causality becomes an arduous task. Potentially, 
accidents can best be described as the result of multiple associations between the same 
social, organizational, and technical interactions within an organizational structure. 
Although a failure might ostensibly appear to be isolated to a single event based on the 
outcome, research has shown that disasters are generally the culmination of convoluted, 
sociological-centric interactions on many levels. Pidgeon and O’Leary, in their analysis 
of Turner’s work, advance the narrative of redefining how accidents should be viewed 
and conclude that disasters should be described with sociological expressions and not by 
a disaster’s tangible effects.91 Such declarations seek to persuade a paradigmatic shift in 
interpreting disasters. Charles Perrow, in his classical work Normal Accidents, makes 
clear distinctions between what constitutes linear and non-linear (complex) systems, as 
depicted in Figure 1.  
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.  
Figure 1.  Complex and Linear Systems92 
As an organization experiences unsafe acts, near misses, and incidents in an 
upward trend that may ultimately lead to accidents, it does so within a span of time that 
merits discussion, one in which Turner succinctly labels an “incubation period.”93 The 
application of the term is suggestive of a negative connotation, as Merriam-Webster 
defines the term as “the period between the infection of an individual by a pathogen and 
the manifestation of the illness or disease it causes.”94 The dictionary term seems to 
coincide with normalization of deviance type behaviors that endure within organizations: 
that near misses and incidents contaminate organizations and germinate over a period of 
time, remaining obscured or unaddressed until the revelation of such incidents culminates 
in an organizational accident. Pinto, in a 2013 article referring to the normalization of 
deviance in organizations, says, “in effect, it [normalization of deviance] provides a 
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perfect petri dish environment for corporate (or project) misbehavior.”95 The term is 
therefore truly befitting of the esoteric nature of the aforementioned events, with Turner 
acknowledging that such incidents seem to aggregate in a furtive manner, either 
inconspicuously present, or perhaps simply that events were somehow misinterpreted, as 
persons or safety features were incapable of detecting such impending events.96  
Dekker and Pruchnicki expound on the notion of how such knowledge could be 
misinterpreted, calling it “subversion,” and argue that data might have failed to be 
grouped properly to see the impending event, or information that clashes with how the 
organization perceives risk in the first place.97 Carrillo and Samuels conceptually 
leverage an iceberg model by considering impactful organizational safety controls 
delineated between restraints that are visible (above the waterline) or invisible (below the 
waterline).98 Visible regulatory mechanisms include items that are mostly objective and 
measurable, such as earnings and regulatory compliance. Invisible processes, which are 
understandably more subjective, include employee associations and views about safety.99 
Finally, Tinsley, Dillon, and Madsen allege that “people are hardwired to misinterpret or 
ignore the warnings embedded in these failures, and so they often go unexamined or, 
perversely, are seen as signs that systems are resilient and things are going well.”100 
Turner is also quick to observe a correlation between the number of errors (near 
misses and incidents) and the magnitude of the accident, when it finally occurs.101 He 
concludes that accidents that happen as a result of only a handful of events have a shorter 
incubation period and thus a small-scale accident ensues, whereas accidents that occur 
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after a long series of events, perhaps measured in years, tends to terminate in epic-scale 
accidents. As it relates to the incubation period, Turner discusses precisely when this 
period begins. Turner claims that the moment an unnoticed event happens, and is 
terminated by what he names a “precipitating event” that generates an unanticipated, 
modified, and abnormal response, the period is initiated.102 In summation, the concept of 
an incubation period as proposed by Turner helps define the boundaries in which the 
normalization of deviance develops. 
Within the incubation period, an almost imperceptible transformation occurs in 
organizational behaviors at the operator end, known as a “drift into failure.” Once again, 
Dekker makes a bold statement and alleges that every organization drifts into failure.103 
He is confident in making such a claim and defends his stance by explaining that failures 
are routed through several avenues within an organization that were initially destined to 
make a company extraordinary.104 Dekker maintains that organizations drift into failure 
due actually to pursuing their overall goals, whether it is in fabricating or selling a 
product or providing a service, common business obstacles develop tensions that compete 
for preeminence, inevitably assuming higher levels of risk while simultaneously 
diminishing safety margins.105 In effect, the organization seems predisposed to operate 
closer to the edge of failure without the intrinsic knowledge that it is doing so. Reason 
buttresses this argument by claiming organizations that fail to analyze negative events 
properly operate with incognizance to impending failure, with failure only perceptible 
when an organization performing at the edge of safety crosses the line, what he calls a 
“recurrent error.”106 Reduced safety boundaries allow organizations to reach those limits 
in a compressed timeframe, which increases the likelihood of an incident, and feasibly, an 
accident.  
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Operating within specific perimeters is reminiscent of the ancient story of Icarus’ 
flight. In Greek mythology, Icarus’ father Daedalus designed a pair of wings from bird 
feathers and wax. Attaching the wings to Icarus, Daedalus warned his son that ascending 
too high would cause the sun’s heat to melt the wax, and thus destroy the wings. When 
Icarus took flight, he simply could not resist soaring high. Flying outside of the 
boundaries, the wax began to melt, and Icarus plunged to his death in the sea.107 While 
the story is mythological, a kernel of truth can be gleaned that it is organizationally 
dangerous to flirt with the boundaries of safety, as oftentimes those who do so, pay 
dearly. Furthermore, it is easy to drift “over the edge” of safety and not realize the 
magnitude of the problem until it is simply too late.  
Another characteristic of drifting into failure, with an ultimate goal manifested as 
an organizational normalization of deviance, is the speed in which drift occurs. When 
examining NASA workgroups, Vaughan makes several observations that demonstrates, 
and in many respects validates, Dekker’s premise of drifting into failure. Vaughan 
addresses drifting at the workgroup level and implies that the group slowly but steadily 
embraces the slightest modifications to normal standards, all within the framework of 
everyday work.108 She adds that by influencing a group with a multitude of new events 
occurring simultaneously they would certainly be noticed, but not when presented little 
by little and distributed among the normally accepted ideas in the workplace. Clarifying 
the issue, Perrow concludes that drift can have disastrous consequences if several 
workgroups are individually drifting towards failure. He allegorizes multiple workgroups 
drifting simultaneously to a group of ships sailing towards a common port. As the boats 
make course corrections to avoid collisions, independent of the other vessels, the “big 
picture” of all boats reveals boats that are sailing towards disaster, where collisions will 
occur.109 Vaughan writes about these workplace modifications, “Small changes-new 
behaviors that were slight deviations from the normal course of events- gradually become 
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the norm, providing a basis for accepting additional deviance.”110 Yet, as Rashid, 
Sambasivan, and Rahman note, change is a normal component of any business model, 
whether in direction, tempo, or pace of workload, as well as employee and managerial 
performance levels.111 Change is a rather robust word that indicates a resignation of a 
former methodology or practice in lieu of a new way of doing something, and can be 
viewed either positively or negatively. Once more, Rashid, Sambasivan, and Rahman 
allege that people by and large oppose change, which in their estimation amplifies the 
chance of failure.112 Burke envisions organizational change developing in one of two 
ways, either evolutionary, which he claims is more accepted as a necessity of business, 
and revolutionary, which is exhibited in changes in management or radical departures 
from previous agendas.113  
The detrimental organizational change that Dekker theorizes about, which comes 
to fruition through a drift into failure, should not be confused with normal business 
adjustments designed to evolve as markets change and the flexibility to improve 
processes that are normally viewed as anticipated and somewhat expected. The speed of 
true organizational drift in complex systems is remarkably slow and undetected until an 
accident occurs. Moreover, it is within this drifting period that deviance is truly 
hazardous to organizations. The longer the drift, the more embedded and hidden 
alternative processes become, and easily acceptable as normal practice. Pettersen and 
Schulman, who contemplated Snook’s views on drifting into failure, claim that 
employees modify actions to accomplish workplace goals when the established 
guidelines fail to address the current dilemma.114 Simply put, under production pressures, 
personnel develop what they think is a reasonably alternative solution, albeit one that is 
unsanctioned and more hazardous to fulfill performance measures.  
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Those organizations undergoing a drift into failure deviate from normal work 
processes appear to do so out of necessity and consider those decisions both rational and 
vital to success that are accepted within social work groups. The resulting aberrant 
activities, taken within the context of countless other actions in the workplace, get “lost in 
the shuffle” of properly performed operations and then become deeply rooted into 
workplace processes. Due to stressed environments, improper actions are accepted and 
ingrained within the organization, ready to be incorporated throughout an organization at 
multiple levels that are then deemed to be acceptable. At the end of a work cycle, success 
is qualitatively measured by the absence of any problems or setbacks and with the deviant 
action obscured by countless good decisions, the organization drifts further into failure. 
Starbuck and Milliken put forward the idea that organizations oftentimes look back at 
former victories as a benchmark of success and point to an absence of failure as 
tantamount to proficiency both procedurally and administratively.115  
Nevertheless, leaning on prior success as an indicator of future success is 
dangerous, especially in high-risk occupations that interact and operate in dynamic 
environments. A famous colloquialism warns to “not rest on one’s laurels.” While 
organizations, much like individuals, want to bask in the accolades that accompany 
success, people are inclined to bank on past victories to propel those same companies 
through future obstacles. Bruggeman notes that organizations, such as NASA, profoundly 
leverage the success of previous launches to affect future plans.116 Starbuck and Milliken 
promote this same belief when they write, “Successes foster complacency, confidence, 
inattention, routinization, and habituation; and so errors grow increasingly likely as 
successes accumulate.”117 The hypothesis that errors grow as successes accumulate seem 
to stand in sharp contrast to popularly held axioms that promote a popular and opposing 
point of view.  
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Interactions are inevitable, despite any preventative actions taken. Innumerable 
interactions, whether one way or reciprocal, exist between the environment, humanity, 
objects, and even within people’s own selves. In the workplace, people interface with 
computer or mechanical equipment, tools, people, and other business entities, all with the 
intent to conduct a fraction of the overall work that contributes to an organization’s 
success. Several of these interactions can occur at various intra or extra-organizational 
strata within a normal work cycle. Inside organizations, however, interplay occurs 
between overarching organizational goals, revealed as SOPs, as well as constraints that 
affect those goals and have an influence down to the work group or individual level. 
Riley seems to support this view by explaining that inter-organizational rules and 
regulations aid in the fabrication of social systems and provide structural support to the 
organization while also affirming the idea of “what has come before,” by which she 
infers that formerly used information is blended into the organization.118 The concept that 
prior experience is valued in an organization helps to define organizational culture, or as 
Riley notes, “It is the combination of individuals and institutions that creates culture.”119 
Vaughan adds context to Riley’s argument, at least within her assessment of 
NASA, when she claims that any organizational constraints upon subordinate 
workgroups to produce should be viewed as reasonable and almost a nudge in a certain 
direction by those the constraints affect, while concurrently respecting the workgroup’s 
prior knowledge and discretion in how to proceed.120 Therefore, the “macro” or 
organizational level policies and procedures establish the guidelines and parameters in 
which “micro” level workgroups or individuals interact and conduct operations through 
approved processes. These processes and accompanying SOPs help frame the work 
environment. The articulation of organizational goals and desires flows through its 
codification of SOPs and is designed to influence decision-making down through social 
constructs, as well as its technical processes, even if that means the application of 
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pressure to subordinate groups to produce in a certain manner. Dekker proclaims that 
Vaughan would perfectly capture the essence of such tensions in the macro-micro 
connection at NASA in unmasking how upper management internalized production 
pressures to launch, and its terminal effect on how individual workgroups estimated risk 
and appraised hazards.121 Verification of organizational goals are oftentimes seen from 
the macro-level, as either success or failure, in qualitative terms, even though a 
comprehensive internal examination might reveal more conflicted, micro-level 
disturbances.  
Organizations typically try to achieve numerous goals concomitantly, with a 
handful that eventually finds themselves in conflict with one another. How do such 
entities reconcile differences in achieving goals from a macro-level, managerial 
viewpoint to the micro-level, decision-maker’s perspective? Dekker and Pruchnicki think 
that most disputes are worked out at the local level, as a series of compromises executed 
by local workgroups.122 Caution must be noted in micro-level assessments that can have 
macro-level repercussions, as both levels are uniquely linked together, as Bergström and 
Dekker maintain was the case in the Challenger catastrophe.123 Dekker points out that 
when organizational level (macro) problems increase, whether from extrinsic or intrinsic 
causes, a strain in the relationship between productivity and safety emerges.124 It is in the 
fertile ground of dissonance between productivity and safety that the weeds of failure 
sprout.  
In discussing the failure of complex organizational systems, employing an 
accident causation model, such as Reason’s SCM, serves as a primer to understand 
further how accidents happen. A goal in dissecting models, such as the SCM, is relatively 
straightforward; to increase someone’s comprehension of the layered defenses that 
comprise complex systems, in addition to realizing how various levels of an organization 
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can contribute to failures. Reason introduces the SCM by explaining that at least three 
defensive tiers make up complex systems: designed, human, and managerial.125 Designed 
barriers can be a physical obstruction, while a human restraint could consist of a person 
whose role is to perform in a safety function. Finally, a managerial deterrent can be a 
myriad of SOPs or laws that seek to inhibit irrational behaviors.  
The SCM, as shown in Figure 2, depicts the trajectory of accident causation in 
complex systems, read from right to left. The individual “cheese slices” represent 
organizational defenses positioned against failure. While such defenses may ideally 
provide a formidable defense, free of error or defect, the reality is that all defenses have 
weaknesses, whether inherent or unforeseen. Sheridan identifies these weaknesses as 
“opportunities,” whether the fragility of the defense was in either a human or machine 
component.126 Reason allegorically compared the defensive tiers to Swiss cheese, of 
which a small portion of the surface is perforated with holes that represent failures within 
the specific layer.127 Certainly, some events can penetrate through a single or perhaps 
multiple defensive layers, where an event is stopped prior to penetrating through all 
layers, and thus, prevent an accident. Roberts, Bea, and Bartles note that some 
organizational vulnerability always exists, while some open and close, and are contingent 
upon current conditions.128 Sheridan acknowledges that when holes in defensive layers 
happen to be aligned, a simple error can advance through these layers and create an 
accident.129  
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Figure 2.  Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model130 
The openings in defensive layers discussed in the SCM necessitate further 
explanation and insight to understand better proximal root causes of system frailties. 
Reason holds that two causes of the holes are experienced in organizational defense 
postures, active and passive failures.131  
Figure 3 reveals both active and passive failure paths. Active pathways run 
completely through the organization into the workplace and filter down to the workgroup 
or individual worker, through all defenses (as described in the SCM), which culminates 
in an accident, with active pathways ending in what is known as the “sharp end” of 
organizations.132 As a result, sharp end personnel include those employees at the distal 
end of organizations; workgroups and employees that interface with organizational 
processes and equipment at a technical level that apply themselves to a finished product 
or service. Reason uses the active failure pathway to disprove the long-held belief that the 
individual worker is the prime mover of accidents, which supports a belief that accidents 
actually start above the worker level.133 A host of factors may influence incipient 
behaviors that can lead to initiating events within complex systems. On the other hand, 
the latent pathway bypasses the workplace and the employee workgroup altogether, 
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which originates from upper management realms far removed from daily operations at 
the individual level and terminates at the defense level, again as Figure 3 shows.134 
Sheridan refers to administrators, in addition to those not at the sharp end of an 
organization, as the “blunt end.”135 
 
Figure 3.  Active and Latent Failure Pathways136 
Figure 4 attempts to provide additional context to accident causation by adding 
details and job tasks within various organizational levels. 
 
Figure 4.  A Model of Organizational Accident Causation137 
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Finally, Reason does point out that latent conditions can exist within an 
organization for an extended timeframe, either hidden or in plain sight, and can merge 
with active failures to produce accidents in a synergistic fashion.138 Such binary failures 
may be extraordinarily dangerous due to the involvement of both active pathways and 
surfacing latent conditions. In conclusion, the SCM offers a roadmap and prospective 
blueprint of accident causation in complex systems by revealing a bifurcated pathway 
that delineates between active pathways that pass through weakened sections of defensive 
layers and latent paths that circumvent much of the normal processes within an 
organization. 
One of the final considerations that can affect the normalization of deviance is the 
idea and influence of loose and tight coupling on organizations. The notion exists that 
organizations can have countless interactions between systems, such as human to human, 
human to machine, and even machine to machine, just to name a few. Such relationships 
between persons or entire systems are vital to any successful operation, and are both 
necessary and proper. Some transactions are uncomplicated and effortless, while some 
exchanges are elaborate and drawn out. To appreciate the effect of coupling on systems, a 
brief discussion of linear and complex systems must take place, as well as a reference 
back to Figure 1.  
Linear systems, as the most elementary of organizational systems, are the most 
prevalent type of networks, according to Perrow.139 The classic example of a linear 
system is the basic assembly line. Linear system failures are fairly easy to recognize, as 
only one path is possible, and locating where the system failed is as simple as 
investigating either uphill (at the beginning of the process) or downhill (towards the 
terminal end). Repair the failed section, and normal production processes continue. 
Perrow however introduces the intricacy of complex systems, where he writes, “complex 
interactions, suggesting that there are branching paths, feedback loops, jumps from one 
linear sequence to another because of proximity and certain other features.”140 Simply 
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put, a component within a complex system may perform a handful of actions, but in the 
event of a failure at this juncture, all interdependent paths are negatively affected. 
Downstream from the point of failure, other system elements can deteriorate, with a 
cascading effect occurring throughout the system. Consequently, what initially presents 
as a negligible local failure can lead to a generalized systemic failure. 
It is vital that an elementary understanding of complexity be understood as it 
relates to the interactions of either loose or tight coupling or their potential to influence 
complex system failures. For the purposes of this project, it is noteworthy to remember 
that coupling generally refers to the ability of systems to rebound back to a pre-accident 
state after suffering a failure. Several industries, in referring to coupling, normally 
associate the term with resiliency inside a system. Resiliency should not be misconstrued 
with redundancy, which is often used interchangeably, which adds to a perversion of both 
terms. For clarification, resiliency as defined in an article by Peruggia is “an ability to 
recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change,” whereas redundancy is explained 
as “exceeding what is necessary or normal.”141 Distinctions and applications of proper 
nomenclature are essential to understand that redundancy in a system contributes to that 
system’s resiliency. An influencing factor of resiliency is whether elements of a system in 
question are loosely or tightly coupled. Coupling, as applied in context of this discussion, 
is intended to show the degree in which components of a system (inside an organization) 
are associated or bound to each other.  
The first type of coupling considered to exist within organizational systems is 
known as loose coupling. Perrow begins his assessment of loose coupling by insisting 
that the use of the term “loose” should not be confused with being in a state of disorder; 
rather, it characterizes the ability of system’s components to retain a distinctiveness and 
individuality, despite its affiliation with the entire system.142 Loosely coupled parts have 
a negligible correlation between other components. Consequently, in the event of a 
failure of a single component, the entire system suffers only slightly, as the points of 
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connection are not interwoven to the overall system. While a system may experience a 
temporary setback, a total failure is averted due to the weak bonds that suggest minimal 
influence over the system.  
Weick noted that loose coupling may actually encourage determination within a 
system, although it may lack the ability to discern what survives.143 In the aftermath of a 
failure, the weakened component can be exchanged for another component, although it is 
understood that replacing the damaged segment is not as easy as it sounds. Legitimate 
questions could arise as to why the component was not more resilient, which leads to 
whether a similar component should be replaced by a more robust one, or to add a 
redundant layer of protection. Perrow claims that loosely coupled systems can absorb 
more failure, while maintaining adequate stability.144 When a failure does occur in a 
single component, the nature of the attachments, whether in a shared process between 
adjacent parts or between any two things, is detached to preserve the overall system. 
Perrow adds that the loose coupling of systems, such as those exhibited through 
manufacturing processes, exhibit a degree of “equifinality,” which allows that system to 
create an end product in an assortment of ways.145 The capacity to produce a product or 
service through a number of pathways, essentially working around a localized failure, is 
the essence of resiliency that reveals multiple layers of redundancy. Additionally, loose 
coupling allows the organization to benefit by having more heterogeneous response 
options, as remedies can be more diverse than tightly coupled systems, as Perrow wrote 
in Normal Accidents.146  
The second category of coupling is known as tight coupling, which is 
predominantly found in complex organizational systems. Perrow explains tight coupling 
as the absence of defense between two items, which results in a direct and negative 
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correlation between two tightknit elements.147 With regard to complex systems, Perrow 
in Normal Accidents highlights common qualities of such systems:  
 Proximity of parts or units that are [sic] not in a production sequence; 
 Many common mode connections between components (parts, units, or 
subsystems) not in a production sequence; 
 Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops; 
 Many control parameters with potential interactions; 
 Indirect or inferential information sources; and 
 Limited understanding of some processes.148 
A perfunctory review of this list reveals an asymmetrical arrangement, one in 
which multiple links are established between various portions of the overall system, 
including repeatable networks that are inserted and exit the system at multiple locations, 
commonly known as feedback loops. It is due to the complexity of these numerous and 
multi-level exchanges that Rijpma claims as the cause of initial stimuli that create initial 
problems that abruptly expand into organizational failures.149 Barton and Sutcliffe 
amplify the tight coupling problem by adding procedural constraints of rigid timeframes 
and the perpetual demands of the organization to produce the good or service.150 Dekker 
et al. supports Barton and Sutcliffe’s conclusions but adds a third confining factor, a slim 
margin of error, as some processes are simply unforgiving and require a “one time only” 
mode of operating.151 Perrow’s conclusions also addressed unequivocal intolerance of 
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workplace deviations from embedded procedures in tightly coupled systems, as marginal 
noncompliance can lead to cataclysmic effects.152  
Tightly coupled organizations are “intertwined,” as Roberts, Bea, and Bartles 
claim, which encounter failures when the slightest perturbations create significant 
imbalances in the total system.153 These reverberations have a rapid ripple effect 
throughout the tight couplings that lead to other system components that can cause mass 
disruption in a brief amount of time. Perrow warns that counteractive measures to failures 
in tightly coupled and complex systems, to be effective, must be considered and designed 
into processes beforehand, so that actions can be deployed without delay.154 The 
sequence of events, from failure to detection to response, is rather intolerant of extended 
timeframes that gives rise to the necessity of managed and integrated control features. 
The narrowness of process pathways in tightly coupled systems is perhaps indicative of 
similar reactive and protective processes that are leveraged against failures. Perrow, in 
highlighting the unforgiving nature of narrowly wound, complex systems, summarizes 
that tightly coupled systems have “unifinality;” in essence, a single way of operating 
these systems, in opposition to loosely coupled systems that enjoy equifinality.155 In 
summary, vast disparities occur between organizational systems that are either loosely or 
tightly coupled, which are dependent in part on the linear or complex nature of a system. 
Reviewing the various organizational issues attributed to workplace failures and 
accidents can facilitate a deeper understanding of a normalization of deviance, which puts 
its contributory nature to accident causation into perspective. Overt as it was, Vaughan’s 
exploration of NASA’s technical failure led to a more covert and deep-rooted explanation 
of Challenger’s demise with her applied normalization of deviance framework. The 
normalization of deviance in many ways is the tragic fulfillment of Turner’s 
sociotechnical theory written about years earlier. That is to say, accidents rarely have a 
purely technical cause, at least when a human-technology interface is involved, but also 
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to blame are the sociological undercurrents that buttress and act as a catalyst within 
organizations to propel it towards failure. Even applying the term “failure” is subject to 
gradation, as unsafe acts, near misses, incidents, and accidents all describe levels of 
failure. While one business might be more tolerant of near misses, another business might 
consider a near miss untenable in any context or degree. Therefore, failure may be 
thought of in quantitative terms, such as a percentage of operations that are negatively 
impacted by a failure, as well as qualitatively, in whether an operation can simply 
continue or not; yes or no. 
Yet, within organizations where a normalization of deviance has developed, social 
interactions can have a profound impact on the overall performance and operational 
status of a system. Social interactions as applied to the workplace include the individual 
workgroup’s influence on other groups above or below their location on an operational 
chain, including groups internal or external to the organization. The workgroups operate 
and make a myriad of decisions within their sphere of influence about their assigned 
tasks. Culturally, normative values as to what is acceptable or unsatisfactory are 
established in the routineness of endless and daily decision-making, which is what 
Vaughan referred to as a “native view,” and describes as the most basic cultural belief 
that the workgroup has established as a way of conducting business.156 Vaughan dissects 
NASA’s work cultures, from the organizational level down to the granular SRB work 
group level to show how a myriad of day-to-day decision-making shaped internal work 
culture. Particularly, how repetitive decision-making, conjoined with risk, took small and 
incremental steps to accept as normal that which had previously been considered 
abnormal. 
Invariably, when considering the Challenger disaster, a question is raised that 
states, “how could NASA move forward with a launch when so many contradictory 
safety features had been violated?” Vaughan offered the normalization of deviance as an 
answer, by theorizing that within the NASA SRB workgroup, the decision to launch was 
nothing unusual, although external to the organization, clear indications of safety 
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violations would cancel any launch. As overarching proof, Vaughan claims that 
employees had broken rules to complete their mission, with groups compelled to do so as 
production took precedence over safety.157 With such an informal imbalance, tilted 
awkwardly towards production at the expense of following industry and organizational 
safety standards, the slightest cultural acceptance towards committing future infractions 
occurs, particularly if no negative repercussions result. Inside the workgroup, what was 
once aberrant and forbidden by rule or communal influence now becomes ordinary and 
customary, acceptable at a cultural level; where the workgroup redefines its own 
subculture of accepted norms and limitations. Dekker claims that psychology refers to 
such actions as “the local rationality principle: people are doing what makes sense given 
the situational indications, operational pressures, and organizational norms existing at the 
time.”158 
The interval in which a workgroup experiences a transformation from what is 
genuinely normal towards a normalization that is deviant is precisely what Turner 
designated as an incubation period. Recalling that during such a span of time, 
organizational culture is negatively shifting at a sluggish pace. Likewise, minute changes 
at foundational levels are taking place to meet organizational goals; however, the 
alterations are outside the normal boundaries of safety, and are reinforced by positive 
outcomes. Gradual changes continue with reinforcement from repeated successes, despite 
an unknown realization of Dekker’s “drift into failure” concept. Pessemier concurs with 
Dekker in the notion that the absence of negative outcomes after dangerous actions were 
performed can foster the idea that such actions are a suitable way to operate.159 Dekker 
notes that a drift into failure is pushed within an organization as a result of local decisions 
that were perceived to be correct and proper when they happened, and therefore, more 
likely to be accepted as satisfactory to the degree that local decisions went unchallenged 
and accepted as the dominant way of operating throughout the organization.160  
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In closing, the normalization of deviance can penetrate organizational defenses 
that originated as a series of trade-offs between production and safety, which compete for 
preeminence in the workplace and frame a workgroup’s cultural norms. Positive 
outcomes in the shadow of poor decisions affirm the bias against organizational norms 
that then turn to alternate avenues to achieve goals. While defenses, such as the SCM, 
seek to prevent accidents by implementing a layered defense posture, drifting into failure 
combines with operating unknowingly inside an incubation period. Additionally, a series 
of micro decisions within a work culture can negatively affect macro levels of operation 
and lead to organizational normalized deviance. An additional complicating factor of 
normalizing deviance is the idea that those inside the organization understand and view 
their actions and decisions as normal and rational, as their decisions have been met with 
past success, which reinforces cultural acceptance of deviant practices to the point of 
normality. The idea that mistakes are born out of social interactions cannot be overstated. 
Looking ahead to the following chapter, consideration is given to the idea that high-risk 
occupations are susceptible to functioning with various principles of normalized 
deviance. 
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IV. THE POTENTIAL OF NORMALIZED DEVIANCE TO 
OCCUR WITHIN HIGH-RISK OCCUPATIONS 
With reference to high-risk occupations, a question of the propensity for “sharp 
end” personnel to slowly and methodically embrace practices and develop behaviors that 
can lead to a normalization of deviance within an organization should be examined. The 
rationale for conducting an analysis stems in part from the close proximity that select 
organizational sections have in relation to the edge of safety in an already hazardous 
setting, with an understanding that adopting particular attitudes and developing divergent 
social standards towards safety can negatively influence an organization. Remaining 
objective, an analysis should be rooted in evaluative criteria that are unbiased and 
pertinent to answering whether high-risk occupations either have drifted or are in the 
midst of drifting into failure that leads to a normalized deviance of an entire organization. 
Individual components of the review include discussions about balancing safety and 
production, as well as concepts of satisficing and escalation of commitment. Finally, the 
evaluative criteria utilized for analyzing high-risk occupations is discussed. An 
overarching goal is to conduct an impartial investigation based on the established criteria 
to determine whether a normalization of deviance has an increased probability of 
occurring in high-risk occupations.  
Normalization of deviance, as an abnormal process, is both antagonistic and 
opportunistic in nature as its name implies and can potentially infiltrate an organization 
over a protracted period of time. Organizations, despite the end product produced, 
whether a good for sale or a service provided, works within production limitations and 
constraints. Ordinarily, the margins of normal output have been established and safety 
goals declared to achieve a level of recognized and acceptable output. Classical 
constraints, such as time and resources (whether in personnel or materials), can quickly 
challenge processes and safety practices designed to protect the optimal production 
method and safeguard the employee. Author Sidney Dekker asserts that when external 
pressures of supply and demand, coupled with the internal pressures of production goals 
and safety expectations are pushed to their limits, these same perimeters that earlier 
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defended an organization from disaster are now drawn upon by those in charge of 
production to meet organizational goals.161  
In many respects, NASA can be considered the epitome of an organization 
inclined to drift into failure, albeit unknowingly, in conjunction with a latent ability to 
produce a normalized deviance. Unsurprisingly, other high-risk industries and certain 
occupations seem predisposed to follow in NASA’s footsteps when it comes to 
workplace cultures that push the envelope of safety to its borders. What defines a high-
risk occupation? The OSHA job hazard analysis list includes industry professions that 
encounter routine workplace dangers, including toxic chemicals, explosion hazards, 
radiation, and fire/heat.162 In Normal Accidents, Perrow organized all sorts of industries, 
admittedly from his cognitive standpoint, into what he termed an “interaction/coupling 
chart.” Perrow integrated two variables into his chart, with the x-axis showing 
“interactions” from linear to complex, as read from left to right. The y-axis denotes the 
level of coupling, loose to tight, as read from the bottom towards the top. Perrow’s chart 
is presented as Figure 5 and is intended to show a wide swathe of industries, with 
emphasis on those in quadrant 2, which are traditionally considered higher-risk 
occupations than others on the same chart by hazards in the workplace.  
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Figure 5.  Interaction/Coupling Chart163 
Unauthorized shortcuts are developed within social work groups that seemingly 
contribute positively to production processes. Nevertheless, such actions have an 
inversely proportional effect that alters safety protocols that have been little by little 
justified through the increased adoption of a “new normal,” which performs 
opportunistically outside the boundaries of an organization’s guidelines. As the shortcut 
is progressively engaged and leveraged against an organization’s obstacles, and done so 
devoid of any negative repercussions, the deviance becomes sluggish and entrenched 
within operational paradigms, sometimes undistinguishable to supervisors as risky 
behavior. A resultant standard of suboptimal work processes is cultivated. Dekker 
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concludes that risky actions become commonplace and writes, “Drifting into failure is a 
gradual, incremental decline into disaster driven by environmental pressure, unruly 
technology, and social pressures that normalize growing risk.”164  
In light of the NASA Challenger example, how could a massive, multi-tiered 
organization like NASA allow itself to drift into failure as a result of improperly handling 
several interagency stressors by normalizing deviant actions, as Dekker suggest 
organizations are prone to do?165 Vaughan argues that opposing forces and limited funds 
elevated the pressure within NASA workgroups to keep the Space Shuttle program on a 
rigorous flight schedule; pressures that had a negative, yet synergistic effect on astronaut 
safety.166 To compound the issue, Vaughan applied a tertiary rationale to NASA’s 
substandard behavior patterns, namely that the organization had adopted a habit of 
concealing the O-ring complications from various internal NASA workgroups, as well as 
outside vendors.167 Presumably, the masking of perpetual O-ring difficulties was 
attributable to production pressures to launch on schedule. Recall that the STS mission by 
design was to be a utilitarian orbiter to carry payloads into space at compressed and 
recurrent intervals, which was an order of magnitude more challenging for NASA and its 
vendors.  
When considering various high-risk occupations that experience pressures related 
to safety and production simultaneously, a proclivity exists towards embracing various 
concepts that circumvent a problem in harmful ways. Regardless of industry, 
management leaders seek high levels of performance from their employees. 
Administrative expectations are based typically on an anticipated output from members 
and specific production levels require workers to operate with a certain level of tempo 
and an equally quick pace. Like most operations, increased demands equate to working 
faster and depending on the occupation, performing at a faster pace could increase the 
margin of error, as all actions are expedited to meet demands. However, McLain and 
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Jarrell emphasize that to increase production, safety parameters are stretched beyond 
what is standard, what they call a “safety-production incompatibility.”168 Prielipp et al. in 
their article speak to this same struggle between safety and production, basically stating 
that stress-laden industries, such as medical anesthesia, as well as both NASA Challenger 
and Columbia tragedies, allowed increased risk to meet deadlines.169 
High-risk occupations, as the name implies, denotes increased risk of injury or 
death to one or more workers based on either a dangerous environment in which workers 
operate, or perhaps the operation and interaction with dangerous and unforgiving 
machinery that can jeopardize employee safety. Smith and Dyal, in their article about the 
dangers and varying job safety in the fire service, state that firefighters perform tasks 
under austere conditions and are subjected to increased mental pressures that occur in 
dynamic settings.170 In the Challenger disaster, Vaughan discovers that at various levels, 
even a heavily scrutinized, safety conscious organization like NASA felt compelled to be 
results-driven, at the expense of breaching safety protocols, including the concealment of 
critical information related to shuttle launches.171 Within high-risk occupations, 
organizations endeavor to find equilibrium between safety and production, as though 
safety is on one scale and production is on the opposite scale. Yet, in the real world, high-
risk organizations, like other entities, appear to resolve imbalances between safety and 
production by a series of concessions, either leaning towards one or the other as a series 
of trade-offs.  
Dekker and Woods allege that organizational output is a short-term goal, whereas 
safety is a persistent, long-term goal.172 Although the two goals seem to be in a steady 
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state of hostility towards one another, they act on one another in various exchanges for 
control. Zohar implies a rivalry between safety and production, adding that how bosses 
react to this struggle, whether safety or production takes priority, sends a distinct message 
to subordinates as to which goal is primary, and which is secondary.173 Workgroups, as 
social entities, form cultural norms for their specific group, based on what supervisors 
have stressed is of supreme importance. If the workgroup perceives managerial signals 
that production is of paramount importance, then socially, workplace decisions and 
successive actions can align with a belief that safety measures can be somewhat 
disobeyed; that aberrant safety actions are sanctioned to achieve production goals.  
Employees functioning within any profession, but especially complex, high-risk 
occupations, may extract information from their operating environment, as well as from 
other sources (other employees, technical information, monitors, and gauges) both 
internal and external to their environment, with a goal of integrating such data into a 
decision-making matrix that is rational and decidedly in the best interest of organizational 
goals. In fact, Bruggeman employs a graphic to show collaborations within a NASA 
project, as seen in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.  NASA Global Interactions174 
Nonetheless, Turner poses that possessing absolute information about an issue is 
often inhibited by many factors that induce a finite information base that leads to finite 
decisions, adding that compressed information streams can culminate in uncalculated 
outcomes.175 Constrained and incomplete information uniquely places high-risk 
organizational decision-makers at a disadvantage, as obscured or undisclosed knowledge 
could have devastating impacts on segments of an organization and arguably the entire 
organization. Simon refers to decision-making with such constraints as the principle of 
bounded rationality.176 Turner, in an attempt at lucidity of Simon’s thoughts, maintains 
that despite someone’s best attempts, rationality is truly a deficient attribute as people 
themselves are restricted and incapable of perfect knowledge.177 Be that as it may, 
Dekker makes a counterargument about rationality and submits that a person tasked with 
making rational choices is competent to do so when he writes, “Finally, the decision 
maker is fully rational and able to rank the alternatives according to their utility relative 
to the goals the decision maker finds important.”178 Organizational decision-makers who 
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perceive production over safety struggles receive filtered informational cues from sources 
biased towards “cutting corners.” Translating this model to high-risk occupational leaders 
whose decisions profoundly influence narrow and rigid safety margins, it is no surprise 
that final determinations can carry substantial consequences.  
When presented with workplace pressure to produce, a possibility exists that 
individuals or workgroups will do a minimum amount of work to achieve a goal, as 
opposed to performing the ideal action, an observation known as satisficing. Schwartz et 
al. contends that in situations where options exist, that decision-makers have a “threshold 
of acceptability.”179 Those responsible for decision-making might choose between 
various courses of action, some of which will marginally meet a standard but one that is 
not optimal for a given situation. Combining a satisficing position on top of critical 
decision-making authority within high-risk occupations can prove perilous to the 
workgroup and organization alike, as satisficing may be integrated into safety measures 
or other processes integral to a successful operation. Turner, in his book Man-Made 
Disasters, expands the conversation of satisficing when he writes, “and as a result of 
being unaware of possible alternatives of action lying outside those considered, the 
decision-maker is forced to settle for ‘acceptable’ or ‘win’ outcomes (if, indeed he is able 
to achieve these) rather than pursuing notions of maximum acceptability, or best possible 
win.”180  
As explained by Weick, citing an earlier work by Barthol and Ku, when people 
are hard-pressed in situations, they retreat to a more familiarized position.181 This 
conclusion is much like a statement by the Greek poet Archilochus, who is credited with 
writing, “We don’t rise to the level of our expectations, we fall to the level of our 
training.”182 The implication, applied to high-risk occupations and decision-making in 
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strenuous moments, is that people in distressing times will not rise to the moment; rather 
they will turn back to what they can comprehend as a workable solution; a former 
presumptive state that is in actuality a form of satisficing and decide on merely an option 
that is adequate (a previous state) versus one that transcends and transforms the current 
dilemma. While examining the communal culture formed at NASA, Vaughan deducted 
that it was bounded rationality that swayed workgroups that had the ability to investigate 
and understand problems at their respective levels, yet were repressed by scientific data 
that suggested aberrations could be effectively rationalized from an entropic to a uniform 
state, characterized as “the representation of chaos in an orderly fashion.”183 As a result 
of bounded rationality, satisficing becomes a viable option, as the optimal solution 
becomes an implausible reality.  
However, should organizational decision-making leaders and particularly those in 
high-risk occupations be held accountable as amoral calculators with wanton regard for 
safety in the wake of disasters, or are decisions merely signs of an underlying disease of 
normalized deviance? A central question to disaster causality is whether those in a 
position to make decisions did so out of gross indifference to safety procedures, and are 
thus considered amoral calculators, or out of a flawed organizational decision matrix that 
filtered and constrained rational decision-making to a few criteria. Regarding the 
Challenger disaster as it relates to MTI, Vaughan was able to show that NASA was 
culpable in satisficing shuttle launches in the midst of a competent MTI design, coupled 
with the favorable economical impacts and unyielding launch timetables.184 The 
dichotomy between satisficing and amoral calculations appears to be birthed in the 
freedom of rationality in the decision-making process. When considering amoral 
calculators, such persons deliberately (and irrationally) push processes and workers 
beyond safety boundaries for the sake of production and are cognizant of such actions. 
Whereas satisficing, when bounded rationally, limits the decision-maker’s options, yet is 
still within the context of being rational. In addition, the person satisficing contemplates 
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rational choice options from within the organization and according to Dekker, may shed 
light on why poor results are realized. [Emphasis added]185 The intentionality of amoral 
calculators in high-risk occupations seeking to economize safety for the sake of increased 
production anesthetizes an organization from within.  
Another contributing component to the normalization of deviance in high-risk 
occupations is the idea of structural secrecy. Enormous organizations that contain 
multiple divisions or levels of production are essentially smaller internal organizations 
under a massive corporate name. Organizations can certainly expand beyond national 
borders and hold an international profile that gives rise to additional levels of structural 
secrecy. Simply put, structural secrecy occurs when monolithic organizations have 
complex and diverse operations that are disconnected from company-wide or “global” 
knowledge, including top executives. Within this organizational isolationist domain, 
cultural norms can flourish unrestricted, while at the same time, conceal problems from 
internal and external customers. Additionally, employees in such divisions essentially 
become inter-organizational authorities, with few (including administrators) 
understanding technical jargon or rationale for decision-making networks, as Vaughan 
points out.186 Starbuck and Farjoun, in their assessment of the Columbia shuttle disaster, 
view structural secrecy as a “blind spot” amongst other characteristics within large 
organizations.187 When applied to high-risk organizations, structural secrecy contributes 
to a normalization of deviance by masking internal workgroup problems that lie dormant 
within the group, as well as translating erroneous or technically enigmatic information 
throughout the organization. 
A final persuading element that can advance a normalization of deviance in high-
risk occupations is an idea known as “escalation of commitment.” According to Staw, 
this theory suggests that persons with management decision authority become extremely 
resolute in assigning supplemental assets to an increasingly failing program or 
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operation.188 Simply stated, it happens when executive leaders refuse to admit that a 
strategy is losing and rather than commit more resources, such as time, personnel, or 
finances, the persons in charge actually assign more assets to attempt to overcome 
negative outcomes in hope of a favorable or profitable solution. Such actions can 
effectually draw an organization deeper into a quagmire and expose the organization to 
increasingly harmful conclusions that decrease resiliency due to overburdened assets. 
Ross and Staw question how organizations progress on a certain trajectory and once on a 
certain course, how can an organization be deterred from continuing on that path?189  
An illustration of escalation of commitment contributing to organizational 
normalized deviance is expressed in NASA’s social culture within the SRB workgroup 
through a variety of ways. In the opinion of Ramanujam and Goodman, escalation of 
commitment frameworks actually assist in deemphasizing cues that alert organizations of 
a potential need to pivot into another direction.190 One such signal within NASA’s SRB 
division came to light through the Presidential Commission Report, where a 1978 
correspondence letter showed that MTI rejected initial SRB tests that revealed a design 
weakness.191 This same report would state that NASA repudiated its own engineers’ 
conclusions and curtailed concerns through official documents.192 NASA appeared to 
advance its escalation of commitment to a defective design, irrational as it was, when the 
Commission Report wrote, “At no time did management either recommend a redesign of 
the joint or call for the Shuttle’s grounding until the problem was solved.”193 The “joint” 
referred to the aft field joint of Challenger’s right SRB.  
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The SRB O-ring issue, along with NASA executive’s failure to heed the warnings 
of its engineers, constituted a grievous encroachment into a component of the launch 
sequence, one of the most dangerous operational periods in a Shuttle mission. Cleavages 
between NASA engineers and NASA executives to some extent validated what 
Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey had written about in their team experiments when 
studying both homogeneous and heterogeneous schools of thought; when a conflict of 
beliefs existed (a dissimilar arrangement), an escalation of commitment also exists, albeit 
to a lesser extent than in undiversified bodies.194 Although clear evidence of dissent 
occurred with some members of the SRB engineering group as to the readiness and safety 
aspects of the O-rings in the SRB field joints, nevertheless, such challenges were 
repudiated by NASA executives. According to Bowen, an escalation of commitment can 
be viewed as an effort to interpret an atmosphere of turmoil, where data is questioned, 
and therefore, remaining on the current path seems to be the best course of action.195 
Several likely reasons can be advanced that a rejection of minority voices within 
the SRB work group were dismissed, among those social and political, to allow an 
escalation of commitment to stay the course with Challenger’s SRB design. Socially, a 
disaster attributed to the SRB, and to a degree the O-rings, could strike a discordant tone 
with the public about the reliability of the STS, given NASA’s previous success with the 
Apollo and Gemini programs, and additionally, as Vaughan would note, an increased 
reluctance in third-party vendors to use a platform that has since proven to be 
unreliable.196 Politically, NASA was experiencing political pressures with diminishing 
budgets, as well as seeking public confirmation from the Reagan administration for the 
STS and had hoped such overt support would translate into Congressional backing of the 
NASA program.197 NASA would receive a public endorsement from President Reagan 
after the safe landing of STS-4 on July 4, 1982. For NASA to reject a design that had 
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been used previously, coupled with compressed launch schedules, in addition to political 
alliances that linked the STS to the White House seemed irrational, which caused an 
escalation of commitment to support the current SRB design.  
In light of the major themes discussed in this chapter, the U.S. fire service as a 
representational high-risk vocation inevitably includes several analogous issues related to 
normalized deviance. Primarily, the notion of production over safety could be perceived 
as a typical construct in the mind of the firefighter. Perhaps because the firefighter has 
historically been trained to engage threats as a normal course of action, without 
performing an adequate and comprehensive risk analysis to determine to what degree 
firefighters will negotiate their safety to save lives [Emphasis added]. The idea of a desire 
path comes into play at this point. A desire path is basically forging a non-traditional and 
deviant path that gets one from point A to point B in an alternative way, punctuated by 
shorter distance or less obstacle-laden than the normative path as designed; a shortcut. 
Within the fire service, following desire paths could pose increased danger, as they 
oftentimes require sacrifices of personal safety or allow the person to adopt “tunnel 
vision” to achieve goals, a true fulfillment of production over safety paradigms. 
Endorsing production over safety in the fire service places firefighters at increased risk of 
accepting decreased safety margins in exchange for increased production. 
An additional idea examined in the chapter with relevance to the fire service that 
gives contextual understanding for normalizing deviance is Perrow’s interaction/coupling 
chart (see Figure 5). Perrow placed various high-risk occupations on his chart by gauging 
each vocation’s characteristics as linear or complex, as well as loosely or tightly coupled. 
Although the fire service is not listed in this chart, arguments can be made that the fire 
service is both complex and loosely coupled and can be placed in quadrant 4 of Perrow’s 
chart. The fire service is decidedly more complex than linear, as multiple components are 
operating in concert to achieve multiple goals simultaneously, at various levels of 
leadership. Likewise, the fire service is also loosely coupled. The multiple fire apparatus 
that are interchangeable and replaceable in the event of loss or malfunction within the 
larger incident evidences loose coupling for the fire service. Concurrently, understanding 
that multiple fire apparatus, each composed of three to four firefighters responding to 
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common emergency incidents, underscores the diversified mindsets that arrive and 
rapidly implement a plan. The commonality between fire service members can eventually 
engender a desire to stand out amongst fellow firefighters by performing in a manner 
characterized by words like “brave” or “courageous.” Classical contrasts between “truck 
men” (those assigned to a fire truck who perform actions related to the burning structure) 
and “hose draggers” (those on a fire engine who go inside to fight the fire) materialize in 
an effort for supremacy by performing admirably under austere conditions. Distinctions 
and accolades for being “real firefighters” within fire districts emerge as badges of honor 
bestowed by fellow firefighters. Explanation of Perrow’s chart helps to clarify how the 
fire service is both complex and loosely coupled and how labeling such characteristics 
aids in understanding how such qualities can prompt normalized deviance. 
Likewise, the supposition that structural secrecy can actually nurture budding 
facets of normalized deviance within the fire service is distressing. The fire service and 
its culture provide one of the most proliferative environments for structural secrecy in 
which abnormal behaviors can become embedded. Fire stations are not just places of 
work but is also a place where firefighters prepare and eat meals for others, sleep, and 
relax with other firefighters. As a result of this closeness in social interactions, strong 
social bonds are formed. Relationships born out of such familiarity, coupled with 
mitigating hazardous emergency incidents by a mutual reliance on each other for safety, 
help fashion normative prescriptive behaviors of right and wrong according to the closed 
group. These tight-knit groups can become uncoupled from truly normal and acceptable 
behaviors, susceptible to adopting abnormal behaviors as normal, when operating in 
isolation or under a fire company officer who disregards certain safety practices over 
extended periods of time. Interactions between other firefighters reveal the contrast 
between current understandings of how operations are conducted within their small group 
as opposed to how the majority performs similar tasks. The ability of small workgroups 
to develop normative values that run counter to larger organizational values and 
standards, in part due to the autonomous nature of fire stations, can help encourage 
normalized deviant attitudes to materialize.  
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To remain objective in analyzing either an occupation or specific organization, 
evaluative criteria are developed to remain neutral. Prior to conducting a review of 
particular incidents that may reveal a normalization of deviance; certain biases must be 
acknowledged and addressed. Reviewing past disasters and incidents from the present 
generate what Dekker calls a hindsight bias.198 The term suggests that the investigator 
possesses an almost limitless amount of information about the disaster in both the pre- 
and post-event periods, which gives the examiner a decisive advantage about facts 
leading up to the event, a comprehensive understanding of the totality of the event, as 
well as an understanding of what key players overlooked and what they should have 
done.199 Rankin et al. believe that an examiner having such perfect knowledge about a 
disaster should also be cognizant of the boundaries that should impact commentaries on 
disaster analysis.200 
The evaluative analysis tool that is applied to this project incorporates five 
different groups, each known as a metric category. The five metric categories are 
production over safety, safety, work group dynamics, satisficing, and escalation of 
commitment. Categories contain statements related to key qualities of organizational 
normalization of deviance in high-risk occupations. The analysis tool approaches each 
metric from a qualitative viewpoint, with responses consisting of either yes or no. It is 
noteworthy that two metric categories, production over safety and safety, although they 
share a common safety theme, the production over safety metric seeks to reveal how 
organizational production stress impacts safety paradigms. Scoring for the tool consists of 
a series of yes and no answers that require further analysis to verify current or emergent 
patterns of normalized deviance. The tool is designed to give the examiner general 
answers to overarching themes related to organizational deviance.  
                                                 
198 Sidney W. A. Dekker, “Reconstructing Human Contributions to Accidents: The New View on 
Error and Performance,” Journal of Safety Research 33, no. 3 (2002): 373.  
199 Dekker, “Reconstructing Human Contributions to Accidents: The New View on Error and 
Performance,” 373. 
200 Amy Rankin et al., “Resilience in Everyday Operations: A Framework for Analyzing Adaptations 
in High-risk Work,” Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making 8, no. 1 (2014): 79.  
 60
Moreover, the evaluative analysis tool can be applied to various organizational 
levels. Previous analysis has shown a general disconnect between executive and 
workgroup levels, and perhaps, a utilitarian instrument can assist in breaking down 
organizational barriers if both executive and workgroup members incorporated the tool. 
Viewpoints from both perspectives may provide compelling evidence of normalized 
deviance, as both an insider’s view (workgroup member) and an outsider (executive) 
outlook can be compared for what is actual versus what is perceived within an 
organization. The evaluative analysis tool, shown in Table 1, is provided as follows as a 
reference.  
Table 1.   Evaluative Criteria for Normalized Deviance 
Evaluative Criteria Metric Category 
There is a stated or implied tradeoff of safety measures 
in order to meet production goals. 
Production over Safety 
A “checks and balances” framework has been 
established in high-risk occupations that verify that 
safety procedures are followed. 
Production over Safety 
Work group safety compliance is an active process, with 
complacent safety attitudes properly addressed. 
Safety 
Notification processes exist to alert management of 
unsafe or dangerous operations. 
Safety 
Work group “norms” have been established that are 
contrary to organizational production goals. 
Work Group Dynamics 
Work group “norms” are consistent and measurable to 
industry standards. 
Work Group Dynamics 
Organizational “short cuts” are resultant of 
unauthorized, alternative process altogether, with 
shortcuts being either overtly or covertly practiced. 
Work Group Dynamics 
Work groups strive to find an optimal solution to 
problems, as opposed to an adequate solution to 
operational issues. 
Satisficing 
Criteria exist in which a course of action can be 





In conclusion, this chapter has sought to develop the notion that high-risk 
occupational workgroups advance towards a state of normalized deviance, perchance out 
of exigent circumstances or a perceived need to barter away safety for the sake of 
production. One way of compromising operational standards within high-risk workgroups 
is through adopting a satisficing mindset; however, the exercising of such beliefs does not 
necessarily establish participants as amoral calculators, as the intent does not appear 
malicious, but rather simply a means to an end. Also, strides have been taken to evaluate 
how an escalation of commitment of resources to a failed design (as seen in the NASA’s 
SRB O-Ring flaws) places high-risk organizations on a course to failure by maintaining a 
particular course of action. Finally, evaluative criteria were developed to review 
objectively certain domains of high-risk occupations that are consistent with 
characteristics of organizations associated with a normalization of deviance. 
Implementing the analysis tool towards a vocation known for performing at the edge of 
safety can authenticate whether such organizations in fact are susceptible to normalizing 
deviant behavior or are currently functioning in this social frame of mind.  
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V. THE NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE THROUGHOUT 
THE FIRE SERVICE 
The fire service is not immune to the latent capacity to normalize deviance. It is 
abundant in traditions that permeate through fire departments, from pride in personnel 
moustaches deemed “salty” to the folklore to pushing new fire apparatus into an existing 
station. While the previous actions are harmless and even encourage camaraderie, some 
traditions, such as driving to a fire at reckless speeds or tolerating the circumvention of 
procedures designed to protect firefighters, might actually be encouraged, which permits 
a degenerate safety culture. Implied sanctioning of such actions, and their foundational 
behaviors rooted in social traditions, can bring about organizational normalization of 
deviance in one of the most revered professions.  
Firefighters in the United States acknowledge the hazards that accompany their 
chosen profession, from operating in untenable environments without protective gear to 
entering into violent situations with irate citizens, all with the same state of mind, to bring 
order to a chaotic environment by evaluating the situation and intervening to mitigate an 
incident to an optimal state. Incidents, such as structure fires, require large numbers of 
trained personnel to perform in a coordinated fashion within a compressed timeframe to 
save lives and property, as well as protect the environment. Traditionally, firefighters are 
assigned to a fire apparatus (engine, truck, ambulance, battalion chief, etc.) and are 
collectively called a “company.” Typically, the individuals who comprise a company are 
close-knit, as members live at the fire station the time that they are on duty. Such 
closeness in all situations, whether in cooking meals together to literally rescuing a fellow 
member from a dangerous situation, allows enduring relationships. Hence, fire stations 
become a second home to many who share triumphs and tragedies alike with other 
company members.  
Within a fire service organization, certain companies project an image of 
courageous grit with borderline reckless behaviors all the while justifying actions based 
on outcomes. Within the same organization, companies also exist that adopt a more 
guarded approach to accomplishing tasks, through less ostentatious actions. As a result, 
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an ethos emerges, as well as group identities within a company’s battalion. Both 
companies, despite being in the same fire district, represent distinct cultural differences at 
the group and organizational levels. The greatest contrast between these two kinds of fire 
companies is in their perspective of what promotes a safety culture. 
Despite valiant efforts to promote safety within the fire service, several 
conflicting statistics and safety-related issues suggest that normalized deviance might 
exist in the U.S. fire service. Ronald Siarnicki, the Executive Director of the National 
Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF), stated in a keynote address that around 100 
firefighters per year die in the line of duty.201 This claim is supported by the U.S. Fire 
Administration (USFA) Line of Duty Death (LODD) statistics shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7.  Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths, 1977–2015202 
An unusually elevated number of LODD appear in the 2001 totals, which can be 
attributed to the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001.  
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Fire service organizations in the United States profess that the trained firefighter 
of 2017 operates at a higher level of safety than in years past. Assertions esteem the 
greatness of improved firefighter protective gear (sometimes called turnout or bunker 
gear) that is lighter and allows for greater thermal protection.203 Donning and wearing 
self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) allows today’s firefighter to operate in a toxic 
environment.204 Thermal-imaging cameras (TICs) allow firefighters to literally discover 
a fire’s origin, as well as heat signatures of potential victims through thick, obscuring 
smoke.205 Finally, the individual firefighter receives training on the social framework of 
modern fire ground operations; the ICS, where the solitary firefighter learns the role of 
being a member within a team of teams, understanding its modular fashion, and its use of 
ordinary language.206 In closing, advancements to equip the single firefighter better 
through protective gear, as well as new and improved tools, should correlate to decreased 
firefighter injuries. Yet, a 2015 (NFPA report claims that 29,130 incidents of firefighter 
injuries occurred at the scene of structure fires, which represents 42.8% of the overall 
68,085 total injuries.207 
The idea of “the cost of doing business” demands the lives of approximately 100 
firefighters annually is simply unacceptable. Bruce Tenniswood places firefighting 
progress into perspective when he writes, “We train on safe procedures, we document 
that training, and then we make safety a part of our daily routine. And then we kill or 
injure ourselves at the same rate that we have for the past 30 years!”208 It is therefore 
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arguable that despite advanced and improved protective gear, fire science discoveries, 
and technological advancements, an imperceptible driving force still remains within the 
fire service that can be ascribed to continued injuries. In addition, Houska claims a 
cultural issue of virile mores are resistant to conversion to a safety-centric firefighting 
culture.209 Consequently, defending the customs, traditions, and conduct of fire 
companies or members within fire service organizations attributable to firefighter injuries 
and LODDs can plausibly lead to normalizing deviance.  
Applying the work of Moore-Merrell et al., six specific activities of 
organizational performance in the fire service are examined for conduciveness to 
fostering a normalization of deviance.210 Ash and Smallman, touching on the Moore-
Merrell et al. conclusions, calculated that 44% of all LODDs, in the years studied, were 
attributable to these six issues.211 The execution of these actions places the person, 
company, and the representative organization at risk of an accident, and can denote a 
“cutting of corners” mindset that can bring about a normalized deviant frame of mind. A 
primary activity contemplated is one that is critical to all members of the fire service, and 
in particular, the incident commander, that of decision-making. First responders are 
routinely called upon to render assistance to the public in times of need. With this 
responsibility comes decision-making authority in how to mitigate an incident, but what 
defines “decision-making”? Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco answer this 
question when they wrote, “We define decision making as the selection of one option 
from a set of two or more options.”212 Incident commanders in the fire service engage 
decision-making abilities prior to arriving at the scene of an incident and depend on a 
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host of factors, such as the potential rescue of occupants versus time of day. As an 
example, a fire in an elementary school during the summer months where occupancy 
levels are expected to be at their lowest requires a different decision-making profile than 
a reported fire when school is in session.  
The ability to make fire ground decisions is further constrained by pressures in 
under less than optimal conditions. Launder and Perry refer to research by Klein, 
Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, which reveals that incident commanders routinely 
make 78% of decisions in under a minute.213 Ideally, decision-makers would be 
presented with a range of viable options to mitigate an incident successfully, along with 
an understanding of ramifications, both positive and negative, as well as both short- and 
long-term effects like disruption timeframes that equate to specific monetary loss. 
Unfortunately, the fire ground incident commander has literally seconds to make 
decisions about incidents that experience rapid complexity. Incident COMMAND 
decisions can have far-reaching ramifications, good or bad, which affect citizens, 
firefighters, and themselves, as well as damage to property.  
Compressed timeframes, in conjunction with other relevant factors, can have an 
appreciable effect on formal decision-making abilities and constructs, as Howell’s 
experiments suggest.214 McLennan and Omodei, referring to Orasanu and Connolly’s 
1993 work, entitled The Role of Prepriming in Recognition-Primed Decisionmaking, list 
seven influences on the ability to make real-world judgments: 
 poorly structured problems 
 uncertain, changing environments 
 shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
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 action/feedback loops which link changes in the situation to prior 
decisions 
 time-pressure 
 high stakes 
 decisions being made within a context of organizational rules, 
roles, and norms215 
Hammond et al. suggested that decision-making models fell into two categories, 
analytical and intuitive determinations.216 McLennan et al. would draw similar 
conclusions on this dualistic model.217 Analytical determinations entails a more 
formalized and calculated course of action, based on a more thorough processing of 
information, with an emphasis on maintaining a more rational approach to decision-
making.218 The same authors utilize Khaneman and Tversky’s description of intuitive 
decision-making as more amorphous and borderline unconventional, in that it is devoid 
of analytical approaches.219  
Within the intuitive framework of fire ground decision-making, the concept of the 
recognition-primed decision model (RPDM) emerges. RPDM, as described by Klein, 
Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco highlights the value of identification over the more 
laborious analytical methodology of decision-making when compressed time frames do 
not permit such drawn out thought processes.220 A fascinating revelation by Klein and 
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Calderwood is that veteran fire ground incident commanders counted on their capacity to 
identify circumstances and conditions that would give rise to a strategy and adjust as 
necessary.221 To clarify the thought more, Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco 
writes, “The majority of the decisions were characterized not by option consideration but 
by the FGCs [Fire Ground Commanders] recognizing the situation as an example of 
something they had encountered many times before. In other words, there was evidence 
for a matching process rather than a calculational [sic] process.”222 In summary, Klein 
and his associates argue that fire service incident commanders oftentimes make decisions 
from an RPDM perspective and draw on past experiences and similarities in incidents to 
dictate a particular course of action.  
Fire ground decision-making authority within an organization can have direct 
applicability to ushering in a normalization of deviance in the workplace by making 
decisions that contribute partly to a production over safety mindset. Incident commanders 
fashioning tactics and strategies from the aforementioned RPDM perspective draw 
conclusions about previous incidents of comparable scope and circumstances. Yet, in the 
event that decisions and strategies are inappropriate, the likelihood exists that initial 
actions are deemed to be less than optimal or perhaps dangerous when based on flawed 
previous experience. Actions, such as requesting firefighters perform unsafely or breach 
SOPs to achieve objectives, could result from initially improper requests to begin with. 
Direct orders can be perceived as normal, as commands are coming directly from a 
superior officer. Additionally, a higher-ranking officer who arrives at the incident and 
assumes the incident commander role can change strategies without the consent of the 
previous incident commander. This conflict of strategies can lead to organizational work 
group confusion. It is feasible that workgroups may revert to satisficing to achieve future 
objectives, and thus reinforce a localized social norm, albeit one that is substandard at 
best. 
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A second fire service activity that can take on precepts of normalized deviance is 
a lack of communication. Within the ICS, communications are sent from the INCIDENT 
COMMANDER either directly to the recipient in small incidents, or through an 
operations section, then to branches, divisions, and groups, as depicted in Figure 8. The 
ICS is hierarchical, with members reporting to a single person in their chain of command. 
In environments like those experienced in the fire service, orders from the incident 
commander must be clear and concise. A strong command presence can induce correct 
behavior, while simultaneously reducing workgroup drift by setting clear expectations of 
definitive roles.  
 
Figure 8.  ICS Flowchart223 
Intradepartmental communications are crucial to defend against normalized 
deviance. Roberts, Bea and Bartles speak to the high importance of organization-wide 
communications by reviewing accidents incurred by HROs.224 Reinforcing 
organizational safety expectations through frequent communications instills in employees 
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firm limitations as to what is acceptable safety behavior. In the absence of established 
safety policies or procedures, firefighters might improvise safety measures in lieu of clear 
direction. Organizational safety voids are breeding grounds for organizational drift and 
deviant safety behaviors, as workgroups develop social norms as to what constitutes safe 
performance.  
The next activity considered refers to violations of SOPs or organizational 
procedures. It is clear that violating fire department policies or SOPs could prove 
dangerous to the employee or workgroup. For this reason, the NFPA has created over 300 
standards to assist firefighters in performing in a manner that promotes a best practices 
approach.225 Why would employees however deem that performing unsafely is a rational 
course of action? Zohar and Luria explore the concept of melioration bias, where they 
proclaim, “Melioration bias concerns the tendency to assign greater weight to short-term 
results when choosing among action alternatives, while self-relevant negative-events bias 
concerns the tendency to under-estimate the likelihood of being adversely affected by 
rare negative events (i.e. ‘it will never happen to me’ syndrome).”226 Pessemier alludes to 
the work of Zohar and Luria and adds to the debate by arguing that in the event that the 
hazardous action has a good result, as well as not winding up causing an accident, that 
such conduct is regarded as productive, and actually invigorates such a predisposition.227 
In light of understanding melioration bias, it appears that the allure is for firefighters to 
achieve goals by weighing dichotomous actions by taking the “short path” (and thereby 
disregarding SOPs and policies) that offers a quick result, whereas the “long path” (and 
the safer course of action) results in an anticlimactic conclusion.  
It is important to remember that the social image of firefighters, amongst 
themselves, as well as with the public, is one defined and rooted in courage by setting 
aside personal safety for others, and risk-taking beyond what is reasonable. In this 
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context, a clear tendency exists for firefighters as social groups to promote SOPs and 
policy violations. As a result, supervisors are tasked with enforcing SOPs and when they 
might be viewed as an annoyance, with compliance perceived as an impediment to 
completing important tasks. A classic example of melioration bias in the fire service 
includes not properly wearing all assigned PPE. The research of Kahn et al. revealed that 
firefighters who do not don all their PPE provide justification for doing so, as some claim 
the gear impedes true life-saving actions by hindering movements.228 While PPE 
violations might be thought of as justifiable, coupled with both a successful outcome in 
addition to no firefighter injuries, such apathy towards wearing required PPE can lead to 
deviant and systematized behavior.  
According to the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), injuries that 
occur while at a structure fire, as evidenced by Figure 9, underscore the significance of 
wearing the correct PPE ensemble to minimize or avoid inhalation and toxic smoke 
exposures or thermal burns.  
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Figure 9.  Firefighter Activity at Time of on Duty Injuries229 
A 2004 RAND Corporation report entitled Emergency Responder Injuries and 
Fatalities summarizes data from a 1998 National Fire Incident Reporting System 
(NFIRS) in Figure 10. Color-coded boxes reveal a graded scale of occurrence, from 
highest to lowest. In conclusion, embracing melioration biases, in conjunction with a 
general disdain of fire department SOPs and procedures, can lead workgroups and 
eventually organizations unknowingly to assume an operational mode of normalized 
deviance, as outcomes are producing results minus any negative consequences. 
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Figure 10.  Firefighter Activity and Injury Cause Matrix230 
Next, a normalization of deviance in the fire service can be promoted through 
infractions of protocols. Protocol is defined by the Oxford Living Dictionaries as “The 
accepted or established code of procedure or behaviour [sic] in any group, organization, 
or situation.”231 Fire service organizations routinely establish protocols when strict 
adherence to a task is desired. Moore-Merrell et al. refocus the meaning of protocols by 
announcing that they are an essential element of tactical executions.232 Regrettably, SOP 
and protocol are used interchangeably; however, distinctions do exist.  
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An SOP provides specific instruction about how to complete a task or utilize a 
specific piece of job-related equipment, as well as dictating when not to perform an 
action. Other included aspects might be generalized rules of use, distinct terminology, as 
well as any permitted discretion or latitude in executing the procedure under certain 
circumstances. Protocols, on the other hand, are more rigorous and inflexible. Unlike the 
SOP, which can allow for some adaptability to circumstances, the protocol contains 
uncompromising sets of rules designed to take the operator from the first to last step. In 
the first responder community, protocols are typically prevalent within the emergency 
medical services (EMS) domain, where treatment guidelines related to patient care tend 
to be stringent. Organizational deviance in the fire service through violating SOPs, while 
harmful, may appear innocuous when compared to organizational deviance to protocols. 
Protocols carry the connotation of being intransigent; under no circumstances are they to 
be violated. SOPs, given the conditions are ideal, allow for a manipulation of rules that 
protocols simply prohibit. Therefore, it is in the breach of protocol by actions that have 
been normalized that seems more repulsive and unforgiving.  
An additional factor is the potential for human error, one in which Moore-Merrell 
et al. make clear is the gaffe made by a person, not arising from defective tools or 
unsatisfactory processes.233 For many years, the idea of accident causation was based on 
human error, as well as imagined levels of uncertainty that humans factored into safety 
margins, according to Dekker’s review of James Reason’s theories.234 Modern beliefs 
about accident causation, and particularly how human error factors into the equation, are 
radically different, as human error is seen more as a manifestation of organizational 
problems, and not as a cause.235 [Emphasis added] Barton and Sutcliffe concur with 
Dekker when they wrote that human error occurs at the operational end of an accident 
chain.236 So, how does human error factor into organizational normalization of deviance? 
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To answer this question in regards to the fire service, Moore-Merrell et al. sought 
to find determinants through examining numerous cases of firefighter injuries, with one 
of the leading causes listed as “human error.”237 While injury patterns characterized by 
human error alone may not suggest normalized deviance at an organizational level, such 
lapses in judgment may indicate that those same firefighters committing errors may have 
developed a melioration bias that can lead to work groups drifting into failure, as well as 
influencing other work groups at incidents to do the same. Sheridan, referring to his own 
earlier work on human error exploration, concedes, “Mental workload, emotional stress, 
or physical incapacitation of one kind or another surely contributes to error.”238 Yet, 
Sheridan concludes wrongdoing that is contributable to a human at the operational level 
is not the solitary reason for errors; rather, he ascribes flawed processes, methodologies, 
and leadership at supervisory levels are just as culpable.239  
Moreover, strong, modern counterarguments exist to those that would lay blame 
at the feet of human error. Concerning the fire service, when reflecting on events that 
happened, investigators have the luxury of the full knowledge of events that transpired, 
something that the perpetrators committing the “human error” did not know at the time, 
as their knowledge was finite, what Pruchnicki calls a “local rationality.”240 Possessing 
the firefighters’ facts (as they knew them in the moment of decision), in conjunction with 
a multitude of other factors, known or unknown to the decision-maker, plays upon and 
influences the firefighters’ decision capabilities in an already complex environment, 
which is labeled as “human error.” Elizabeth West makes the argument that complex 
organizations possess the aptitude to achieve objectives that are outside the reach of a 
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single person, in which case the errors of a solitary employee are not relatable to a lone 
actor.241  
The final assertion, a lack of situational awareness, can support an organizational 
normalization of deviance in the fire service. Robert Dubé defines situational awareness 
(SA) as “being aware of everything that’s happening and could happen during your 
arrival on scene, initial and ongoing size-up, operational period and overhaul and rehab 
period.”242 Maintaining a constant SA is exceedingly crucial to employees engaged in 
high-risk occupations, and as Kunadharaju, Smith, and DeJoy call attention to, ordinarily 
takes a “hazard avoidance” posture.243 However, the firefighter, like other first 
responders, responds to what the same authors referred to as “hazard engagement.”244 
Firefighters place themselves into an interventionist role and seek to initiate a sequence 
of events that theoretically has an immediate, positive impact on a deteriorating situation. 
Therefore, SA is a requisite trait for firefighters to draw upon continually, as well as 
something that requires constant training to maintain proficiency. Dubé reports that in 
2006, firefighters documenting near-miss accounts claimed that losing SA was the top 
reason for potential accidents.245  
Forfeiting SA for the firefighter can prove tragic for themselves, other 
firefighters, or perhaps civilians. Actions as simple as opening a door or breaking out 
windows without the SA of how those acts will impact others can dramatically increase 
the negative impact on other fire ground operations. A tragic but classic example of 
losing SA that impacted operations and lives was the Charleston, South Carolina Sofa 
Super Store fire that occurred on June 18, 2007. Nine firefighters died in the structure fire 
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in a commercial building. In the aftermath, an exhaustive study conducted by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) would disclose the following in 
the findings section of a 2011 technical study: 
 During the early stages of the fire (10 minutes to 15 minutes after 
fire department arrived), the heat release rate of the fire in the rear 
of the main showroom was slowed by the lack of air; that is, the 
fire was underventilated. 
 Front windows were broken or vented by the fire department to 
improve visibility. 
 Fire spread extremely rapidly from the rear to the front of the 
showroom as additional air flowed through the broken windows, 
feeding the fire in the rear of the showroom.246 
While the firefighters ventilating the windows were supposedly taking steps to 
assist other firefighters (by creating a path for smoke release through broken windows), 
the action actually had the negative effect of adding air to an underventilated fire in the 
rear of the building. The NIST report’s recommendations section, section 6.3, advocates 
the following: 
Develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be 
implemented during a fire; provide education to fire fighters on the 
science of fire behavior in vented and non-vented structures and how the 
addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the fuel; and 
provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation (vertical, 
horizontal, or positive-pressure) and integrate into daily operations on the 
fire ground.247  
The perpetual loss of SA or “tunnel vision” by firefighters can become 
increasingly problematic as no negative impacts are realized. Dismissing active 
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engagement of SA in seemingly insignificant actions, such as those of lesser degrees of 
imminent danger, may produce a dull and latent response to future, and perhaps more 
precarious situations that require an amplified SA. Porter, Bliss, and Sleet relates a strong 
SA to accident foresight by invoking Reason’s SCM; occurrences are “holes” through 
which negative events penetrate weakened organizational defenses.248 Porter and his 
colleagues also claim [the highest] “Level 3 SA is necessary for people to anticipate the 
holes aligning.”249 When a fire service organizational work group depreciates the value 
of SA by underestimating its value or application in the workplace, by normalizing a 
downplayed attitude, this group’s inability to engage an adequate level of SA properly in 
a hazardous situation becomes potentially life threatening. 
Additional concepts that deserve inquiry as to the normalization of deviance in the 
fire service are the ideas of goal seduction and situation aversion. Goal seduction, 
according to Maglio et al., is a driving force towards dangerous practices at the expense 
of operating safely.250 Classical actions, such as driving excessively over the speed limit, 
as well as reckless driving in general to a fire, can be an example of goal seduction. The 
allure of the goal for firefighters consists of getting to the scene to save people from 
harm.251 The same authors also declare that firefighters are routinely confronted with 
“strong situations,” whereby decision-making actions are impacted by the tensions 
associated with fire ground decisions that influenced those judgments.252 Bearman, 
Paletz, and Orasanu assert that strong situations can induce those making determinations 
by selecting either goal seduction or situation aversion.253  
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On the other hand, situation aversion, as described by Maglio et al., “is motivation 
away from safe behavior.”254 Those employing situation aversion shun safety due to its 
disapproval in social settings like the workplace, as embracing safety can be viewed as 
undesirable.255 Such a motivating factor is relevant in the fire service, as situation 
aversion possibly can prevent a firefighter from acting in a safe manner out of trepidation 
and backlash from other members within workplace social groups.256 Situation aversion 
can feasibly be amplified within an entire workgroup that decides to forego safety, PPE 
usage for example, so as not to appear weak in front of other groups, even though the 
situation and SOPs dictate its use. Whether a person or group using goal seduction or 
situation aversion leverages one over another is still debatable, as Bearman and Bremner 
point out, both may work in unison at times or separately.257 The brief analyses of both 
goal seduction and situation aversion have bearing on organizational deviance in the fire 
service. Strong situations will certainly present themselves to firefighters called upon to 
make critical decisions, and any negative impingement upon thought processes through 
goal seduction or situation aversion constructs can erode safety-centric decision-making.  
Any normalization of deviance within the modern U.S. fire service possibly can 
be initiated from within both organizational and safety cultures that can undermine fire 
departments. Pessemier and England recall the herculean efforts of the collective fire 
service to transform itself, from innovations in tools, tactics, fire apparatus, and PPE, to 
standards that seek to influence and alter firefighter behaviors through a deeper 
understanding and importance of physical fitness and emergency management 
techniques.258 Maybe retired Phoenix Fire Chief Alan Brunacini was correct when he 
stated, “For 200 years, we’ve been providing a service at the expense of those providing a 
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service.”259 In addition, perhaps one of the most salient quotes about the modern fire 
service comes from Houska when he wrote, “The biggest fact to face is that the U.S. fire 
service is a 19th century organization operating in the 21st century, so our priority should 
be strategic reorganization from the bedrock up.”260 To be relevant and successful in the 
modern era, the U.S. fire service must undertake its biggest challenge; that of changing 
the very culture of the fire service to impede the injuries and deaths of more firefighters. 
Change is simply tough and stressful. People usually find change to be somewhat 
painful, so trying to change an entire organization is exponentially more challenging. 
Going a step further, attempting to effect change to cultural beliefs within an organization 
seems to be a monumental task, given that this level of transformation includes 
fundamental behavioral changes in how employees and managers view work itself, as 
well as adjusting to an overall new culture that drives decisions-making and how the 
organization is viewed, both internally and externally, according to Rashid, Sambasivan, 
and Rahman.261 Executing change within an organization consists of three facets: 
“organizational, personal, and technological.”262  
What defines organizational culture? Marcoulides and Heck, recounting Schein’s 
earlier definition, state, “patterns of shared values and beliefs over time which produce 
behavioral norms that are adopted in solving problems.”263 Organizations certainly 
develop unifying beliefs over time that extend deep into an organization to allow certain 
instinctive behaviors to settle in as natural, which aid in defining, shaping, and fortifying 
those cultures. Balthazard, Cooke, and Potter claim that an organization’s function is 
directly associated with the organizational culture to the extent that if a culture of an 
organization refuses to embrace safety, that this refusal may be reflected in 
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counterproductive organizational results.264 It should come as no surprise that business 
culture and business execution are linked, with culture stimulating performance. When 
applying this concept to the fire service organization, as explained by Pessemier and 
England, the culmination of a fire department’s safety culture is one characterized by 
risky behavior as a normal way of doing business.265  
The fire service in the United States, as a high-risk organization, places great 
significance on the safety of its members by advancing the idea of creating a safety 
culture. A declaration of what frames a safety culture, as well as its relationship is 
fundamental to understanding its implications within the fire service. The term “safety 
culture” first appeared in an International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) 
report, in reference to the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident.266 What however defines a 
safety culture? In her PhD dissertation, Freaney applied a safety culture definition by 
Weigmann et al., which states:  
The enduring value and priority placed on and public safety by everyone 
in every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the extent to 
which individuals and groups will commit to personal responsibility for 
safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety concerns, strive 
to actively earn, adapt and modify (both individual and organizational) 
behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a 
manner consistent with these values.267 
This stated definition seems comprehensive from the standpoint that safety culture 
is viewed as existing in a state that is constantly evolving. Cooper addresses this quality 
after reflecting on Pierce’s work, when he claims safety culture is not confined to some 
organizational void; rather, it interacts with and is interacted upon by organizational 
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frameworks and activities at all levels of an organization.268 If this is the case, then 
organizational safety culture can be viewed as collaborating with organizational culture 
and established norms, which makes it unique to that organization with the ability to 
undergo conversions as the organization experiences change. Reason adds to this 
evolving concept of safety culture by expressing that progression is sluggish and 
dependent upon a number of components, such as the temperament of management, prior 
workplace actions, and reactions to work climates.269 Similar to Reason’s understanding 
of persuading factors but speaking in more overarching suppositions about safety culture, 
Pessemier writes, “Safety culture is influenced by psychological, behavioral, and 
situational variables.”270  
As Reason and Pessemier have concluded that safety culture has the ability to be 
shaped by several components within an organization, does a safety culture have 
reciprocal impacts on those interfacing with its visible characteristics, namely safety 
policies, procedures, and guidelines? Unequivocally, the ultimate aim of any 
organizational safety control mechanisms, expressed through organizational policies, etc., 
is the safety of its members. Hence, safety culture is designed to unseat risky behavior 
patterns that drive organizational culture by changing cognitive and operational 
dispositions in personnel, as Pessemier suggests are needed.271 Understandably, 
organizational culture change is challenging for any organization, for as Wiegmann et al. 
point out, employees tend to merge their personal identity with organizational culture to 
the degree that such organizational norms carry over into how people analyze and frame 
their understanding with a correlative result of elevating organizational allegiance.272 
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271 Ibid. 
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Presumably in no other vocation does an inextricable link exist between the individual 
and organizational culture as it does within the first responder community, especially 
with firefighters. This strong affiliation between organizational culture and firefighter 
identity is encapsulated arguably nowhere better than in cinema, where the 1991 movie 
Backdraft has one of its characters, Ronald Bartel, stating, “The funny thing about 
firemen is… Night and day they are always firemen.”273 Thus, Wiegmann’s et al. 
concepts on links between identities immersed in organizational culture seem at home in 
the U.S. fire service. 
What does the framework between organizational culture and identity look like? 
Hatch and Schultz proposed that relationships, reciprocal in flow, exist between 
organizational identities, organizational image (an external component), and 
organizational culture (an internal component).274 Pessemier, in a later article, showed a 
simplified visual of what he termed an “organizational identity dynamics model,” which 
is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Organizational Identity Dynamics Model275 
                                                 
273 “Backdraft,” IMDb, accessed September 19, 2017, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0101393/quotes. 
274 Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz, “Relations between Organizational Culture, Identity and 
Image,” European Journal of Marketing 31, no. 5/6 (1997): 361, http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/ 
pdf/10.1108/eb060636.  
275 Source: Pessemier, “Developing a Safety Culture in the Fire Service,” 11. See Figure 2 entitled 
Organizational Identity Dynamics Model. 
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The model in Figure 11 provides an illustrative view of how organizational 
identity is dependent on both internal, as well as external factors. Culture, as an internal 
organizational aspect, is the collective beliefs shared by employees tied into self-identity, 
as Pessemier argues.276 External to the organization is organizational image, which are 
the views and opinions of the organization by key players.277  
Both organizational and safety cultures serve as the locomotion for organizational 
success. In other words, what the organization believes, as well as how it behaves in 
relation to being safe, can act as determinants in the organization effectually moving 
forward. The fire service has certainly witnessed attempts to advance an organizational 
safety culture, although persistent injuries to firefighters suggest that a normalization of 
deviance might be contending with those efforts. In spite of numerous changes, the fire 
service organizational culture, as well as its safety culture, seems unyielding to authentic 
change. Organizational modification within the fire service will require a reassessment of 
how firefighters view themselves in relation to themselves, other members of the fire 
service, their department, and the public they serve. As long as melioration bias exists to 
reinforce the “it won’t happen to me” mindset of the firefighter, in conjunction with an 
intertwining between organizational identity and organizational culture that is encouraged 
by an external image that promotes risky behavior, an undercurrent of normalized deviant 
behaviors will continue to exist within the fire service culture. 
  
                                                 
276 Pessemier, “Developing a Safety Culture in the Fire Service,” 11. 
277 Ibid. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE DALLAS FIRE RESCUE DEPARTMENT 
FOR POTENTIAL NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE 
The U.S. fire service is composed of both career (paid) and volunteer fire 
departments, with a portion of departments consisting of a combination fire department 
of paid members working together with volunteers. According to a NFPA report, as of 
2015, almost 30% of all U.S. fire departments are career-based.278 The DFRD in Dallas, 
Texas is a career fire department that was formally created on July 4, 1872.279 Currently, 
the DFRD consist of 58 fire stations that protect over 1.3 million citizens in Dallas, 
spread out over 340 square miles, as reported by a 2016 U.S. Census Bureau population 
estimate.280 While the previous chapter discussed the potential for the fire service by and 
large to practice a normalization of deviance, this chapter focuses on the potential of 
organizational deviance solely within the DFRD. A review of internal DFRD documents, 
and additional external, non-departmental publications, is conducted and the results 
analyzed to determine if such literature is ancillary to organizational deviance.  
The DFRD, similar to any other fire department, executes various emergency 
functions based on multiple internal documents known as SOPs and MOPs. The DFRD 
operates under four SOPs and seven MOPs. Two of these SOPs relate to emergency 
response, while the other two SOPs pertain to special operations and aircraft rescue and 
fire fighting (ARFF). The seven MOPs cover both administrative operations and some 
vital emergency procedures that support issues related to emergency response. SOPs and 
MOPs attempt to provide a framework in which employees can effectively operate and 
clarify their roles and responsibilities in various emergency situations.  
                                                 
278 Hylton J. G. Haynes and Gary P. Stein, U.S. Fire Department Profile—2015 (Quincy, MA: 
National Fire Protection Association, 2017), V. See section entitled “The U.S. Fire Department Profile 
through 2015 Fact Sheet.” 
279 “Dallas Fire-Rescue Department,” City of Dallas, accessed September 24, 2017, http://www.dallas 
firerescue.com/leadership_history.html. See A History of the Dallas Fire-Rescue Department. 
280 “Quick Facts: Dallas City, Texas,” United States Census Bureau, accessed September 24, 2017, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/dallascitytexas#viewtop. See under the People and Geography 
sections.  
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The DFRD AAR is an additional internal record designed to provide a 
comprehensive report. The AAR is a formal, written account that provides a more 
thorough and detailed assessment of all facets of an incident to which the DFRD 
responded. According to the DFRD SOP Emergency Response Bureau (ERB), Section 
131.02, completed AARs are forwarded to the assistant chief of the ERB for final review 
and subsequent posting to the DFRD’s internal document system (IDS) for department-
wide analysis.281 The following section, Section 131.03 of the same DFRD ERB SOP, 
clarifies benchmarks by which AARs are mandatory, including: 
 Incidents that are three alarms or greater or present extraordinary 
circumstances. 
 Incidents that require unusual tactics, e.g., high angle rescue, helicopter 
rescue, etc. 
 Incidents involving significant injuries or death of firefighters. 
 Mass casualty incidents 
 Any other incident at the discretion of the incident commander or higher-
ranking officer in the department.282  
A total of 43 DFRD AARs, spanning the years 2011 through August 2017, were 
examined and such criteria as initial arrival conditions, primary actions taken, injuries, 
and areas of improvement were reviewed to name a few. The objective was to classify 
DFRD AARs by expressed areas of improvement by those tasked with finishing the 
report. Concerns were classified into 10 categories, and are depicted by a prepared radar 
graph in Figure 12. A key objective was to identify latent propensities within DFRD 
AARs that suggest organizational drift, and potentially normalization of deviance by 
                                                 
281 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Standard Operating Procedures 100.00 Emergency Response 
Bureau (Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2016). See Section 131.02, Responsibility. Revised 
November 7, 2016. 
282 Ibid. See Section 131.03, Scope.  
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repeatable offenses that are confirmed by the AARs. All 10 domains of the radar graph 
have a common denominator of safety. 
 
Figure 12.  DFRD AAR Areas of Improvement Summary, 2011–2017283 
The most prevalent topic revolved around personnel issues, and is noted in eight 
of the 43 AARs (18.6%). Personnel issues comprise a variety of subtopics, from multiple 
fire apparatus in the same area of the city “riding short” (a DFRD colloquialism where 
less than a full complement of four firefighters, for up to four hours, responds to incidents 
with only three members), to a loss of situational awareness that resulted in a firefighter 
injury, as well as damage to DFRD equipment. Unfortunately, two of the AARs 
examined are in relation to the LODDs of Lieutenant Todd Krodle and Fire Rescue 
Officer William S. Tanksley.  
Despite only one occurrence (2.33%), the “Chemical Exposure/Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) Issue” event noted in Figure 12 is quite significant for a 
number of reasons. First, scenarios involving hazardous materials that have breached 
their containment vessel are rather infrequent and oftentimes make remediation efforts at 
such incidents unsafe and are a complicating element for the incident commander. 
Veritably, a response operation at such a scene increases the risk to firefighters, as the 
                                                 
283 Adapted from Dallas Fire Rescue Department, DFRD AAR Areas of Improvement Summary, 
2011–2017 (Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2017). 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) concludes.284 Occurrences connected 
with hazardous materials can be traditionally classified as low probability/high risk 
events, connoting that these events are uncommon, yet when they do occur, responders, 
civilians, and the environment are subjected to an elevated risk.  
Next, the chemical that the four DFRD firefighters were exposed to in the 
aftermath of a structure fire is granulated chlorine, a dangerous chemical capable of 
causing a buildup of fluid in the lungs, nausea and vomiting, as well as a burning 
sensation of mucous membranes, according to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC).285 What is noteworthy is that the AAR reports that a small room 
containing a known hazardous material, which had been previously identified and pointed 
out, (and had inadvertently spilled its granular chlorine contents) was entered by 
firefighters wearing improper PPE.286 The same report states that one member wore 
structural firefighting gear with a SCBA, while the other three exposed firefighters only 
wore firefighting gear without respiratory protection.287 Shortly thereafter, three 
members not wearing SCBA began experiencing symptoms consistent with chlorine 
exposure, which required transportation to a hospital for evaluation.288  
Given that chlorine was present and visually identified, a quick review of the 
Department of Transportation’s (DOT) emergency response guidebook (ERG), Guide 
124, reveals the following recommended and appropriate guidelines: wear SCBA, use 
chemical protective clothing, and provides a warning that structural firefighting gear 
                                                 
284 U.S. Fire Administration, Risk Management Practices in the Fire Service, FA-166 (Emmitsburg, 
MD: U.S. Fire Administration, 1996), https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-166.pdf.  
285 “Facts about Chlorine,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed September 28, 
2017, https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/chlorine/basics/facts.asp. See immediate signs and symptoms of 
chlorine exposure. 
286 Battalion Chief 07A, After Action Report of Structure Fire at 11611 Dennis Rd. Dallas, Texas 
(Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2016), 9. EMS, under section entitled: “Describe What Went Well 




offers minimal safety.289 The application and proper usage of the ERG is a required skill 
by the Texas Commission on Fire Protection (TCFP) for persons operating at both the 
hazardous materials awareness level, as well as the hazardous materials operations 
level.290 According to the DFRD SOP 205.00, “All Department members who are 
certified firefighters and perform firefighting duties will be trained at the First Responder 
Operations Level during the rookie academy.”291 Likewise, to meet the requirement of 
the U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA CFR, specifically 1910.120(e)(3)(ii), the DFRD 
personnel must receive 24 hours of initial training.292 This federal mandate is supported 
in the DFRD SOPs as well.293 It is unknown whether the incident commander or other 
firefighting companies consulted the DOT ERG as a reference for incidents involving 
hazardous materials. 
As this incident and the remaining AARs suggest, several DFRD workgroups 
have potentially adopted practices that promote a drift towards failure as discussed in 
previous chapters. The aforementioned example indicates that the DFRD workgroup 
compartmentalization of abnormal practices, such as entry into a conceivably hazardous 
or immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) environment without proper PPE can 
have disastrous consequences. It is arguable that the aforementioned instance was due in 
part to adhering to the concept of production over safety. Additionally, the idea of 
                                                 
289 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 2016 Emergency Response Guidebook 
(Washington, DC: United States Department of Transportation, 2016), 186, https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/ 
staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Hazmat/ERG2016.pdf. Under Public Safety section, 
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290 Texas Commission on Fire Protection, Skills Manual, Chapter Six, Hazardous Materials, NFPA 
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Awareness Performance Standards, DOT Emergency Response Guidebook, Skill #1. See Hazardous 
Materials Operations Performance Standards. Analyze, Plan, Implement, and Evaluate Response 
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291 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Department Special Operations Standard 
Operating Procedures (Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2016), 41. See Section 205.00, 
Certification Levels, A.2.a. 
292 “Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response—1910.120,” Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, accessed September 28, 2017, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_ 
document?p_table=standards&p_id=9765. See Initial training at 1910.120(e)(3)(ii).  
293 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Department Special Operations Standard 
Operating Procedures, 41. See Section 205.00, A.2. 
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possible goal seduction related to completing the assigned task of the truck company and 
loss of situational awareness to hazards in the immediate area were not fully appreciated 
and factored into the risk analysis. Only six AARs reported no area of improvement or 
negative aspects related to the incident (13.9%). The audited DFRD AARs have 
presumptively given an honest and possibly unfiltered level of introspection within 
specific DFRD incidents, a cardinal aspect of AARs, according to one of the 16 life 
safety initiatives of the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation’s Everyone Goes Home 
program.294  
A second source of internal DFRD data evaluated for potential confirmation of 
normalized deviance is an Excel database consisting of a list of DFRD on-duty injuries 
spanning the years 2000 through August 2017. The database contains a total of 1,982 
injury claims, which have been sorted into 15 injury types by percentages, represented in 
Figure 13. 
                                                 
294 “After Action Review,” Everyone Goes Home, accessed September 29, 2017, https://www.every 
onegoeshome.com/16-initiatives/13-psychological-support/action-review/. See Life Safety Initiative 
number 13: Psychological Support, subsection After Action Review. 
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Figure 13.  DFRD Injury Data from 2000 through August 2017295 
An examination of the data presented in Figure 13 shows the majority (40%) of 
injuries are due to sprains and strains of either extremity or general muscle strains. 
However, an alarming statistic is located within the second highest category (31%), 
classified as “exposures.” Usage of the term in the context of Figure 13, as well as for 
this discussion, is intended to be all-inclusive, from exposure to dangerous chemicals or 
productions of combustion in smoke from a structure fire, to a paramedic’s exposure to 
an infectious disease.  
Yet, it is a subset of the exposure category, exposure to dangerous or toxic 
materials at fire-related incidents, those outside the scope of emergency medical incident 
exposures, which deserves attention. Figure 14 analyzes assorted hazardous materials that 
DFRD members claim to have been exposed to while responding to emergency incidents. 
A total of 231 claims of smoke and various chemical exposures out of the total 616 total 
exposures account for 37.5% of the total exposures gleaned from the original DFRD 
                                                 
295 Adapted from Jamilia Quaite, email message to author, September 12, 2017. The author created 
the graph in Excel after collecting data from information contained in an Excel file from the Dallas Fire 
Rescue Safety Division. 
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database. The most numerous exposures reported were from asbestos exposures, followed 
by products of smoke produced from a structure fire. Bear in mind that the statistics are 
from those who formally claim exposure to a material, and do not include undisclosed 
exposures, which are arguably happening. In closing, the harmful exposure subsection of 
the greater exposure category is quantifiable and concerning.  
 
Figure 14.  DFRD Smoke and Chemical Exposures296 
An extensive study by Weiss and Miller demonstrated the presence of 
carcinogenic materials (cancer-causing) and toxic gases and substances in the overhaul 
period of a structure fire.297 Overhaul is a term used for the period of time after a fire has 
been extinguished in which firefighters open up void spaces, such as walls and attic 
spaces to search for, and extinguish, small sources of fire or hot embers distributed in the 
                                                 
296 Adapted from Jamilia Quaite, email message to author, September 12, 2017. The author created 
the bar graph after collecting data from information contained in an Excel file from the Dallas Fire Rescue 
Safety Division. It is a further breakdown of occupational exposures to particular products “chemicals and 
products of smoke.”  
297 Deric C. Weiss and Jeff T. Miller, A Study on Chemicals Found in the Overhaul Phase of 
Structure Fires Using Advanced Portable Air Monitoring Available for Chemical Speciation (Salem, OR: 




initial fire attack, as stated in a 2011 Fire Engineering article.298 Weiss and Miller’s 
research confirmed two particularly harmful materials present in post-structure fire 
smoke are the heavy metals arsenic and mercury.299 OSHA has deemed both heavy 
metals to be harmful to humans.300 Supporting this claim of the hazards of contaminants 
in smoke, a 2010 report from Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., Fabian et al. state in the 
executive summary that firefighters are routinely exposed to four classes of respiratory 
poisons classified as: “asphyxiants, irritants, allergens, and carcinogens.”301 Figure 14 
communicates that 59 DFRD employees have reported exposure to smoke and its 
byproducts related to firefighting activities, which may contain similar toxicants, perhaps 
even additional hazardous materials present at unknown levels.  
Thus, can the data from Figures 13 and 14 reveal any detectable levels of 
organizational drift or normalization of deviance? The last several years have revealed 
occult dangers of contaminants in smoke during both initial fire suppression phases and 
the overhaul period, as affirmed by previous scientific studies mentioned. Armed with 
this knowledge, the DFRD SOP 100.00, ERB, seems rather archaic in its approach to 
limiting an employee’s exposure to toxic smoke, when it is written: 
Overhauling: The company officer will determine the degree of protection 
needed to assure the safety of the firefighters during overhaul operations. 
Face shields, goggles, SCBAs, and PASS [Personal Alert Safety System] 
devices will be utilized where warranted. If the company officer allows 
firefighting coats to be removed during overhaul, at the officer’s discretion 
PASS devices will be worn on the member’s belts.302  
                                                 
298 “Overhaul and Extension,” Fire Engineering, accessed October 1, 2017, http://www.fireengineer 
ing.com/articles/2011/01/sheridan-overhaul.html. 
299 Weiss and Miller, A Study on Chemicals Found in the Overhaul Phase of Structure Fires Using 
Advanced Portable Air Monitoring Available for Chemical Speciation, 10. 
300 “Toxic Metals,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration, accessed October 1, 2017, 
https:// 
www.osha.gov/SLTC/metalsheavy/. 
301 Thomas Fabian et al., Firefighter Exposure to Smoke Particulates (Northbrook, IL: Underwriters 
Laboratories, 2010), ii, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/157e/6dc272dba2e5fcc4e77212fca302ab96e28f. 
pdf. See Executive Summary, Introduction.  
302 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Standard Operating Procedures, 100.00 Emergency Response 
Bureau (Dallas: Dallas Fire Fighters Association, 2012), 159, http://dffa.org/docs/100ERB.pdf. Section 
115.00, Personal Protective Attire, subsection Attire at Fire Emergencies, section E, Overhauling.  
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Therefore, the question looms over every incident in which DFRD members are 
exposed to the byproducts of smoke; under what scientific criteria is the DFRD company 
officer making a logical determination to direct members under their command to discard 
both dermal and respiratory levels of protection (emphasis added)? Section A of the same 
DFRD SOP claims that all members will operate with SCBAs and PASS devices in an 
atmosphere “charged with smoke and/or toxic gasses or vapors. SCBA and PASS devices 
will be worn and utilized until the area has been ventilated. The IDLH atmosphere 
completely purged of any toxic gasses, and all possibility of a backdraft explosion 
eliminated.”303  
While such rules exist to protect the firefighter, the 59 smoke exposures 
documented in Figure 14 suggests that some members have adopted an alternative 
threshold whereby they expose themselves to products of combustion through either 
inhaling smoke or toxins or dermally by absorption through the skin. The Texas 
Commission of Fire Protection (TCFP) tracks firefighter exposures to smoke in what it 
terms “smoke-gas inhalation,” and cites a total of 107 exposures from the years 2012–
2015.304 Whether such exposures are isolated to particular workgroups was not disclosed 
in the received informational database. Figure 14 also reveals additional DFRD member 
exposures to other highly dangerous materials, from mercury and lead to ammonium 
nitrate and muriatic acid. At the least, organizational drift towards failure seems 
unmistakable due to an inordinate number of documented cases where members have 
presumably bypassed SOPs that exist for their safety.  
The next set of internal documents examined for normalized deviance is the 
DFRD MOPs. As stated earlier, the DFRD conducts daily operations, both emergency 
and non-emergency responsibilities, using seven MOPs: 
 MOP 200.00—Administration 
                                                 
303 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Standard Operating Procedures, 100.00 Emergency Response 
Bureau. See Attire at Fire Emergencies, subsection A, Structure fires.  
304 Texas Commission on Fire Protection, Texas Commission on Fire Protection Injury Report, 
January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015 (Austin, TX: Texas Commission on Fire Protection, 2015), 8, 
http://www.tcfp.texas.gov/injuries/TCFP_Injury_Report_2015.pdf. See Table 6, Types of Injury, 2012–
2015. 
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 MOP 300.00—Department Operations 
 MOP 400.00—Pay and Personnel 
 MOP 500.00—Internal Investigations and Discipline 
 MOP 600.00—Emergency Response Procedures 
 MOP 700.00—Code of Conduct 
 MOP 800.00—Vehicles, Facilities, and Equipment  
An exhaustive inquiry into each of the seven DFRD MOPs has revealed no 
empirical evidence of normalized deviance constructed into any procedures or policies. 
However, it is conceivable that individual members, or perhaps a small group of 
individuals, have violated one or more of the MOPs for reasons unknown to other 
members of the DFRD or available in the public record. In essence, the reviewed MOPs 
seem to encourage proper procedural adherence strongly, which is consistent with 
foundational documents of the fire service, such as NFPA standards.  
Any semblance of organizational drift or perceived misdeed could stem from 
within the DFRD MOP 600.00, Emergency Response Procedures, particularly Section 
607.00—Respiratory Protection Program. DFRD members assigned to an emergency 
apparatus (engine, truck, rescue (ambulance), or battalion chief vehicle to name a few) 
are required to perform a daily operational check of their SCBA upon placing their 
firefighting gear on their assigned spot on the apparatus. The SCBA is an integral 
component of the firefighter’s PPE, as it provides the highest level of respiratory 
protection to the user. The procedure for performing the daily inspection and operational 
check is also outlined in a 13-step process in section 607.00.305 Additionally, each 
member must complete a DFRD Form 136, officially titled Daily Inspection Checklist-
Form 136. Form 136 is a paper-based form with a duplicate copy that also lists the 13-
                                                 
305 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Manual of Procedure 600.00 Emergency 
Response Procedures (Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2012). See Section 607.00, Subsection C, 
Daily Inspection “Item Numbers”—DFR Form 136. 
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step process to ensure that all steps are completed. After all steps have been physically 
performed and successfully passed, members complete the form by placing their 
signature in the signature column. Forms have 31 spaces, one for each corresponding day 
of the month in which the form is completed.  
The end of month procedures for Form 136, which applies to both station and 
company officers (those person(s) in charge of the apparatus), are also listed in Section 
607.00.306 The MOP states that the responsibility for authenticating the proper 
completion of the daily operational checks (Form 136) for all SCBAs falls to the 
previously mentioned supervisors, stating, “No date will be left without an entry.”307 In 
the event that incomplete documentation on a previous and specific date is discovered, 
what is the company officer or station officer to do? To send in partially completed 
official DFRD forms, such as Form 136, is unacceptable according to the aforementioned 
statement about deficient documentation. Is the officer to complete the form, which 
constitutes a clear violation of the City of Dallas personnel rules, which states, 
“Dishonesty is exemplified by, but is not limited to, the following violations: cheating, 
forging, or willful falsification of official city reports or records”?308 It is understandable 
the predicament in which supervisors would find themselves. Incomplete documentation 
discovered on a DFRD Form can cause people to complete the document, so as not to 
violate the DFRD MOP concerning the intolerance of forms with deficient information. 
Completing Form 136 by falsifying a city document can be viewed as a normalized 
deviance within the established DFRD MOP, as completion of the form can be viewed as 
compulsory. 
A fourth source of DFRD internal information is the SOPs. DFRD operations are 
managed under four SOPs listed as follows: 
 SOP 100.00 Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) 
                                                 
306 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Manual of Procedure 600.00 Emergency 
Response Procedures. See Section B, subsection 3.b.  
307 Ibid. 
308 City of Dallas, City of Dallas Personnel Rules 2015 (Dallas: City of Dallas, 2015), 34. See Article 
V., Rules of Conduct, section 34–36, Rules of Conduct, 8, B. 
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 SOP Emergency Medical Service (EMS) 
 SOP Emergency Response Bureau (ERB) 
 SOP Special Operations (SPOPS) 
Much like the MOPs considered previously, a thorough search concluded that the 
concepts and ideas found in the DFRD SOPs appear consistent with fire service related 
standards of the NFPA and other agencies that routinely weigh in on firefighter safety. 
The SOPs appear to be free of any divergent policies or procedures that are inconsistent 
with best practices. Nonetheless, it is plausible that individual members and workgroups 
may possibly circumvent these established SOPs and conduct emergency operations 
within the idea of organizational drift that may lead to a confined normalization of 
deviance in the workplace, such as a fire station. However, it is the conclusion that the 
DFRD SOPs are faithful to the overarching concepts of fire ground operations, including 
emergency medical services, emergency response, special operations, and aircraft rescue 
and firefighting.  
The following section exclusively considers documents and other sources of 
information that fire departments, such as DFRD adhere to, yet are external to the 
organization, and seeks to clarify possibly embedded concepts of normalized deviance 
along with potential infractions of these documents by DFRD personnel. Two objectives 
are considered in light of auditing external information sources. First, are fire service 
related organizations, those that offer guidance through standards, laws, and best 
practices, considering the principles of organizational drift and normalization of 
deviance, resulting in becoming an agent of change, reflected in their respective 
contributions to firefighter safety? Secondly, have DFRD members or workgroups (such 
as an entire engine or truck company) disregarded external, organizational-guiding 
axioms, and what effect, if any, did such actions have on an incident? 
The first source material to be examined is the TCFP Fire Department Safety 
Officer Certification Curriculum Manual. Under “Qualifications of the Incident Safety 
Officer”, section 1002-4.5, a section discusses the disposition of filling such a position on 
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the fire ground.309 The subsection discusses the necessity of an ISO to comprehend 
varying feelings that firefighters may have concerning their work, along with leveraging 
the ISO’s abilities to frame a healthy, safety-centric mindset and philosophy among 
firefighters.310 The section appears to support an idea of not merely a commitment to 
operating safely, but to a deeper meaning of incorporating safety into all aspects of 
emergency response by modifying behaviors that drive actions. Likewise, another section 
of the same manual encourages the ISO to maintain a “cyclic thinking” strategy, where 
decisions and observable actions are continuously undergoing an assessment process that 
seeks to support perpetual situational awareness.311 Finally, the ISO is heavily involved 
with the post-incident analysis (PIA) from a safety viewpoint, and is required to 
contribute and submit written documentation stating safety issues discovered at the 
emergency incident, which are presented in a constructive fashion.312 To a degree, the 
ISO position in this document is perceived to act almost as an intercessor between the 
firefighters who are about to commit an unsafe act, or through a loss of situational 
awareness, have placed themselves in a risky situation, in which case the ISO has 
intervened prior to an accident. In closing, the TCFP Fire Department Safety Officer 
Curriculum Manual seems to epitomize certain aspects of preventing organizational drift 
into failure, and eventually, accepting deviant behaviors as normal. 
A second external source for review is the 2014 DFRD Safety Officer Student 
Manual presented through a PowerPoint presentation made available from the Fire 
Department Safety Officers Association. The slide section for Chapter 11 contains a 
section called “Traps,” where one of the mentioned traps of ISOs is becoming “The 
Bunker Cop,” who spends an unreasonable amount of time worried about PPE, which 
prevents the ISO from seeing the broader view of the incident, as well as creating 
                                                 
309 Texas Commission on Fire Protection, Fire Department Safety Officer, NFPA 1521, 2012 Edition, 
Certification Curriculum Manual (Austin, TX: Texas Commission on Fire Protection, 2012), 3. See section 
1002-4.5.2, subsection 4-Incident Safety Officer Attitude, a–f. 
310 Texas Commission on Fire Protection, Fire Department Safety Officer, NFPA 1521, 2012 Edition, 
Certification Curriculum Manual, 3. See section 1002-4.5.2, subsection 4-Incident Safety Officer Attitude, 
a–f. 
311 Ibid., 13. See Section 1002-6.1.5, subsection 2.e, Cyclic Thinking. 
312 Ibid., 39–40. See Section 1002-6.7, Post-Incident Analysis. subsections 1002.6.7.1-1002-6.7.2. 
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firefighter animosity.313 This position seems to be easygoing on the finer points of safety 
(PPE compliance), while focusing on more global incident safety issues. Although an 
ISO should concentrate on larger safety issues concerning emergency incidents, the 
position must adopt an exhaustive perspective of safety, one that includes reminders 
about PPE compliance. While the presentation slide seems to suggest against adopting 
such a restricted role, the previously noted 231 smoke and chemical exposures by DFRD 
members makes the enforcement of PPE conformity an invaluable aspect. Indubitably, it 
seems that an ISO enforcing proper PPE usage may theoretically save members from 
specific physical injuries, as well as perform in a catalyst role, which fortifies acceptable 
behaviors towards safety concepts in emergency situations.  
Another outside source, and a truly indispensable book, is the 6th edition of the 
textbook Essentials of Firefighting. The book is used by the DFRD Training Academy as 
the foundational text for preparing recruits to transition into firefighters. The first chapter 
introduces the recruit to the annals of firefighting, as well as the culture of the fire 
service. As culture relates to organizational deviance, the text discusses what is termed 
“cultural challenges.”314 One of the conflicts listed discusses the various personalities 
and viewpoints between young and old firefighters coupled with the idea that similar 
temperaments are embraced by like-minded persons, while those holding opposing views 
are oftentimes unwelcome, which causes outsiders to sometimes attempt to act unsafely 
to impress those of a particular group.315 Chapter two of the text warns firefighters-in-
training about the dangers of exposure to toxicants, such as smoke and other harmful 
chemical compounds or gases encountered in firefighting incidents, and admonishes the 
reader to wear appropriate respiratory protection.316 A comprehensive review of the 
textbook, focusing on both firefighter and safety cultures, seems to advance the notion 
that the firefighting culture is undergoing a radical transformation, despite the concession 
                                                 
313 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, “Dallas Fire Rescue Department Safety Officer Training Manual” 
(PowerPoint presentation, Dallas, TX, March 2014), ch. 11, slide number 318.  
314 IFSTA, Essentials of Firefighting, 6th ed. (Stillwater, OK: Fire Protection Publications, 2013), 18, 
ch. 1. 
315 Ibid., 19. 
316 Ibid., 50. 
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that since 2001, close to 100 firefighters die each year as a result of firefighting, with tens 
of thousands of injuries annually.317 In conclusion, the Essentials of Firefighting 
textbook used by DFRD acknowledges continual shortcomings of the fire service, while 
simultaneously attempting to portray the culture of the fire service as one striving to 
improve its culture on many fronts. 
The next document appears on www.everyonegoeshome.com, which is actually a 
website devoted to practically every facet of firefighter safety, from advancing the idea of 
cultural change in the fire service, technological advancements that promote firefighter 
safety, to psychological assistance to cope with the mental pressures that accompany 
unspeakable tragedies that firefighters face on a routine basis. The 16 firefighter life 
safety initiatives were created after a 2004 convention devoted to addressing pragmatic 
reforms within the fire service, and is established by the National Fallen Firefighter 
Foundation, (www.firehero.org) an entity created by the U.S. Congress.318 The first life 
safety initiative is considered an anchor point on which the remaining 15 initiatives 
hinge, listed as “cultural change.”319 The initiative states, “Define and advocate the need 
for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, 
management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.” This introductory 
initiative includes a sobering statement that is truly nascent, “Within the context of 
Everyone Goes Home© and the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, no advocacy point 
carries more importance than the need to change the culture of safety from within.”320 So 
much significance is placed on transformational change in the fire service culture that a 
U.S. Fire Administration report underscores the significance of the first initiative by 
                                                 
317 IFSTA, Essentials of Firefighting, 47. See Table 2.1 Firefighter Fatalities and Injuries Recorded 
between 2001–2010. 
318 “16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives,” Everyone Goes Home, accessed September 26, 2017, 
https://www.everyonegoeshome.com/16-initiatives/. See About Us; “National Fallen Firefighters 
Foundation,” National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, accessed October 4, 2017, https://www.firehero.org/. 
See About Us. 




declaring that devoid of an appreciation of the fire service culture, whatever ground 
gained in the other 15 initiatives is non-viable and non-feasible.321 
A thorough review of the Everyone Goes Home website exhibits practically no 
organizational normalization of deviance or condoning of organizational drift. 
Conversely, the website, and its many training aids actually seem to amplify efforts that 
support genuine fire service cultural change that curtails deviant behavior patterns from 
the individual, company, and organizational levels. One example is found in the AAR 
section that stresses the relevance of conducting AARs after each emergency incident, 
regardless of incident complexity or size, emphasizing that firefighters sometimes die at 
the “ordinary call.”322 Under Initiative 9, Fatality, Near Miss Investigation, a link to a 
study of the city of Flint firefighter injuries at vacant buildings revealed that “Fire 
incidents at buildings that were found vacant and unsecured upon firefighter arrival 
caused by far the most injuries, most lost hours, and highest cost.”323 Minimizing injuries 
to Flint firefighters prompted a search of other fire department SOPs, including the Fire 
Department of New York (FDNY), whose abandoned structure policy states, “Members 
must psychologically adjust to a “no rush” approach. In these buildings, the life hazard is 
to the firefighter. A slower, more cautious operation is definitely indicated.”324  
Such tactics and fire ground strategies obviously seek to induce behavior 
modification towards fire ground operations against vacant structures. These adjustments 
help to fulfill Initiative 9 by lowering near miss incidents by enhancing critical thinking 
skills. An example of selecting a fire ground action based on a thorough risk assessment 
at vacant structure fires is discussed in the Flint vacant injury study as a fulfillment of the 
NFPA standard 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health 
                                                 
321 U.S. Fire Administration, National Safety Culture Change Initiative: Study of Behavioral 
Motivation on Reduction of Risk-Taking Behaviors in the Fire and Emergency Service, Report FA-342 
(Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire Administration, 2015), 3, introduction, https://www.usfa.fema.gov/down 
loads/pdf/publications/fa_342.pdf. 
322 “After Action Review (AAR),” Everyone Goes Home, accessed October 4, 2017, https://www. 
everyonegoeshome.com/training/action-review-aar/. 
323 “Initiative 9: Documentation Archives,” Everyone Goes Home, accessed October 4, 2017, 
https://www.everyonegoeshome.com/resource-area/initiative-9-documentation/page/8/. 8 of 9, Links 
section, Vacant Structure Fires & Firefighter Injuries, 
324 Ibid. See Section 8: Vacant Building S.O.P.s at Other Fire Departments. 
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Program.325 The NFPA 1500 standard specifically states, “No risk to the safety of 
members shall be acceptable when there is no possibility to save lives or property.”326 
Such alterations in cognition can actively suppress organizational deviance by 
consciously selecting a suitable alternative. 
The following section seeks to look into specific examples within the DFRD that 
describes the culture of some individuals operating within a localized workgroup, as 
viewed through the lenses of organizational drift and the normalization of deviance. The 
purpose of reviewing such incidents in their aftermath is to gain an understanding of the 
internal work culture of the DFRD, how such groups process information, and ultimately 
make sense of how such knowledge leads to specific actions. Moreover, are these actions 
reasonable and justifiable in light of DFRD policies, external standards, and local, state, 
and federal regulations? Finally, have “lessons learned” from previous events influenced 
current decision-making paradigms for future incidents? In effect, has the DFRD 
genuinely recognized the subtle impacts that organizational drift or an actual 
normalization of deviance has on its organizational culture?  
The first illustration studied is the degree of employee safety at emergency 
incidents within the DFRD. The first instance involves the LODD of Second Driver 
Stanley Wilson, which occurred while conducting firefighting activities at a 4-alarm 
structure fire in the early morning hours of May 20, 2013 in Dallas, Texas. Second Driver 
Wilson died as a result of injuries sustained by a structural collapse of a second floor 
walkway (and maybe the third floor) while searching individual apartments for victims 
with another firefighter in the main building on fire, according to a report by the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).327 Second Driver Wilson likely 
understood the risk associated with structure fires, as his over 28 years of career 
                                                 
325 Everyone Goes Home, “Initiative 9: Documentation Archives,” Section 6: NFPA 1500.  
326 “NFPA 1500: Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety, Health, and Wellness Program,” 
National Fire Protection Association, 28, accessed September 12, 2017, http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-
standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=1500. See section 8.3.2(3). 
327 National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality Investigation 
and Prevention Program, A Summary of a NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career Fire Fighter 
Killed by Structure Collapse While Conducting Interior Search for Occupants Following 4th Alarm-Texas, 
Report #F2013-17 (Washington, DC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014), i, https://www. 
cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face201317.pdf. See Executive Summary. 
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firefighting experience with the DFRD had taught him. Although, the NIOSH report 
questions whether anybody should have been in the building that would eventually 
collapse, given the defensive mode of operation in which the DFRD incident commander 
was working.328  
One of the fire ground strategies utilized by fire departments is to take a defensive 
posture. As reported in a FireRescue1 article, defensive tactics are incorporated when the 
danger is too great to send firefighters inside the structure, due to increased collapse 
potential, which requires the placement of fire trucks with piped waterways (called a 
master stream) that can be raised to discharge water from an elevated position from a safe 
distance to protect surrounding buildings from catching fire.329 Figure 15 shows an 
elevated master stream in operation at the fire where Stanley Wilson died. To put the 
power of a master stream into perspective, a master stream flowing water at 1,000 gallons 
per minute adds 8,330 pounds per minute to the total weight of a burning structure.330 
The respective NIOSH reports for Stanley Wilson’s LODD fire states on page 20 that 
seven master streams were operating at the time T53 entered the building.331 Calculations 
show a potential total discharge of 58,310 pounds of water per minute, which equates to 
slightly over 29 tons of water per minute. To commit firefighters to a building being 
assaulted by both a large volume of fire and large water streams reveals a conflict of 
overall strategies between defensive and offensive profiles, of which the NIOSH 
investigators allude to in their fourth recommendation concerning the communication of 
                                                 
328 National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality Investigation 
and Prevention Program, A Summary of a NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career Fire Fighter 
Killed by Structure Collapse While Conducting Interior Search for Occupants Following 4th Alarm-Texas, 
20. The NIOSH report states that when T53 began a primary search of the fire building, other firefighters 
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329 “Fire Tactic: Offensive vs. Defensive Fire Attack,” FireRescue1, accessed October 4, 2017, 
https:// 
www.firerescue1.com/firefighter-training/articles/499269-Fire-tactic-offensive-vs-defensive-fire-attack/.  
330 National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality Investigation 
and Prevention Program, A Summary of a NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career Fire Fighter 
Killed by Structure Collapse While Conducting Interior Search for Occupants Following 4th Alarm-Texas, 
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331 Ibid., 20. 
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current operational strategies, from the incident commander down the chain of command 
to the firefighter. 
 
Figure 15.  Elevated Master Stream in Operation on May 20, 2013332 
A second mode of attack is known as an offensive mode of operation, based on an 
article describing this approach.333 This strategy is perhaps the most familiar to the non-
firefighter, and describes actions where firefighters in protective gear, including a SCBA, 
utilize fire hoses of various diameters and make an aggressive attack into the interior of a 
structure with the intent of discharging water onto the “seat of the fire.” This tactic is 
used primarily when firefighters receive reports of persons trapped inside and need to be 
rescued by conducting a search to find persons under austere conditions, or the intent to 
save the structure itself from succumbing to the fire. In context of the fire in which 
Stanley Wilson perished, his apparatus, Truck 53, was conducting a search of the 
                                                 
332 Source: National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality 
Investigation and Prevention Program, A Summary of a NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career 
Fire Fighter Killed by Structure Collapse While Conducting Interior Search for Occupants Following 4th 
Alarm-Texas, 14. Photo courtesy of Dallas Fire Rescue Department. 
333 FireRescue1, “Fire Tactic: Offensive vs. Defensive Fire Attack.”  
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building on fire (an offensive tactic) while defensive operations were underway (multiple 
master streams actively deployed). As stated earlier, merging both offensive and 
defensive tactics is extremely hazardous, as firefighters are potentially operating in a 
building that for all intents and purposes has been written off, demonstrated by master 
streams protecting nearby buildings exposed to the main fire building. The incident 
commander initiates the offensive tactic when a possibility exists to save both lives and 
property, even though it exposes firefighters to a greater degree of danger by working 
inside a burning structure. 
The fire that claimed the life of Stanley Wilson, according to the two NIOSH 
investigators filing their report, stemmed principally from multiple failures of the DFRD 
incident command to apply proven leadership principles at the incident scene, from its 
initial stages up until the structural collapse and immediate “mayday” called by Stanley 
Wilson’s partner who was assisting in the search.334 Key recommendations expressly 
stated in the NIOSH report that address incident command issues and areas of 
improvement at the Stanley Wilson fatality fire incident are the following: 
 Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that the incident 
commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of 
director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-
fighting efforts. 
 Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that the incident 
commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident 
scene before interior fire-fighting operations begin. 
 Recommendation #4: Fire departments should develop, implement and 
enforce clear procedures for operational modes. Changes in modes must 
be coordinated between the incident command, the command staff and fire 
fighters. 
                                                 
334 National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality Investigation 
and Prevention Program, A Summary of a NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career Fire Fighter 
Killed by Structure Collapse While Conducting Interior Search for Occupants Following 4th Alarm-Texas, 
ii. See Key Recommendations. 
 108
 Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure the pre-designated 
ISO assumes that role upon arrival on the fireground. 
 Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that pre-determined 
assignments are assumed and staffed.335 
The incident commander at the fire, Deputy Chief Bobby Ross, possessed more 
than 30 years of fire service experience. The NIOSH LODD report, Report # F2013-17, 
dated November 25, 2014, reveals that “The Incident Commander (IC) had more than 30 
years of experience and training on topics including Incident Command System 100-400, 
Incident Safety Officer, instructional techniques for company officers, and National 
Incident Management System NIMS 701-704.”336 Although the NIOSH report asserts 
that Deputy Chief Ross has achieved several fire service accomplishments, including a 
state certification for ISO, a review of public records located on the Texas Commission 
on Fire Protection’s website, (http://www.tcfp.texas.gov/certification/certification_verifi 
cation_4.asp) reveals that Deputy Chief Ross was issued the ISO certification 10 days 
after the Stanley Wilson LODD fire.337 An internally initiated DFRD investigation report 
lists the incident commander as Deputy Chief Bobby Ross.338 This same report goes on 
to state that 806 (DFRD Division 1 Deputy Chief’s radio call sign) did not give an 
updated “size-up,” (a verbal report of current conditions of the fire and a brief progress 
report), nor did he assume command (as incident commander) at the fire.339 
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Actions and inactions by those fulfilling the incident commander role at the fire 
where Stanley Wilson perished should be deeply concerning from an organizational drift 
perspective, and possibly showing normalized deviance. The deputy chief who would 
become the incident commander failed to follow basic tenets of the ICS, as well as 
violating several components of DFRD’s MOPs volumes 600 and 700, including:  
 “The Deputy Chief will give a verbal size-up upon arrival.”340 
 “Prevent members from exposure to unnecessary danger while on 
duty.”341 
 “Any action that places any person in greater danger than is 
necessary for the proper performance of duties.”342 
In light of the LODD of Second Driver Stanley Wilson, concepts related to strong 
organizational drift emerge. First, the concept of Reason’s Swiss cheese model, where 
organizational defenses are the slices of cheese, and the “holes” are weaknesses within 
those defenses, through which hazards progress until an accident occurs is evident in this 
incident. Massive fire ground confusion, coupled with a lack of adherence to basic 
principles of the ICS, as well as DFRD MOPs, and competing strategies (offensive and 
defensive strategies and tactics), led to an error (sending T53 crew into a hazardous 
environment) that passed through organizational defenses and caused a fatal accident. 
Also, contributing to the confusion was the delay in assigning an ISO, one of the most 
dynamic defenses to fire ground accidents.  
The next example of normalized deviance within the DFRD concerns compliance 
with required standards related to PPE available to firefighters, specifically what is 
known as a “N95 mask.” The N95 mask is a particle type respirator that offers a level of 
respiratory protection against commonly encountered infectious diseases that can be 
                                                 
340 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Manual of Procedure 600.00 Emergency 
Response Procedures. See Section 601.03, subsection E, Size-up. 
341 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, DFRD Manual of Procedures 700.00 Code of Conduct (Dallas: 
Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2012). See Section 709.16, subsection Officers and Supervisors. 
342 Ibid. See Section 710.02, Dereliction of Duty, Subsection C. 
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inhaled by first responders by filtering particles in the environment. An example of such 
diseases includes measles, tuberculosis and meningitis amongst others.343 Since the N95 
mask is a type of respirator, a federal requirement mandates that the employee using the 
N95 mask is indeed wearing the correct size mask, which is validated by a process known 
as fit testing. This section explores the degree that the DFRD is compliant with fit testing 
guidelines, and whether current levels of conformity suggest an organizational level of 
deviance. 
Firefighters in the DFRD do not just fight fires; they respond to other calls for 
help when citizens are experiencing numerous forms of medical emergencies, from chest 
pain to seizures, as well as trauma caused from motor vehicle accidents or falls. On 
certain occasions, incidents involve patients with infectious diseases who have the 
capability to transmit infected respiratory droplets from patients to first responders by 
sneezing or coughing. In those cases, it is highly advisable that the DFRD members take 
respiratory precautions by donning a particulate filtering type mask as an additional layer 
of protection coupled with the standard disposable examination gloves worn. The N95 
mask is available for DFRD members to order in three sizes (small, medium, and large) 
for field use under the DFRD IDS EMS supply order page. Yet, a perplexing question 
still exists, which size N95 mask is a DFRD member supposed to use and what process 
assists the member in making an educated determination so that the best fit is obtained? 
Certainly, with several diverse facial types, it is reasonable to think that a “one size fits 
all” approach is incongruent as an acceptable practice. A picture of the Moldex® N95 
mask is shown as a reference in Figure 16. 
                                                 
343 “Infectious Diseases—A to Z List,” State of Rhode Island, Department of Health, accessed 
October 5, 2017, http://www.health.ri.gov/diseases/infectious/. 
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Figure 16.  Moldex N95 Particulate Respirator344 
A thorough search of all seven DFRD MOPs and four SOPs produced zero results 
that mentioned any standardized or mandated process to ensure that DFRD members 
follow a procedure to obtain either a best or proper fit for the N95 particulate mask. In the 
absence of a DFRD policy to guide members into some semblance of compliance, what 
are acceptable actions on the part of the DFRD members? In the event that members of 
the DFRD were exposed to an infectious disease, those members and their supervisors are 
required to complete documentation to record the event for investigative and potential 
worker’s compensation purposes. Documentation consists of various internal DFRD 
documents, including: 
 Dallas Fire Department Form 362: Employee Injury Investigation Form 
 City of Dallas Supervisor’s Injury Investigation Report Form RM1A 
 DFR Form #356 Dallas Fire-Rescue Communicable Disease Notification 
Form 
The required documentation at no time asks if the exposed members used 
properly sized PPE. Therefore, is it through conjecture and assumptions that members are 
always in compliance with DFRD policies regarding PPE usage, particularly the N95 
mask?  
OSHA has definitively answered the question regarding what constitutes the 
procedure to be followed for proper sizing of an N95 mask through one of its standards, 
                                                 
344 Source: “Moldex® 1500 N95 Series,” Moldex, accessed August 16, 2017, http://www.moldex. 
com/non-product/niosh-ratings/1500.php. 1500 N95 Healthcare Particulate Respirator and Surgical Mask. 
Shown is 1513 N95-Large.  
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Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR), Standard 1910.134.345 The OSHA 
standard demands, “before an employee may be required to use any respirator with a 
negative or positive-pressure tight-fitting facepiece, the employee must be fit tested with 
the same make, model, style, and size of respirator that will be used.”346 Again, a 
complete search was conducted of DFRD’s SOPs and MOPs, particularly MOP 600.00, 
subsection 607.00, which describes the tenets of the DFRD respiratory protection 
program.347 Bolstering the argument for N95 fit testing is the manufacturer’s restrictions 
of using the product (N95 mask) itself. Moldex® is the current supplier of N95 masks for 
the DFRD. The two-page fitting instructions contained within the box of N95 masks 
warns the users that the product must be fit tested in accordance with the OSHA 
1910.134 standard discussed earlier.348  
Moreover, the DFRD has been reminded of the need to come into compliance 
with OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 as it relates to N95 fit testing as far back as late October 
2014, partly in response to the first documented case of Ebola diagnosed in Dallas, Texas 
in September 2014.349 Two healthcare workers treating this initial diagnosed patient 
would contract the virus as well.350 In light of the growing Ebola case in Dallas, Texas, 
coupled with the confirmed transmission of the virus to two healthcare workers, a DFRD 
member appeared to have reservations concerning DFRD’s non-compliance with N95 fit 
testing, as the employee seemed to equate non-compliance with increased risk to the 
DFRD employee tasked with wearing a non-tested component of PPE. The DFRD 
                                                 
345 “Respiratory Protection—1910.134,” Occupational Safety and Health Administration, accessed 
April 20, 2017, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_ 
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346 Ibid. 
347 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Chapter 6 MOP 600.00 (Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 
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africa/united-states-imported-case.html. See date of September 30, 2014. 
350 Ibid. See dates October 10 and October 15, 2014. 
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member’s concern is evidenced by redacted emails sent from the DFRD member to the 
chain of command, and is seen in Figure 17 (slides 1–3). 
 
 
Figure 17.  Redacted Email from DFRD Member to DFRD Chain of Command351 
                                                 
351 Source: DFRD Member to DFRD Chain of Command, redacted email message to author, January 
2, 2015. 
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Logical conclusions can be drawn from the above argument that the DFRD is 
potentially derelict in complying with a federal regulation connected with occupational 
safety in the workplace, as it pertains to normalization of deviance within the DFRD. 
Recalling the conclusions of Starbuck and Milliken concerning organizational deviance, 
the authors claim, “Organizations often interpret past successes as evidencing their 
competence and the adequacy of their procedures, and so they try to lock their behaviours 
[sic] into existing patterns.”352 At face value, the current versions of DFRD’s MOPs and 
SOPs in reference to OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 seem deficient in its present state, in 
conjunction with a DFRD member’s petition to DFRD leadership to protect its members 
by observing current laws. The current stalemate between compliance and non-
compliance, with current DFRD policies suggesting non-compliance, hints at an 
organizational level of approval with the status quo; a surreal rejection that the 
organization exists in an incubation period of near misses, where DFRD members don 
non-tested masks in potentially infectious atmospheres, perhaps in truly lethal 
environments like Ebola, with an accident waiting to happen. 
A final illustration of latent organizational drift and deviance within the DFRD 
lies within its special operations division, and in particular, the DFRD’s urban search and 
rescue (USAR) team, known as Texas Task Force-2 (TTF-2). TTF-2 is designated as a 
Type I task force under the National Incident Management System (NIMS) typing 
system, consisting of a 70-person team with six specialized areas.353 The specific 
instance chosen to demonstrate the mentioned concepts was a response to a natural 
disaster that occurred on December 26, 2015 in Garland, Texas, a city contiguous to the 
city of Dallas, Texas. Issues related to emergency response and operational safety at an 
emergency incident would reveal a mindset presumably driven by an acknowledgement 
of safety in name only, and not in practice. An assessment of transpired events in the 
aftermath of the response could be viewed as confirmed normalization of deviance within 
                                                 
352 Starbuck and Milliken, “Challenger,” 319. 
353 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Typed Resource Definitions, Search and Rescue 
Resources, FEMA 508-8 (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2005), 36, 
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TTF-2, as official responses to noted critiques seemed to be met with justifications that 
failed to address the overall safety of TTF-2’s most valuable asset, its members.  
Multiple tornadoes touched down in the Garland area on a balmy December night, 
killing a total of 13 people, and causing massive structural damage to several residential 
neighborhoods, a large apartment complex, and a nearby trailer park. Garland emergency 
response leadership leveraged the capabilities of TTF-2, and a request was issued for 
their assistance in conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations in some of the hardest 
hit areas. TTF-2 maintains a fleet of heterogeneous apparatus designed to meet the 
operational needs of the various workgroups within the task force, from vehicles 
equipped to carry canine units, to flatbed trailers with portable generators and personnel 
tents constructed on site to act as a base of operations. One of those vehicles is the 
hazardous materials (HazMat) vehicle, which contains PPE, equipment in which to 
conduct decontamination operations, along with various monitors that take atmospheric 
readings of the air in a potentially hazardous area to determine the safety of task force 
members and those being rescued. All the equipment is assigned in a ready state at a 
location on the west side of Dallas in a secured location.  
When TTF-2 is activated and deploys, its members are required to report to this 
pre-incident staging location to check out and load equipment that is on chargers, or 
needs loading upon activation orders. The equipment travels in a convoy style 
arrangement to the incident location, and returns as well. On the activation in December 
2015, somehow the HazMat vehicle was loaded up but never left the staging location, and 
thus, all the necessary equipment was unavailable to the task force. TTF-2 is staffed with 
10 HazMat technicians, who have specific roles on the task force, according to the 
national Urban Search and Rescue Response System’s Concept of Operations, Annex B: 
 Two HazMat team managers to provide safety to SAR operations by 
conducting and assessing atmospheric monitoring readings to ensure the 
safety of the task force. 
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 Two HazMat specialists who are attached to reconnaissance teams, as well 
as structural triage engineers who provide constant atmospheric 
monitoring for hazards. 
 Four HazMat specialists with one assigned to each of the four rescue 
squads to provide atmospheric monitoring for hazards.  
 Two HazMat specialists to establish and maintain decontaminations 
operations in a safe area.354 
Without the HazMat vehicle, the HazMat technicians are unable to perform 
atmospheric air monitoring of potentially hazardous atmospheres, conduct 
decontamination operations, or truly act in a role to provide safety parameters or 
recommendations in which the other task force members operate. Depriving the HazMat 
technicians of the capability to monitor the surrounding atmosphere and conduct 
decontamination, by leaving vital and necessary equipment, goes against the very mission 
of USAR operations in a contaminated environment.355 In the Garland tornado incident, 
the HazMmat technicians who responded to the scene did so without any of their 
equipment; tools crucial to keeping the task force, survivors, and others in the area safe 
from hidden or unknown hazards in collapsed structures. 
After TTF-2 had completed their assignments of searching partially or completely 
destroyed buildings, a DFRD memorandum was drafted by one of the HazMat team 
managers who responded in the waning moments of the incident. The internal 
memorandum spoke to the inherent dangers of continuing SAR operations in the absence 
of HazMat specialists to monitor the air quality of collapsed structures prior to SAR 
teams entering the structures to look for survivors. The content of the letter suggests an 
indifference towards the HazMat component of TTF-2, by those in TTF-2 leadership. The 
memorandum also seeks to defend its position based on the concept of operations 
                                                 
354 National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, Concept of Operations Annex B-US&R 
Operations in a Contaminated Environment (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2013), 4. See Section 1–6, Staffing. 
355 Ibid., 1. See Section 1–2, Mission.  
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document referred to earlier as a foundational document through which task force 
operations can be viewed as dangerous, as no qualification or quantification of hazards 
can be determined without HazMat monitors. The memorandum is shown in Figure 20 in 
six slides. 
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Slide 6 of 6. 
Figure 18.  Urban Search and Rescue Operations Safety Concerns356 
The memorandum is rather direct and seems to endeavor to reinforce the purpose 
of HazMat specialists and HazMat managers on TTF-2, which is to keep the task force 
members safe by verifying that the operating environment is safe, and provide a 
continuous and consistent presence in the event that conditions deteriorate. From an 
organizational drift and normalized deviance perspective, the memorandum seems to 
                                                 
356 Source: Texas Task Force 2 Hazmat Manager to Texas Task Force 2 Program Manager, redacted 
email message to author, January 9, 2016. 
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imply the idea of “production over safety” as normal in this incident, by entering 
structures that may possibly contain hazards, such as ruptured natural gas lines and task 
force members putting themselves at increased risk without monitors to verify the 
absence (or presence) of HazMat. The concept of operations iterates multiple times that 
the security and safety of task force personnel is of paramount importance.357 
Furthermore, and as the memorandum speaks to, was the designated safety officer, and 
the task force leader, advised of the HazMat vehicle not being located on site, and under 
what pretext can the safety officer, in good conscience, send task force members into 
possibly hazardous structures without air monitoring? Overall, the memorandum 
appeared to reinforce the concept of operations for USAR operations in a contaminated 
environment particularly related to keeping the task force safe as a local workgroup. 
The response to the HazMat manager’s memorandum from the DFRD’s USAR 
program manager offers insight into the operational mindset of how critiques are 
accepted and processed, despite the criticism coming from a fellow task force member. 
The reply listed eight deployment issues that had a bearing on the eventual exclusion of 
the HazMat vehicle from the equipment convoy. Yet, the last point perhaps is significant. 
The last issue states, “There is a general lack of understanding of the concept of 
operations for US&R operations in potential hazardous materials environments. Some of 
this is due to the fact that the majority of our training has focused on rescue operations 
and search operations.”358 This rebuttal clarifies the position of HazMat operations and 
concerns within TTF-2; namely, that other operations take precedence and priority in 
training over HazMat operations, and how these operations, based on keeping all 
members safe, are not given a higher ranking. It is therefore understandable that since 
HazMat concerns receive a lower priority in training that these transfer over to actual 
deployments, to the increased jeopardy of all task force members. 
In summary, numerous documents and published materials related to the fire 
service culture have been investigated to determine if the materials functioned in either 
                                                 
357 National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, Concept of Operations Annex B-US&R 
Operations in a Contaminated Environment, 2. See Section 1–5, Assumptions. 
358 Program Manager, “Response Memo—US&R Safety Concerns” (official memorandum, Dallas: 
Texas Task Force-2, February 3, 2016), 2, no. 8. 
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antagonist or protagonist roles as it corresponds to organizational drift or normalization 
of deviance within the DFRD. Starting with a review of the DFRD after action reports 
(AARs), research suggests a possible organizational drift exhibited through common 
errors noted in AARs. A second DFRD internal source of information is an injury 
database that ranked injuries into 15 classes, with an expanded discussion on exposures to 
potentially harmful products that pointed to a lackadaisical use of protective gear. Next, a 
review of both the DFRD’s MOPs and SOPs was conducted to search for any normalized 
deviance in the procedures.  
Next, an analysis of documents outside of the DFRD was conducted to probe for 
similar characteristics. The first two sources canvassed concern the integral role of the 
ISO position, and the manuals used for training DFRD personnel. The next item is the 
textbook used by the DFRD in its training of new recruits. A following source involved 
reviewing the Everyone Goes Home website, which is profoundly influential to fire 
department safety programs, including the DFRD. The final section of the chapter seeks 
to show through specific examples in the DFRD’s history how organizational drift and 
potentially normalized workgroup deviance factored into decision-making that placed 
DFRD members in eminent danger or possibly were a contributing factor in a DFRD 
LODD. Whereas many vocations seek to circumvent risk in the workplace, firefighters 
and other first responders, including police officers and EMS workers, actually seek to 
locate and interact with the hazards to diminish their impact on the situation. Members of 
the DFRD respond to emergency situations guided and dependent on both internal and 
external documents that help craft and define components of response frameworks, which 
are theoretically devoid of subtle influences of processes that seek to promote 
organizational drift or normalized deviance.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
FIRE SERVICE REGARDING THE NORMALIZATION OF 
DEVIANCE 
Every strike brings me closer to the next home run. 
~ Babe Ruth 
 
In light of the previous chapters that have examined root causes of organizational 
drift that lead to a normalization of deviance within the fire service, and specifically the 
DFRD, this chapter develops conclusions based on the data provided in earlier chapters. 
Additionally, three specific policy recommendations are presented that fundamentally 
seek to impede or altogether avert the damage that such phenomena can have on the fire 
service. The conclusions drawn from the research are intended to reveal the complex 
nature of the problem facing the modern fire service in general, and are likely present in 
all fire service organizations to one degree or another. Firefighting agencies committed to 
protecting its employees, as well as maintaining a respectable level of organizational 
health, are indubitably introspective as a matter of self-preservation. The following 
conclusions are designed to reveal the current state of organizational attitudes that 
pervade the U.S. fire service. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
(1) Conclusion Number 1 
“Near-miss” reporting, as a self-evaluative method, has been generally 
undervalued by organizations from its ability to gauge resiliency effectiveness, as well as 
prevent future incidents or accidents, and its underreporting deprives organizations like 
the U.S. fire service of learning opportunities.  
In the hierarchy of accident causation as described in Chapter III, near misses are 
an antecedent to an incident in which organizations can learn from events, as well as 
personnel actions and reactions that lead up to the near miss, yet are hardly reported as no 
actual injury occurred. Since the near miss incurs no loss to the employee (through injury 
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time or financial loss through medical expenses) or organizational loss (like equipment), 
any lessons learned by the employee remain localized. The true value in a near miss event 
is realized when the facts surrounding the event are shared on a global scale, so that those 
in similar situations in the future can be cognizant of action sequences and their potential 
outcomes. Likewise, the near miss offers a trial run of organizational resiliency 
frameworks, without experiencing an actual loss from employee injuries, as well as 
financial or materiel damage. In light of the negative implications that a near miss should 
reveal to an organization, the overall effect should be seen as an educational experience 
that is capitalized on. Organizations whose members operate in dangerous atmospheres, 
such as firefighters, can gain tremendous value from near miss events, as areas such as 
situational awareness, decision-making paradigms, and judgment parameters can be 
reconciled with other firefighters.  
(2) Conclusion Number 2 
Production goals and safety measures are antagonist agents against one another, 
which compromise the employee, as well as the establishment of irrational societal norms 
cultivated within the local workgroup.  
Organizations are enterprises that meet needs through the offering of goods or 
services to consumers. While the safety of the employees should be of paramount 
importance to the organization, the businesses must produce their products, which can 
expose their employees to ever-changing levels of risk. This project has investigated how 
production pressures within organizations can induce personnel to cut corners in regards 
to performing safely to produce at a certain level. This concept was exemplified in the 6-
page memorandum found in Chapter VI where members of TTF-2 entered compromised 
structures without safety checks by personnel to achieve tactical goals. The overarching 
idea expressed in the production over safety argument is that management signals to 
produce can be misconstrued or decoded as sanctioned behavior as no adverse effects 
were encountered while cutting corners. 
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(3) Conclusion Number 3 
The U.S. fire service culture has consistently proven ineffectual at modifying its 
safety culture, as evidenced by persistent annual casualty rates, due in part to a lack of 
SA.  
While the U.S. fire service produces a modern firefighter who integrates 
technology and science into decision-making algorithms, the fact remains that firefighters 
are still encountering LODD, in part due to a loss of SA. A specific instance where SA 
was lost, leading to a LODD, was in the example of DFRD second driver Stanley Wilson. 
Recalling that case, the IC clearly lost SA early in the incident by becoming involved in 
fire-fighting efforts, as well as allowing a building search while operating in a defensive 
mindset, both of which were indicated in the NIOSH LODD report.359 The theory of goal 
seduction may possibly also be a contributing factor to loss of SA, and interplays with the 
production over safety concept discussed earlier. 
(4) Conclusion Number 4 
The assessed documents reveal that the DFRD engages in organizational drift and 
possibly practices a normalization of deviance within isolated workgroups. 
The information concerning the DFRD in Chapter VI offers a glimpse into 
specific operations from a pragmatic point of view, and is not intended to describe all 
DFRD operations. The intent is to bring to light instances where the organizational drift 
towards failure was clearly displayed. Additionally, a normalization of deviance does 
appear to occur within the EMS division, where perpetual non-compliance with the CFR 
regarding respiratory standards remains, which endangers employees by failing to adhere 
to a standard designed to protect personnel. Whether individual fire companies, housed at 
fire stations throughout the city of Dallas, are practicing normalized deviance in response 
to emergency incidents is unfounded, and outside the scope of this project. 
                                                 
359 National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Firefighter Fatality Investigation 
and Prevention Program, A Summary of a NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation, Career Fire Fighter 
Killed by Structure Collapse While Conducting Interior Search for Occupants Following 4th Alarm-Texas, 
ii. See Key Recommendations. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following three recommendations are devised to ameliorate both manifest and 
latent root causes of organizational drift and normalized deviance in the DFRD. While 
recommendations are offered namely to the DFRD, broad application to the fire service 
in general is possible and aspires to provide a simplified roadmap that disrupts 
organizational drift and arrests patterns conducive to normalized deviance. The 
recommendations are also sequential as arranged to reveal a developmental strategy for 
potential implementation. The first recommendation speaks to motivating the fire service 
to embrace the principles of resilience engineering (RE) that performs as a cornerstone of 
high-reliability organizations (HROs). Next is a strong suggestion to develop and 
implement a local “near miss reporting system,” so that regional near miss event 
information can be captured, evaluated, and processed for the copious lessons that exist 
in such instances. Finally, the last recommendation describes a process by which local 
fire service organizations like the DFRD can initiate the process of collecting post-
incident safety data from more everyday incidents, much like the AARs in the aftermath 
of large-scale events. In conclusion, the recommendations suggest that the fire service 
thoroughly leverage the components of HROs to its advantage and then to offer two 
regional methods to seize data and ultimately to maximize the information for 
organizational safety advantages. 
(1) Recommendation Number 1 
The DFRD should appropriate components of HROs through elements of RE into 
its operational constructs and overall accident prevention planning frameworks in 
furtherance of measurable organizational safety.  
This first recommendation for the DFRD is not so much the application of an 
original idea, but rather the resurrection and tactical execution of dormant characteristics 
of HROs. Therefore conjecturally, the DFRD suffers from an identity crisis, one in which 
it does not realize its potential abilities. Roberts Bea, and Bartles describe three ways in 
which HROs can become more dependable as an organization, (1) vigorously discover 
what an organization does not understand, (2) structure a cost/benefit model that reminds 
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personnel of the toll of failure compared against the gains of organizational stability, and 
(3) continuously advise employees of organizational game plans through lateral 
communications, as well as their specific roles within the plan that are conveyed 
horizontally between members.360 As stated earlier, the capacity to perform these 
indispensable measures already lies within the DFRD in dormancy. Therefore, the 
guidance is to devise a written strategic plan, within a defined timeframe, that clearly 
defines and articulates the processes that will achieve the three methods for improvement. 
Allocating internal DFRD resources to such ends maximizes the effectiveness of the 
workforce and allows knowledgeable employees to uncover weaknesses within their 
normal environments, foster a cross-pollination of ideas and thoughts, breakdown 
interagency cultural barriers that stifle growth, and promote a silo effect within 
organizations.  
The DFRD could benefit from a slightly different perspective about the elemental 
components of HROs, but clearly in unison with the Roberts Bea, and Bartles’ article that 
consists of four conclusions offered by Rochlin, La Porte, and Roberts. The conclusions 
of Rochlin La Porte, and Roberts concerning HROs promote: (1) The mandate of safety 
from organizational leadership is vital, (2) redundancy as an essential component, (3) 
reliance on a distributed employee network to handle some arduous cases with authority 
actively as organizational values have been instilled, and (4) organizational 
enlightenment through experimentation with lesser effects to preclude greater threats in 
the future.361 Slight differences in findings primarily include the need for redundancy and 
a more expanded view of decentralization and its overall effect on a system. The DFRD 
to a degree is a decentralized organization that empowers the IC with decision-making 
authority at incident scenes.362 The concept of redundancy is also somewhat established 
                                                 
360 Roberts, Bea, and Bartles, “Must Accidents Happen?” 71. 
361 Gene I. Rochlin, Todd R. La Porte, and Karlene H. Roberts, “The Self-Designing High-Reliability 
Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea,” Naval War College Review 51, no. 3 (Summer 
1998): 98.  
362 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Manual of Procedure 600.00 Emergency 
Response Procedures. See Section 601.01 and 601.02, Incident Commander. 
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through the completion of DFRD fire apparatus “fill-ins” in resource-depleted areas when 
other fire-fighting equipment is utilized at larger incidents.363 
Next, the DFRD can benefit from within its own ranks by engaging the principles 
found in RE. Hollnagel seeks to reclaim what has been a general misapplication of the 
term “resilience” in an organizational context when he writes, “RE has from the very 
beginning maintained that resilience is a characteristic of how a system performs, not a 
quality that the system as such has or possesses. Resilience is functional and not 
structural.”364 Such disparity of terms is critical to understanding the role that resilience 
plays in preventing normalized deviance, as resilience is essentially a measurable 
performance metric that can gauge the robustness of an organization quantitatively, as 
opposed to a semi-qualitative understanding that claims possession is equal to 
effectiveness. Dekker et al. agrees with Hollnagel in redefining resilience to take on a 
positive connotation, whereby resilience defines what is good about organizational 
skillsets and their flexibility in stressful situations, as opposed to eliminating adverse 
events.365 Such efforts actively seek to prevent accidents from happening.  
Unfortunately, accidents will occur, and oftentimes organizations concentrate 
exclusively on what went wrong as the foundation of accident causation. Besides, an 
awareness of what went wrong aids investigators into promoting actions that seek to 
prevent future and similar episodes. An orthodox risk matrix, provided by Hollnagel, is 
shown in Figure 19. 
                                                 
363 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Dallas Fire Rescue Department Emergency Response Bureau 
Standard Operating Procedures (Dallas: Dallas Fire Rescue Department, 2016). See Section 100.11.B, 
Category B Box-Radio Communications/Response Anomalies. 
364 Erik Hollnagel, “RAG-The Resilience Analysis Grid,” in Resilience Engineering in Practice: A 
Guidebook (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 275, Introduction.  
365 Dekker et al., Resilience Engineering, 3, Executive Summary. 
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Figure 19.  Traditional Risk Matrix Model366 
In this model, the degree of risk is dependent upon two variables, consequence on 
the vertical axis, and probability on the horizontal axis. It is upon this influential model 
that many organizations base their prescriptive risk models for operating in potentially 
hazardous environments. Those whose risk is deemed to be in the extreme or even high 
categories tend to be avoided at all cost, and therefore safer alternatives are opted for to 
achieve tactical goals. Any increase in either consequence or probability theoretically 
pushes the boundaries of safety into undesirable realms of risk.  
A limiting factor in using such a model, one indicated by Hollnagel, is that this 
model solely considers errors in incidents.367 Therefore, this begs the question of when 
does an organization routinely examine what it does right? To bolster this point, 
Hollnagel adds, “It is furthermore reasonable to expect that things normally will go right, 
that they will turn out as planned or intended, and that it is unusual for things to go 
wrong.”368 Without a doubt, organizations experience more things that go right than 
wrong, yet how much time is spent studying how and why things go right in 
                                                 
366 Source: Erik Hollnagel, “Prologue: The Scope of Resilience Engineering,” in Resilience 
Engineering in Practice: A Guidebook (Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), xxx, 
http://www.itn.liu.se/mit/education/courses/tnfl05-risk-och-olycksanalys/vecka-49/1.308926/Hollnagel 




organizations? (Emphasis added) Hollnagel also notes that people historically revert to 
habituation, where people cease to notice the item or action that they have grown 
accustomed to sensing or seeing. Continuing in the theme of organizational reviews of 
what goes according to plan requires the application of an altered risk matrix model, one 
in which the consequence domain is expanded to consider positive results. For this 
reason, Hollnagel submits a more detailed matrix in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20.  Hollnagel’s Revised Risk Matrix369 
This updated matrix seems to reflect the reality more accurately in which most 
organizations including the fire service operates, experiencing normal outcomes. 
Leveraging this revised type of risk matrix may prove beneficial for organizational 
leadership to understand Recommendation 2. The DFRD can potentially interrupt 
organizational drift and normalized deviance through a revival of the components of both 
HROs and RE. 
(2) Recommendation Number 2 
The DFRD should institute a localized structure of the national “near miss 
reporting system,” to collect anonymous data to be applied to identifying trends, 
                                                 
369 Source: Hollnagel, “Prologue: The Scope of Resilience Engineering,” in Resilience Engineering in 
Practice: A Guidebook, xxx. The figure was originally entitled “Range of Outcomes.” 
 133
executing training, and providing educational opportunities driven by data native to the 
DFRD.  
Firefighters place themselves in dangerous situations to rescue persons or save 
property from the destructive forces of fire or other hazards. It is conceivable that some 
encounters will produce a near miss, when a firefighter come close to suffering an injury, 
but does not. While an unknown number of these near misses go unreported, since no 
injury occurred, the firefighters’ experience (how they reacted, conditions leading up to 
the event, etc.) is lost as a teachable moment for others who might experience very 
similar conditions at some point in the future. However, steps are being taken to quantify 
the problem and scope the size of common issues through nameless self-reporting 
websites like www.firefighternearmiss.com. Perhaps, many near misses go unreported 
potentially due to a lack of understanding that such incidents hold tremendous 
educational value to making the fire service safer. The aforementioned referenced 
website started in 2005 and claimed to have documented over 5,000 near miss reports, 
according to its 2016 annual report.370 While the website tracks generic statistical 
information, such as service area (urban or rural, for example), the website currently has 
no means to bring such information down to a local level, where information particular to 
an organization can be reviewed by its leadership.  
Having said that, the same website took strides to remedy the localized issue in 
2017 by providing a customizable program that allows data to become localized and 
organization-specific, known as the Insight 360 Event Reporting Tool.371 It is possible 
however, that the DFRD may be able to create its own internal NMRF for use within its 
IDS. A customizable NMRF can plausibly produce several positive results for the DFRD. 
First, the form can be tailored to obtain information that may be specifically plaguing the 
organization, with input from within the DFRD itself. Next, a localized form can be 
received and processed in a more expedient fashion than those forms filtered through a 
                                                 
370 National Firefighter near Miss Program, 2016 Firefighter near Miss Annual Report (Fairfax, VA: 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2016), 2, http://firereports.nationalnearmiss.org/Portals/2/Easy 
DNNNewsDocuments/Annual%20Reports/2016%20Firefighter%20Near%20Miss%20Annual%20Report.p
df. See About the Program.  
371 Ibid., 14. See the New Resources and Updates section.  
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national collection platform, which decreases the time from reporting to 
acknowledgement. Finally, implementing the NMRF can serve as a local example to 
other fire service jurisdictions of the commitment to safety and the strides that the DFRD 
is willing to undergo, which can influence local partners, as well as enter into a tangible 
partnership of member safety. 
While the NMRF can take several shapes, Figure 21 is an example of a possible 
primary template to be incorporated. An inspection of this NMRF reveals that the form is 
submitted anonymously. The promise of anonymity affords the member completing the 
form a measure of relief from retaliation for reporting near misses that reveal violations 
of procedures. Obviously, instituting this form requires a policy to outline its scope, 
purpose, design, and limitations. Training of members to complete the form properly 
should be conducted to introduce the program formally to all DFRD members, as well as 
an understanding of how received data will be used. It is suggested that either quarterly or 
semi-annual reports revealing aggregate data and common themes be produced and 
distributed. Such information can serve to drive future in-service training sessions that 
reinforce correct procedures that accurately address received NMRFs. 
 135
 
Figure 21.  DFRD Near-Miss Reporting Form  
(3) Recommendation Number 3 
Given the tremendous value of an AAR as a debriefing mechanism, the DFRD 
should seek to increase the frequency of documenting AARs on routine incidents that can 
be shared collectively for the benefit of all members. 
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A key component for fire service personnel in the immediate aftermath of an 
incident is to discuss their actions casually amongst other firefighters, which is then 
formally reported in a written AAR. The AAR provides an official, written account of 
events that occurred at the scene of an incident, including initial actions, as well as 
accountability and areas that need improvement. While DFRD SOPs dictate when the 
completion of an AAR is mandatory, no constraint exists in the same SOP to prevent an 
IC from voluntarily completing an AAR. In fact, the creation of an AAR is always at the 
discretion of the IC.372 The recommendation seeks to increase the frequency of formal 
AAR reporting procedures to obtain increased data concerning firefighter efforts at 
routine incidents.  
For those incidents in which an AAR is required, the DFRD provides a five-page 
AAR template for ICs to use in achieving consistency in reporting.373 A review of the 
form seems too lengthy for the routine incident, and is impractical to complete in a timely 
manner for those involved in emergency response. However, an abbreviated version of 
the AAR can still prove beneficial by collecting and recording pertinent information from 
ordinary emergency runs. Figure 22 provides an abbreviated, two-page AAR that 
attempts to document crucial data. The purpose of the required information is intended to 
collect vital DFRD member actions within the bulk of everyday emergency responses. 
Unlike the NMRF, this condensed AAR is required information that is completed by the 
IC and is not confidential. Whether this abridged AAR is placed on a DFRD apparatus 
mobile data computer (MDC) for completion while still on scene is the decision of 
DFRD’s leadership. It does seem logical to have the mobile capability to complete the 
forms at the incident scene.  
                                                 
372 Dallas Fire Rescue Department, Standard Operating Procedures 100.00 Emergency Response 
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Figure 22.  After Action Report  
 138
Integrating the AAR into daily operations throughout the DFRD should ideally be 
implemented in a phased-in approach after appropriate training and policy that clarify and 
define the reasoning behind such changes. It is suggested that all companies required to 
complete the forms begin with a small number of required forms to complete per shift, 
such as one third of all incidents. With time and increased proficiency in completing the 
forms, the percentage of required documentation increases until 100% of incidents are 
documented. The timeframe should be clearly defined with target dates for total 
implementation expressly given. Information in completed forms can be extrapolated to 
discover common occurrences of negative issues for further evaluation and potential 
training modules at a later date. Future iterations of the form, for increased brevity or 
wholesale changes to the form, should be strongly considered as needed. 
It can be acknowledged that the three recommendations offered may be met with 
noticeable resistance from DFRD members. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that 
discharging the NMRF and AAR programs are expected to generate a financial cost by 
way of personnel to process received information and computer equipment to process and 
securely store acquired data. Furthermore, it is understood that such implementations 
may have ramifications for appointed officials in the event that widespread instances of 
near misses reflect unfavorably on the confidence levels of DFRD emergency personnel. 
Assuredly, exuberant levels of safety infractions, coupled with documentation attesting to 
that fact, may almost necessitate a written plan of action to ameliorate both the frequency 
and severity of infractions and near misses. This plan of action should include a timeline 
in which to achieve a quantifiable level of reduced notifications through NMRF reporting 
and other instituted control measures to gauge the impact and effectiveness. 
Hesitation in form completion by DFRD members may pose an initial problem for 
using the NMRF for fear of reprisal, despite policy implementation that communicates 
otherwise. Simultaneously, it is plausible that the submission of these same forms may 
possibly reveal a lackadaisical attitude towards safety in general, which can be rampant 
throughout the organization. The result of near miss reporting may close the gap between 
what an organization thinks is happening as opposed to what is actually occurring within 
its ranks. Information gleaned from NMRFs could prove invaluable in future injury 
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prevention efforts. Measuring the cost between a member’s satisfactions with the status 
quo about safety and preventing a member’s accident, where the potential for loss of life 
exists, is still a worthwhile enterprise. In the event that only one recommendation can be 
chosen for implementation, the NMRF recommendation provides the most immediate 
increase in functional knowledge that has the ability to drive changes in behaviors. 
Raising near miss awareness and serial reporting as a constructive necessity within fire 
service organizations through NMRF instruments or other accounting methodologies will 
be paramount in determining whether those same organizations can adopt emerging data 
sources to their advantage.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is strongly recommended that future research into the normalization of deviance 
within the fire service be considered. Particularly, further examination may include a 
more in-depth and detailed exploration of how accumulated data from high-risk 
occupations can be gathered, evaluated, and leveraged to pinpoint further normalized 
deviance within workgroups. For the fire service, the concept of collecting aggregate data 
on near misses for analysis and educational purposes is still in its infancy. Additionally, a 
comparative review between the traditional risk matrix model and Hollnagel’s revised 
risk matrix model may prove beneficial for organizations by improving the sensemaking 
capabilities for its members engaged in events resulting in near misses. Such a 
philosophy would certainly be predicated on the role that RE tenets play in the modern 
fire service. If the persistent trends of annual firefighter fatalities are to be decreased to a 
perceptible degree, the fire service culture must be examined for dysfunctional behaviors 
that have classically been acknowledged as mainstream thought that has been potentially 
naturalized into a firefighter’s decision-making skillset.  
This thesis aspires to support firefighters by assisting their entire organizations 
through identifying behaviors antithetical to fostering best practices. It is understandable 
that the ideas contained in this thesis may possibly present themselves as revolutionary or 
too lofty for some. Yet, consider the words of Machiavelli, when he writes,  
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Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which 
yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of 
their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by 
their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so 
high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.374 
The phrase “caring, serving, and protecting” is written on the side of all front line 
emergency response vehicles in the DFRD fleet. While firefighters are committed to this 
motto for the citizenry served, an internal commitment to care, serve, and protect the first 
responder should be discoverable in actions and attitudes throughout dynamic fire service 
organizations. The trajectory of this thesis, much like the archer’s arrow, is to reach its 
intended target through aiming for a higher understanding of the fire service culture. 
                                                 
374 Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Electronics Classics Series, trans. W. K. Marriott (State College, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 28–29.  
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